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Part I
Introduction of the Research
Questions

Chapter 1
Diﬀusion of Morality
Policies:
Introducing the Research
Questions
1.1 Galton’s Problem as a Theoretical Objective
In 1889, Sir Edward Tylor presented a study on the methods of cross-cultural
research at the Royal Anthropological Institute. Applying his methods to
marriage laws and descent laws, one of Tylor’s claims read that as societies
become more complex, their laws on marriage and descent shift from a
maternal to a paternal point of view (Tylor, 1889). One of the people in
the audience, Sir Francis Galton, formulated strong objections against this
claim. Galton argued that societies cannot be thought of as independent
actors, and this had strong implications for Tylor’s findings. Tylor could
not rule out that the shift to a paternal focus in laws on marriage and
descent was in fact the result of the diﬀusion of these laws among complex
societies. Complex societies are often geographically clustered, and it is
therefore likely that members of these societies interact with each other,
and thereby influence each other. Furthermore, it may be the case that
these societies were influenced by an external source, which could explain
the occurrence of similar traits in diﬀerent societies.1 In other words, based
on the finding that two traits occur at the same time in societies, one cannot
draw conclusions about a relation between the two societal traits. Galton’s
criticism, which became known as Galton’s problem, had an enormous impact
on cross-cultural research. As solutions to Galton’s problem remained absent,
quantitative cross-cultural studies were put on the back burner for decades
(Naroll, 1961; Ross and Homer, 1976).
Initially, Galton’s problem “was treated simply as a ‘problem’, an annoy-
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ance that complicated empirical research”(Braun and Gilardi, 2006, p. 299).
Starting in the late 1960s, scholars began formulating theories focusing on
the interdependence between observations in cross-national research. The
dependency between societies was no longer considered as merely a statistical
problem, but oﬀered theoretical explanations for the spread of policies among
polities. Policy diﬀusion theories assume that, in their decision making pro-
cess, policy makers are influenced by decisions made by other policy makers
in other polities. Literature on policy diﬀusion suggests that five mechanisms
explain why policies diﬀuse across jurisdictions (Elkins and Simmons, 2005;
Gilardi, 2005; Shipan and Volden, 2008). Firstly, policy makers in diﬀerent
jurisdictions may learn from each other’s decisions. Secondly, policies may
spread because policy makers aim to maintain their competitive position.
Thirdly, policy makers of diﬀerent polities may cooperate to collectively
tackle societal problems. Fourthly, a policy adoption in one jurisdiction may
serve as a precedent, legitimating the policy adoption in other jurisdictions.
Fifthly, policy makers may simply copy each others legislation. However, sim-
ilar to the problems Tylor encountered, one cannot speak of policy diﬀusion
when similar policies are adopted in diﬀerent jurisdictions. Policy makers
in diﬀerent jurisdiction may respond to similar developments occurring in
their jurisdictions. Therefore, it is necessary to simultaneously study both
internal explanations for policy adoption and policy diﬀusion explanations
(Berry and Berry, 1992).
Policy diﬀusion theories predict observable patterns of policy adoptions
in two dimensions: time and space (Mooney and Lee, 1995). Theories on
temporal diﬀusion hypothesize on the influence of previous adoptions in
other jurisdictions on the likelihood to adopt a certain policies (Gray, 1973).
Theories on spatial diﬀusion give expectations on geographical diﬀusion
patterns, suggesting that a policy is more likely to diﬀuse across nearby
jurisdictions (Walker, 1969).
Evidence for the claim that policy makers are influenced by decisions made
by other policy makers in other polities has been found in numerous studies,
focusing on the diﬀusion of policies between organizations (Greenhalgh et al.,
2004), cities (Crain, 1966), federal states (e.g., Gilardi and Fuglister, 2008;
Gray, 1973; Walker, 1969), and countries (e.g., Brooks, 2005; Gilardi, 2008;
Weyland, 2005). However, not all policies diﬀuse in the same way, and some
policies even do not diﬀuse at all. Early scholars on policy diﬀusion have
already recognized the possibility that diﬀerent policies involve dissimilar
diﬀusion patterns (e.g., Gray, 1973; Walker, 1969). Savage (1985, p. 10)
asserts that “much diﬀusion research has pointed to the fact that various
attributes of innovations, including their particular substance, shape the
responsiveness of adopters to them”. Makse and Volden (2011) and Nicholson-
Crotty (2009) recently provided with an empirical test of this claim. Makse
and Volden (2011) show that policies with high relative advantages, high
compatibility, low complexity, high observability, and high trialability diﬀuse
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faster than others. Nicholson-Crotty (2009) finds that salient policies are
more likely to diﬀuse rapidly, especially when the matter of the policies is
relatively simple.
Inspired by the idea that diﬀerent policies do not diﬀuse in similar ways,
scholars have hypothesized on distinct diﬀusion patterns of so-called morality
policies. Such policies are characterized first and foremost by a controversial
moral dispute (Mooney, 1999). As these policies are salient and less complex,
morality policy scholars have suggested that adoption rate of morality policies
should be relatively fast (Boushey, 2010; Mooney and Lee, 1999b). However,
due to their controversial nature, morality policies diﬀuse across a smaller
number of countries, and the learning mechanism is less applicable to morality
policies than to other policies (Mooney and Lee, 1995).
In this book, we study diﬀusion patterns of morality policies in Western
Europe between 1960 and 2010. Research on morality policies most often
studies the adoption of morality policies in U.S. states, and the attention for
Western European abortion policies remains underexposed in the literature
on morality policies. In fact, no study has yet addressed the diﬀusion of
morality policies among Western European countries. We start with exploring
the diﬀusion of morality policies in Western Europe by studying the policy
adoption and diﬀusion of liberal abortion policies. Abortion is generally
considered as the prime example of a morality policy (Mooney and Lee, 1995;
Patton, 2007). Our first central question reads: To what extent do internal
explanations and policy diﬀusion explanations account for the adoption of
liberal abortion policies in Western European countries between 1961 and
2010? Answering this central question provides us with information on the
extent to which the expectations of morality policy theory also hold for
the European context. Evidence for morality policy diﬀusion has mainly
been found in the U.S. states (Cocca, 2002; Klawitter and Hammer, 1999;
Mooney and Lee, 1995, 1999b), and it is unclear to what extent European
morality policies have diﬀused as well. To answer this question, we study
the temporal and spatial diﬀusion patterns of liberal abortion policies in
Western European countries.
Our second central question reads: To what extent do morality policies
diﬀuse in a diﬀerent way among Western European countries between 1961
and 2010 than other policies? Numerous scholars have suggested that
morality policies follow distinct diﬀusion patterns, but the lion’s share of
studies on morality policy diﬀusion merely examines the diﬀusion pattern of
a single morality policy, instead of actually comparing the diﬀusion patterns
of morality policies and non-morality policies. To answer this question, we
compare the diﬀusion patterns of six morality policies and eleven non-morality
policies. Derived from policy diﬀusion theories and the morality policy theory,
we hypothesize on the distinct typicalities of the diﬀusion patterns of morality
policies. Hypotheses are tested by comparing the diﬀusion patterns of both
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morality and non-morality policies.
In the remainder of this chapter, we discuss why morality polices are thought
to be distinct from other policies in Section 1.2. Secondly, we explain why and
how morality policies are expected to involve their own diﬀusion processes in
Section 1.3. Further, we discuss lacunae in the studies on morality policies
and diﬀusion patterns in Section 1.4. Fourthly and finally, we conclude this
chapter by formulating research questions and sketching the outline of this
thesis in Section 1.5.
1.2 Morality policies
1.2.1 Characteristics of Morality Policies
Scholars have gone to great lengths to describe how morality policies are
distinguishable from non-morality policies (e.g., Haider-Markel and Meier,
1996; Meier, 1994; Mooney, 2000; Tatalovich and Daynes, 2005). Their “[. . . ]
central unifying claim is that there is a class of value- or morality-based
policies that can be distinguished from non-morality policies, and that these
distinguishing characteristics can be used to explain and predict political
behaviour in morality policy arenas” (Smith, 2002, p. 382). In this section,
we set out to understand what characteristics constitute morality policies.
The most notable feature of morality policies is the way the policy is
framed in the debate surrounding the issue. Debates on morality policies are
about first principles, in which “at least one advocacy coalition . . . portray[s]
the issue as one of morality or sin and use[s] moral arguments in its policy
advocacy” (Haider-Markel and Meier, 1996, p. 333). Next to this, perhaps
somewhat circular definition of morality policies, scholars have distinguished
six characteristic features of morality policies. Firstly, the issue at stake is
relatively simple (Meier, 1994; Mooney, 1999, 2000). Morality issues are
about issues concerning for example life and death, freedom and justice.
These topics touch the heart of basic values, and complex information to
form one’s opinion is not necessary. Secondly, as morality issues involve basic
values to which people are deeply attached, the issues at stake are highly
salient to the public (Mooney, 1999). Thirdly, since morality issues are
relatively easy to grasp and highly salient, citizen participation in the debate
on morality policies is greater than average (Mooney, 1999, 2000). Citizens
are more likely to be actively involved in either pressuring the adoption
of a morality policy, or remaining the status quo. Fourthly, according to
Tatalovich and Daynes (2005), morality policies are most often characterized
by their low-level economic impact. The adoption of morality policy does not
involve high costs, nor does it produces high economic gains. Finally, Lowi
(2005) argues that due to the controversial nature of the debates surrounding
morality policy, there is an unwillingness to compromise among the public, as
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well as among policy makers. The views of supporters of a certain morality
policy runs diametrically contrary to those of its opponents, and both groups
are not willing to make concessions.
1.2.2 Politics of Morality Policies
Morality policies are thus distinguishable from other types of policies. Moral-
ity policy theory suggest that, following from the distinguishable features of
morality policies, the adoption process of morality policies diﬀers from those
of other policies. Most prominent, morality policy scholars have studied
the internal explanations for policy adoptions. Their findings suggest that
the politics of morality policies can be distinguished from other types of
policies in several way. The first hypothesis from morality policy theory
reads that, since the matter of morality policies concern moral issues rather
than economic ones, morality policy adoption is to a larger extent aﬀected
by moral determinants, and not by economic determinants (Mooney and Lee,
1995).
Further, since morality policies are characterized by their highly salient
matter, and a strong public participation, the public opinion towards the
issue at stake is highly influential. When morality issues are on the table,
policy makers are found to be more responsive to public attitudes than in
case of non-morality policies (Camobreco and Barnello, 2008; Fairbanks,
1977; Haider-Markel and Meier, 1996; Mooney and Lee, 1995, 2000).
Furthermore, interest groups play a diﬀerent role in the politics of morality
policies than in the politics of non-morality policies. Even if public support
is low, interest groups can be highly influential in the adoption process of
non-morality, less observable policies. However, in the case of highly salient
morality policies, interest groups are unable to successfully influence the
policy adoption process without substantial support (Haider-Markel and
Meier, 1996; Meier and Johnson, 1990).
Finally, as Lowi (2005) argued, there is an unwillingness to compromise
on morality issues. This results in a failure to reach a policy equilibrium.
When those advocating morality policy change succeed in their goal, the
people denouncing the policy change will be triggered to political action,
sometimes even resorting to violence (Mooney, 2000). Furthermore, since
policy equilibrium for morality policies is diﬃcult to reach, political actors
may be highly important in the democratic policy adoption process. With
a strong majority coalition of political parties, compromising on policy is
unnecessary.
1.3 The Diﬀusion of Morality Policies
Next to diﬀerences in the internal explanations for morality policies, morality
policy theory suggest that morality policies diﬀuse in diﬀerent patterns than
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other policies. There are two important dimensions of policy diﬀusion: they
diﬀuse over time and across countries (Mooney and Lee, 1995). In the next
paragraphs, we discuss the general theories on respectively temporal and
spatial diﬀusion patterns, and the theoretical and empirical headway morality
policy scholars have made in the field of temporal and spatial policy diﬀusion.
1.3.1 Temporal Diﬀusion Patterns
Policies diﬀuse over time. Following the theory on the diﬀusion of innovations
developed by Rogers (1995) in the early 1960s, scholars in the field of policy
diﬀusion have hypothesized how “adopters influence those in the social system
who have not yet adopted”(Gray, 1973, p. 1176). As more jurisdictions have
adopted a certain policy, those who have not yet done so are more likely to
adopt it as well.
An important characteristic of the temporal policy diﬀusion patterns is
that the adoption rates vary over time (Gilardi, 2008; Gray, 1973; Mahajan
and Peterson, 1985). When plotted over time, the cumulative number of
adopters follows an S-shaped curve (see Figure 1.1). This S-shaped curve (or
S-curve) is not only characteristic for policy diﬀusion, but found in studies
on diﬀusion of a wide range of innovations (Rogers, 1995). The shape of the
curve can be explained by social learning theory (Gray, 1973; Mooney and
Lee, 1995; Rogers, 1995). Initially, only a few countries adopt a new policy.
Policy makers in other countries await whether the policy is successful or not.
When this policy is perceived as successful, more and more countries will
follow, resulting in a faster growing number of adoptions. After a majority
of the countries has adopted the policy, a turning point is reached, and the
adoption rate starts to decrease. Ultimately, most countries will adopt, with
more cautious countries, the laggards, adopting in the final years. Thus,
following Rogers’ theory on the diﬀusion of innovations, we can hypothesize
that:
S-curve Hypothesis: Over time, the cumulative number of
policy adoptions follows an S-shaped curve
This temporal pattern of diﬀusion is often found in studies on policy adoptions
(Fink, 2011; Gilardi, 2008; Gray, 1973; Levi-Faur, 2005; Simmons and Elkins,
2004). It is considered a strong indication for policy diﬀusion.
The shape of the S-curve can widely vary from one policy to the other.
Some morality policy scholars have found empirical evidence that morality
policies diﬀuse in similar patterns as non-morality policies. For instance, in
the case of U.S. pre-Roe versus Wade abortion reform (Mooney and Lee,
1995), the distribution of cumulative adoptions follows a clear S-shaped
function over time. However, other scholars have provided arguments that
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Figure 1.1: Example of the S-curve Distribution
may lead one to expect diﬀerent temporal diﬀusion patterns for morality
policies. Firstly, we note that some policies diﬀuse faster than others, leading
to a steep learning curve, while others diﬀuse slower, resulting in a flattened
curve. Nicholson-Crotty (2009) and Makse and Volden (2011) found evidence
that policies with characteristics similar to those of morality policies are
likely to diﬀuse faster. Nicholson-Crotty (2009) studied a wide range of
policies, and concentrated on the eﬀect of two main attributes of policies on
the temporal diﬀusion patterns: the salience and complexity of the policy.
He concluded that policies with high salience and less complexity are more
likely to diﬀuse rapidly. Makse and Volden (2011) studied the role of five
policy attributes in the diﬀusion process, and concluded that less complex
and highly visible policies tend to show faster adoption rates than more
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complex and less visible policies.
0 5 10 15 20
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
time
cu
m
ula
tiv
e 
nu
m
be
r o
f a
do
pt
er
s
Figure 1.2: Example of the R-curve Distribution
Such rapid adoption rates will not produce the expected S-curve, rather,
as Boushey (2010) describes, an R-curve. Figure 1.2 presents an overview of
a typical R-curve. The curve is characterized by a sudden boost of policy
adoptions in a small time period. After this boost, the number of adoptions
rapidly decreases over time. Mooney and Lee (1999b) suggested that this
R-curve pattern is especially likely to occur when a morality policy is favored
by the majority of the population. Policy makers are thought to be more
responsive to public opinion in the case of morality policies. Therefore, these
policies diﬀuse more rapidly than others when a majority of the population
is in favor of the policy adoption. Boushey (2010) found that the cumulative
number of United States morality policies adoptions - regardless of whether
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or not it is favored by the majority - indeed produces the expected R-curve.
This finding suggests that morality policies diﬀuse more rapidly than the
social learning theory may lead one to expect.2 Thus, we can formulate that:
R-curve Hypothesis: Over time, the cumulative number of
morality policy adoptions follows an R-shaped curve
1.3.2 Spatial Diﬀusion Patterns
The spatial spread of policies was first theorized by Walker (1969). He
claimed that policy makers use policies as an instrument to solve problems in
society. However, solving such problems is often highly complex, and policy
makers can never gather all information necessary for making such decisions.
To reduce the risk of failing policies, policy makers are assumed to make
use of analogies. According to Walker one way to do so is by examining the
solution oﬀered by legislators in other polities. And since policy makers are
better aware of policy decisions that have been adopted by nearby polities,
he argued that policies tend to diﬀuse across regional jurisdictions. The first
hypothesis on spatial diﬀusion thus reads:
Regional Diﬀusion Hypothesis: A country’s likelihood to
adopt a policy increases when neighbouring countries have already
adopted the policy.
Haider-Markel (2001) and Mooney and Lee (1995) expected that morality
policies do not diﬀuse across neighbouring countries, as a result of the contro-
versial nature of morality policies and the strong influence of the majority’s
opinion on morality policies. Empirical evidence for this expectation is mixed.
On the one hand, Mooney and Lee 1995 found evidence that the adoption
of a permissive abortion law by a state is more likely if the surrounding
states already have such laws. On the other hand, Haider-Markel 2001 found
that national interest groups activity and state characteristics better explain
morality policy adoptions than policy adoptions in neighbouring states.
Some studies have dealt with the spatial diﬀusion of morality policies
(Haider-Markel, 2001; Klawitter and Hammer, 1999; Mooney and Lee, 1995,
1999b; Pierce and Miller, 1999). While analysing the diﬀusion of diﬀerent
policies, their conclusions regarding the spatial diﬀusion of morality policies
are, to put it mildly, mixed. Strikingly, Klawitter and Hammer (1999) found
that although a county’s likelihood to adopt a local anti-discrimination
policy for sexual orientation increases when more counties within a state
have already adopted such policy, the probability of adopting the policy
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drops when neighbouring counties have already adopted the policy. In his
study on same-sex marriage bans in the United States, Haider-Markel (2001)
found that morality policies do not spread across neighbouring or regional
states. Berry and Berry (1990) found that the adoption of a state lottery
policy is more likely to occur when neighbouring states have already adopted
such policy. However, mixed evidence on the diﬀusion of state lottery policies
is found by Pierce and Miller (1999). They found no evidence for spatial
diﬀusion for the adoption of state lottery policy dedicating all or part of the
revenue to education. They argued, however, that general-fund state lottery
policies diﬀuse across neighbouring states. Finally, Mooney and Lee (1995)
indicated that, in the case of the (pre-Roe versus Wade) abortion policies,
these policies indeed diﬀuse across neighbouring states. They concluded that,
although some characteristics of the diﬀusion pattern of abortion legislation
are similar to those of other policy types, morality policies diﬀuse slower
among regional states than non-morality policies.
In a more general formulation, Walker’s theoretical argument is also known
as Tobler’s law, which reads that “everything is related to everything else,
but near things are more related than distant things” (Tobler, 1970, p. 236).
This law is closely related to ideas on reasoning in analogies formulated by
Hume (1757) and further developed by Topitsch (1954, 1958). To explain
the unknown, people tend to reason in analogies with what they know and
with what is important to them.
The analogy-argument is further developed by Beck, Gleditsch and Beard-
sley (2006). These authors claimed that, in studies on spatial interdependence,
scholars tend to confine their hypotheses to geographic proximity. Using a
slogan, Beck et al. (2006) stated that “space is more than geography”. While
it is indeed plausible that policy makers are better informed about neigh-
bouring countries than about countries further away, other interpretations of
“nearby” are possible. For example, the authors suggested that “one might
envision that observations are influenced not by geographically proximate
units, but rather by historically shared ties (such as language or colonial
history) or high levels of interactions.”(Beck et al., 2006, p. 31)3 Thus, the
“space is more than geography”-slogan can be formulated in an hypothesis as
follows:
Shared Ties Diﬀusion Hypothesis: A country’s likelihood
to adopt a policy increases when countries with shared ties have
already adopted the policy.
Thus, countries can be close in other ways than geographic as well. In this
thesis, we explore whether policies diﬀuse across countries that are similar to
each other in a linguistic, economic or cultural sense. Similarities in language,
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as suggested by Beck et al. (2006), might explain why some countries are
more aﬀected by the adoption of a policy in a particular country than in
another one. Diﬀerences in languages might act as a barrier for policy makers
to gain knowledge on the adopted law in a country. Furthermore, we can
imagine that countries with similar views on the welfare state are more likely
to look at each others’ policies regarding social-economic, privatization and
regulatory policies. For morality policies, however, it can be expected that
countries with similar ethical background are more likely to follow each other.
Since morality policies concern ethical issues, and religion has clear opinions
on ethical issues, we argue that countries with similar religious backgrounds
are more likely to learn from one another. For example, countries with a
Catholic background are likely to influence each other when it comes to
policies regarding morality, for instance matters of life and death.
1.4 Lacunae in Theory and Research
There is much known about the diﬀusion patterns of morality policies.
Nevertheless, we believe that there is also much not known about this topic.
We have identified six major lacunae in research on morality policy diﬀusion.
This section provides an overview of these lacunae, and on the approaches
we undertake to fill these gaps.
Firstly, morality policy studies have mainly been conducted in the United
States. However, adding to the large pile of American studies, there is a
growing branch of literature studying morality policies in Europe (e.g., Albæk
et al., 2007; Engeli, 2009; Fink, 2008; Green-Pedersen, 2007; Montpetit et al.,
2007; Sciﬃono et al., 2009). American and European research on morality
policy theory diﬀer sharply in their methodological approach. Studies on
American policies often employ quantitative empirical analyses (e.g., Allen,
2005; Mooney and Lee, 1995; Patton, 2007; Roh and Haider-Markel, 2003),
whereas European morality policies studies are predominantly qualitative
(e.g., Albæk et al., 2007; Engeli, 2009; Green-Pedersen, 2007; Sciﬃono et al.,
2009).4 One of the major advantages of a quantitative approach is the
possibility to estimate the impact of diﬀerent characteristics simultaneously
using a formal test. In our empirical studies on policy adoptions and policy
diﬀusion, we apply such quantitative approach, using sophisticated statistical
techniques. In so doing, we are able to simultaneously account for internal
explanations and diﬀusion explanations for policy adoption.
Secondly, while there is increasing attention in scientific literature on morality
policies in Europe, no study has yet addressed the diﬀusion of morality policies
across European countries. This is somewhat surprising for three reasons.
Firstly, policy diﬀusion is not limited to U.S. federal states, as suggested
by Boushey (2010), but numerous policies have diﬀused over European
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countries as well (e.g., Delmas, 2002; Fink, 2011; Gilardi, 2005; Tews et al.,
2003). Secondly, literature on American morality policies provide convincing
empirical evidence for the spread of morality policies across countries and
over time (e.g., Klawitter and Hammer, 1999; Mooney and Lee, 1995, 1999b).
Thirdly, anecdotal evidence suggests that, at least in the case of liberal
abortion reform, morality policies tend to diﬀuse in European countries as
well (e.g., Ferree et al., 2002; Ketting and Van Praag, 1983; World Health
Organisation, 1971a). We aim to gain a better understanding of the diﬀusion
processes of morality policies across European countries.
Thirdly, another lacuna is the lack of a detailed test of the diﬀerences between
the diﬀusion patterns of morality policy and other policies. Morality policy
theory predicts distinct diﬀusion patterns for morality policies. Unfortunately,
studies on the diﬀusion of morality policies examined individual policies, such
as laws on abortion (Mooney and Lee, 1995), capital punishment (Mooney
and Lee, 1999b) and gay and lesbian rights (Cocca, 2002; Haider-Markel,
2001; Klawitter and Hammer, 1999). Mooney and Schuldt (2008) remarked
that future research by morality policy scholars should focus on the actual
comparison of morality policy by simultaneously studying multiple policies.
Until now, only one study has addressed the diﬀusion patterns of morality
policies using a multi-policy approach. In a large-scale study covering 133
diﬀerent policies in the U.S. States, Boushey (2010) compared the temporal
diﬀusion patterns of morality policies with other types of policies. This study
shows that the diﬀusion of morality policies is characterized by a relatively
rapid adoption and a faster take-oﬀ point than other policies. Unfortunately,
spatial diﬀusion patterns are neglected in Boushey’s study. In this thesis, we
study both temporal and spatial diﬀusion patterns of multiple policies.
Throughout this book, we argue that the claim that morality policies
involve diﬀerent diﬀusion dynamics than non-morality policies requires a
multi-policy approach, focusing on the adoptions of both morality and non-
morality policies. Such multi-policy approach has been dominant in the early
literature on policy diﬀusion (e.g., Gray, 1973; Walker, 1969; Welch and
Thompson, 1980). However, since Berry and Berry (1990, 1992) introduced
methods to incorporate measures for internal explanations and diﬀusion
simultaneously, policy diﬀusion researchers started to examine individual
policies (e.g. Brooks, 2005; Mooney and Lee, 1995; Schmitt, 2011), or a small
number of similar policies (Gilardi, 2008; Simmons and Elkins, 2004). Since
each policy involves its own set of internal determinants, a single-policy or
similar-policy approach is better able to capture the influence of internal
characteristics than a multi-policy approach. Nevertheless, recent studies on
policy diﬀusion among U.S. states have applied the multi-policy approach to
examine diﬀerences in the diﬀusion of policies (e.g., Boushey, 2010; Makse and
Volden, 2011; Nicholson-Crotty, 2009). To capture the influence of internal
determinants, these studies include a small set of variables measuring internal
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characteristics.
Fourthly, there are severe drawbacks in the methods applied to test temporal
diﬀusion patterns. Social-learning hypotheses regarding policy diﬀuse expect
that over time, the cumulative number of adopters follows an S-shaped curve
(Gray, 1973; Mooney and Lee, 1999b; Klawitter and Hammer, 1999). The
empirical recognition of this S-shaped curve is often regarded as a strong
indication of policy diﬀusion (Boushey, 2010; Gilardi, 2008; Mahajan and
Peterson, 1985). Whether this curve is observed is generally tested using two
methods. The most straightforward approach is by plotting the cumulative
number of policies over time, and decide whether the curve follows the S-
shape (e.g., Mooney and Lee, 1999b). This approach is problematic, first
and foremost because temporal patterns are not always easy to read. To
determine the extent to which the empirical S-curve can deviate from the
theoretical curve, a formal statistical test is necessary.
Gray (1973) provided such test. She formulated a model that explains
the number of adoptions at a certain time-point by the number of adoptions
at a previous time-point. A significant quadratic eﬀect of the previous
number of adoptions would support the S-curve hypothesis. This method
indeed provides us a formal test, but it neglects internal explanations. As
Galton convincingly argued (Naroll, 1961; Ross and Homer, 1976; Tylor,
1889), controlling for internal explanations is necessary, as policy spread
may not be the result of interacting policy makers, but merely the result
of similar independent reactions to similar developments within a country
(Elkins and Simmons, 2005; Gilardi, 2005; Holzinger and Knill, 2005). The
social learning hypothesis on the S-curve assumes that policy makers interact
with each other. We must therefore rule out that they are not responding
to similar internal developments. In this book, we propose a formal test of
temporal diﬀusion hypotheses that does not neglect internal characteristics.
Incorporating transformations of a duration variable in event history models
allow us to test whether the likelihood of adopting is non-incremental.
Fifthly, while some studies have been devoted to the diﬀusion of morality
policies across regional states (e.g., Mooney and Lee, 1995; Klawitter and
Hammer, 1999), other hypotheses on spatial diﬀusion are often neglected. The
regional diﬀusion hypothesis is deducted from the more general hypothesis
that policy makers tend to make an analogy with nearby regions. Recent
insights in the field of policy diﬀusion has suggested that diﬀusion might
occur through diﬀerent channels. The argument that policy makers in nearby
countries are more aware of each others decision might be interpreted less
strict, as Beck et al. (2006) argued. Policy makers might also be more aware
of the developments in countries that are in a diﬀerent sense proximate.
In our studies on spatial diﬀusion mechanisms, we test hypotheses on the
diﬀusion of policies across neighbouring countries, as well as on the diﬀusion
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of policies across countries with similar views on morality and economics.
Furthermore, as Walker (1969) assumed that policy diﬀusion is driven by
knowledge of policies in other jurisdictions, we formulate hypotheses on
similarities in linguistics. Linguistics barriers might trouble the diﬀusion of
policies across countries.
Sixthly, the commonly applied state-year event history approach can only
globally test hypotheses on policy adoption. Since its introduction to the
research field by Berry and Berry (1990, 1992), state-year event history
analysis has been the dominant approach in quantitative research on policy
diﬀusion. By incorporating a so-called spatial lag - which measures the
proportion of regional jurisdictions that already adopted the policy at stake
- event history models can test hypotheses on spatial diﬀusion and internal
explanation simultaneously. While the state-year event history approach suits
well in estimating the influence of internal determinants on the adoption of
a policy, it underestimates the influence of external determinants (Ward and
Gleditsch, 2007). A dyadic approach is a convenient method to disentangle
diﬀerent spatial patterns of diﬀusion (Gilardi and Fuglister, 2008; Volden,
2006).
1.5 Research Questions and Structure of the Book
1.5.1 Part Two: Abortion Policies
In this book, we study the diﬀusion of morality policies across Western
European countries. The first aim of this book is to examine the extent to
which morality policy adoption in Western Europe is explained by similar
mechanisms as morality policy adoption in the United States. Studying
whether the predictions of morality policy theories also hold true for the
Western European context is necessary since, as Studlar (2000) argued, there
are diﬀerences in the way morality policies are perceived in the United States
and outside the United States. To do so, we start with three empirical
studies on the adoption of abortion policies, the prime example of a morality
policy. During the period 1960-2010, the legal status of abortion has changed
drastically. Halfway the twentieth century, abortion laws in most Western
European were firmly restrictive. Most laws allowed abortion only to preserve
the life of the pregnant woman, or in case of severe threat to her health
(David, 1992). This contrasts with the legal status of abortion in most
Western European countries at present, where abortion is available during
the first period of the pregnancy on socio-economic grounds, in case of distress
or on request of the pregnant woman (Eser and Koch, 1988; International
Planned Parenthood, 2007, 2009; Ketting and Van Praag, 1983; United
Nations, 2002).
Numerous studies have set out to explain why Western European countries
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adopted permissive abortion policies in a relative short period of time.
Unfortunately, most studies are either devoted to the abortion reform in a
single country, or they compare a few countries only. In the first part of this
study, we aim to describe when countries adopted which abortion policy, and
to explain why some countries adopted these policies earlier than others by
studying internal and diﬀusion explanations for policy adoption. The first
central question we formulate reads:
Central Question 1: To what extent do internal explanations
and policy diﬀusion explanations account for the adoption of
liberal abortion policies in Western European countries between
1961 and 2010?
In Chapter 2, we present an overview of the developments in eighteen West-
ern European abortion policies. The countries included in this overview are
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, (The Federal Republic of) Germany, Finland,
France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Nor-
way, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. We
aim to answer the first research question, which reads:
Research Question I: Which changes in the conditions for
legally obtaining an abortion and the procedural barriers to abor-
tion occurred in Western European countries between 1960 and
2010?
Numerous researchers have preceded us in the aim to present an overview
of abortion policies in Western (European) countries. However, most of
these studies are limited either because of (1) their lack of detail, (2) the
limited time span, or (3) the limited geographic span, and in some cases
the findings of studies contradict with each other, without discussing the
origin of such contradiction. To overcome these limitations, we construct
an overview of all abortion policies that were in act in the period 1960-
2010 in the eighteen countries. We consulted the original law texts of these
policies whenever possible and we studied secondary sources to present an
overview of historical developments in the judicial status of abortion. Next,
we categorize the abortion policies based on their degree of permissiveness,
using a nine-step scale measuring the grounds on which women can obtain
an abortion. Subsequently, we present an overview of procedural barriers to
abortion between 1960 and 2010 in the eighteen European countries.
The classification of abortion policies enables us to study the timing of
the adoption of abortion policies in Western European countries. In the
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remaining chapters of Part II, we study the adoption and diﬀusion processes
of permissive abortion policies in Western Europe.
As Elkins and Simmons (2005) pointed out, what appears as a process of
diﬀusion might not be the result of an interdependence among policy makers.
Policy makers of diﬀerent jurisdictions might act independent from each
other, but react to similar developments occurring in diﬀerent countries at
the same time. Hence, it is important to control for such explanations. To
account for internal determinants, we first identify internal explanations
for the adoption of permissive abortion laws in Chapter 3 by studying the
adoption of abortion policies in eighteen Western European countries between
1961 and 2010.
Furthermore, there is a debate going on in the literature on European
abortion policies if political determinants influence the adoption process. In
this study, we contribute to this debate by testing both political and societal
determinants at the same time, and scrutinizing on the interplay between
both types of determinants.
Research Question II: To what extent do (a) political and (b)
societal characteristics influence the likelihood of abortion laws
being liberalized in Western European countries between 1961 and
2010?
In Chapter 4, we study the temporal diﬀusion of abortion policies in European
countries. Several studies on abortion policies have hinted towards the
diﬀusion of these policies among European countries. However, there is no
study thoroughly testing this phenomenon. In Chapter 4, we study the extent
to which liberal abortion policies have diﬀused among Western European
countries since 1968, the year following the adoption of the UK 1967 Abortion
Act. We improve on previous research in two important ways. Firstly, we gain
knowledge about the sustainability of the claim that abortion policies have
diﬀused in Western Europe. Secondly, we apply advanced methodological
techniques to model the adoption rate over time. These methods provide
us with an opportunity to control for internal determinants, which aﬀords a
more strict test of hypotheses on temporal diﬀusion.
Research Question III: To what extent does the cumulative
number of liberal abortion law adoptions in Western European
countries between 1968 and 2010 follow an S-curve or an R-
curve?
In Chapter 5, we study spatial diﬀusion patterns. Anecdotal evidence of
the diﬀusion of European abortion policies suggest that the adoption of a
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liberal abortion policy is more likely if neighbouring countries have already
adopted a permissive abortion law. Studies on policy diﬀusion have often
found evidence for the diﬀusion of policies among neighbouring countries
(e.g., Berry and Berry, 1990; Mooney and Lee, 1995; Walker, 1969). However,
scholars have recently argued that policies might not only diﬀuse across
regional jurisdictions, but policy makers might also turn to jurisdiction that
are near in a diﬀerent sense (Beck et al., 2006). For instance, countries with
similar views on religion, which is highly important for shaping basic values,
might learn from each other’s abortion policy adoptions. Thus, the diﬀusion
of abortion policies might not only occur across regional countries, but also
among countries with other similarities. In Chapter 5, we study the extent
to which European abortion policies have diﬀused across regional countries,
and whether European abortion policies have diﬀused across countries with
other similarities. Hypotheses are tested using dyadic-year event history
analyses. The research question here reads:
Research Question IV: To what extent is the adoption of
liberal abortion policies in Western European countries between
1968 and 2010 aﬀected by previous adoptions in (a) neighbouring
countries, and (b) culturally, linguistically and politically similar
countries?
1.5.2 Part Three: Morality and Non-morality Policies
In Part Three, we study whether morality policies indeed have diﬀerent
diﬀusion patterns than other types of policies. The claim that morality
policies invoke their own politics is a comparative one. However, most scholars
have only studied morality policy adoption by examining the adoption of
a single policy. To thoroughly test the morality policy theory claim, one
should use a multi-policy approach, combining information on morality
policy adoptions and other types of policies. Mooney and Schuldt (2008)
acknowledged the importance of such approach, when stating that “[e]ven
comparing only two policies, a morality policy and a non[-]morality policy,
on the same aspect of politics would be far better than no explicit comparison
at all.” (Mooney and Schuldt, 2008, p. 212). Up until now, only on
study has actually provided such comparison, focusing on diﬀerences in the
temporal diﬀusion patterns of morality and non-morality policies in the
U.S. states (Boushey, 2010). In Part Three of this thesis, we conduct a
comparison of temporal and spatial diﬀusion patterns of six morality and
eleven non-morality policies across seventeen European countries5 between
1961 and 2010. The six morality policies we study are the adoption of liberal
abortion laws, the abolishment of capital punishment, embryo production
and germline therapy, the adoption of liberal laws on same-sex partnership,
and the introduction of smoking bans. Further, we study the following eleven
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non-morality policies: the introduction of an independent regulatory agency
in the field of competition, electricity, the environment, financial services,
pharmaceuticals and telecommunications, the privatization of airlines and
telecommunications, the adoption of parental leave laws, and the introduction
of data protection legislation and the ombudsman. The central question of
this part reads:
Central Question 2: To what extent do morality policies diﬀuse
in a diﬀerent way among Western European countries between
1961 and 2010 than non-morality policies?
In Chapter 6, we study the extent to which the diﬀusion patterns of moral-
ity policies indeed have diﬀerent characteristics than non-morality policies.
Morality policy scholars claimed that morality policies diﬀuse at a faster
rate, and therefore will not produce the S-curve that is expected for non-
morality policies (Boushey, 2010; Mooney and Lee, 1999b). To test this
claim, we study how time influences the likelihood to adopt morality and
non-morality policies, while incorporating a small set of determinants to
account for internal explanations. Our research question here reads:
Research Question V: To what extent do the temporal diﬀu-
sion patterns of morality policies in Western European countries
diﬀer from those of non-morality policies in Western European
countries?
In Chapter 7, we study the spatial diﬀusion patterns of morality and non-
morality policies. Literature on morality policy diﬀusion across U.S. states
is inconclusive when it comes to spatial diﬀusion (Haider-Markel, 2001;
Klawitter and Hammer, 1999; Mooney and Lee, 1995; Pierce and Miller,
1999). However, Mooney and Lee (1995) suggest that the influence of the
policy decisions of other jurisdictions on state level morality policy adoption
is limited compared to other types of policies, as the politics of morality
policies are shaped first and foremost by public responsiveness and interest
group pressure. Similar to Chapter 5, our hypotheses on spatial diﬀusion
are not confined to regional diﬀusion processes. Inspired by the ‘space is
more than geography’-claim by Beck et al. (2006), we also hypothesize on
diﬀusion across countries with shared religious heritage and views on the
welfare state. We apply dyad-year logistic regression analysis to analyse
diﬀusion patterns of seventeen policies that have been frequently adopted
between 1961 and 2010. We study the extent to which morality policies
diﬀuse in diﬀerent patterns over space than other policies. Our last research
question in Chapter 7 thus reads:
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Research Question VI: To what extent is the adoption of
morality and non-morality policies in Western European countries
between 1961 and 2010 aﬀected by previous adoptions in (a)
neighbouring countries, and (b) culturally and politically similar
countries?
1.5.3 Part Four: Answering our Research Questions
We answer the central questions of this thesis in Part Four of this book. In
Chapter 8 we articulate the most important findings of the six empirical
studies. Furthermore, we elaborate on the implications of our findings for
the two central questions we have formulated above. We answer to what
extent the expectations of morality policy theory apply to the Western
European context, and to what extent the diﬀusion patterns of Western
European morality policies deviate from those of other policies in Western
Europe. Subsequently, we reflect on the implications of our findings and the
limitations of our research. Finally, we discuss possible directions for future
research.
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Part II
Abortion Policy as a
Morality Policy

Chapter 2
Developments in Western
European Abortion Policies
between 1960 and 20106
2.1 Introduction
The extent to which women have had access to legal abortions in the past
fifty years has diﬀered considerably across European countries. Abortion
could be punishable under criminal law in almost every circumstance in one
country and freely available in a neighbouring country. The legal status
of abortion also changed radically over time in most European counties.
Historically, abortion was mostly covered in Penal Codes that criminalized
abortion (Boland and Katzive, 2008), but during the past fifty years, most
European countries have replaced Penal Code provisions by laws that specify
circumstances in which abortions can be legally obtained. When we want to
describe diﬀerences in the legal status of induced abortion between European
countries and over time - as is the focus of this study - it is essential to
use reliable and detailed information about the legal status of abortion
in European countries. This chapter provides a review of developments in
abortion laws in eighteen Western European countries between 1960 and 2010.
It contains a description of all relevant legal changes and judicial decisions
that determined the legality of abortion and procedural barriers to abortion
in these countries in the last fifty years. In addition, we classify historical
and current abortion laws in the various Western European countries in
a way that allows for a cross-national comparison of the long-term trends
in abortion law reform in the following chapters. This description serves
as a reference for scholars who wish to study the extent to which changes
in abortion laws aﬀected behaviour from a cross-national perspective, for
scientists who wish to study adaptation and diﬀusion of abortion legislation,
and for policy makers and other people interested in abortion laws.
26 2. DEVELOPMENTS IN WESTERN EUROPEAN ABORTION POLICIES
There is ample literature about the legal status of abortion in European
countries. However, for several distinct reasons, the existing literature does
not provide us the opportunity to study long-term trends in abortion legisla-
tion. A number of cross-national comparisons of abortion law permissiveness
described the extent to which abortion is permitted in a number of countries
at a single point in time (Berer, 2008; International Planned Parenthood,
2007, 2009; Ketting and Van Praag, 1986; Myers and Seif, 2010; Pinter,
2002; Pinter et al., 2005). These studies make particularly useful tools for
policy makers, since they provide an up-to-date comparative foundation
for policy initiatives on reproductive health and women’s rights. They also
provide a foundation for cross-national studies about the consequences of
abortion laws (e.g., Sedgh et al., 2007)). Of course, for studying the causes
of dissimilar development of abortion laws over a long period in various
countries, snap-shot studies fall short by design.
To address questions regarding such law adoptions, it is essential to have
information about the way abortion laws have developed over time in various
countries. This information is widely available, most notably in case studies
that describe how the legal status of abortion has developed over time in par-
ticular countries, such as in Austria (Mock, 1984), Belgium (Trommelmans,
2006), the Federal Republic of Germany (Quaas, 1984), the German Demo-
cratic Republic (Dorbritz and Fleischhacker, 1999), Italy (Bognetti, 1984);
the Netherlands (Ketting, 1978; De Bruijn, 1979), and Norway (Løkeland,
2004). These studies often contain highly detailed and elaborate descriptions
of the legal proceedings in the various countries. However, since they cover
only a single country, case studies cannot be straightforwardly used for cross-
national comparisons. Such studies provide country-specific descriptions of
legal developments, but usually do not attempt to classify the laws in a way
that allows for the cross-nationally comparison of the legal status of abortion.
A number of cross-national comparisons of developments over time aim to
do precisely that (Boland and Katzive, 2008; Cook and Dickens, 1978, 1988;
Cook et al., 1999; Henshaw et al., 2008; Rahman et al., 1998). However, these
studies also have their limitations. Firstly, most studies cover a relatively
limited time span, typically about a decade. This is problematic since the
development of abortion laws mostly is a long-term process that is also often
gradual: countries sometimes remove restrictions to abortion access in small,
incremental steps. The timing of this process diﬀers considerably between
countries. By limiting the description to a relatively short time-span, these
studies run the risk of missing out on important developments that are not
covered by the observation window.7 Secondly, an even more important
problem is intrinsic to the categorization itself. To make the information
about the level of permissiveness cross-nationally comparable, laws need to
be categorized in general classifications that indicate the circumstances in
which abortion is legally obtainable. For example, the United Nations (2002)
distinguished countries that never allow abortion, allow abortion to save
2.1. INTRODUCTION 27
a woman’s life, protect her physical health, protect her mental health, in
cases of sexual oﬀences, in cases of fetal malformation, for socio-economic
reasons, and on request. The categorization of abortion laws for comparative
study is by definition an over-simplified version of the laws it classifies. Of
course, not every idiosyncratic legal arrangement fits nicely into the proposed
categories. Although scholars usually went to great lengths to describe the
various peculiarities of national abortion laws, a generalized classification
cannot fully encapsulate the subtleties typical for the abortion law in a
particular country. For example, the Finnish abortion laws impose diﬀerent
restrictions for diﬀerent demographic groups, allowing abortion on request
for minors, but penalizing abortion for others. Such typicalities are almost
always lost in categorization. As a consequence, laws can be more restrictive
than would appear from available studies, as legally required procedural
barriers usually do not show up in cross-national comparisons.
To summarize, the various designs commonly used to study the permis-
siveness of abortion laws have intrinsic short-comings. Case studies are often
very detailed but cover single countries. Cross-national comparisons are often
too rudimentary and perhaps more importantly, sometimes various sources
contradict one another to the point where at least one of the sources must be
mistaken. Firstly, legal changes are sometimes reported in diﬀerent years by
diﬀerent studies. For example, while most scholars dated the legalization of
abortion in France in 1975 (Cook and Dickens, 1978; United Nations, 2002)
at least one study reported that in France abortion was made legally available
on request as early as 1953 (Rust Bullfinch, 1984). Also, diﬀerent scholars
can sometimes interpret a law diﬀerently. For example, Cook and Dickens
(1988) classified the liberalization of the Dutch law on abortion in 1981 as
allowing woman to have an abortion in case the life of the pregnant woman
is at risk, or to preserve her physical or mental health. Others (International
Planned Parenthood, 2009; Ketting and Van Praag, 1983; Outshoorn, 1996;
United Nations, 2002) argued that abortion is available on request. The
confusion might be caused by the need for woman to state that they are in a
situation of distress, by which it appears as if preserving the mental health
is a legal ground for abortion. However, there is no one who needs to certify
whether the woman is actually in a state of distress. Therefore, abortion is
virtually available on request. We set out to solve these diﬀerences in inter-
pretation by studying the original laws, and by comparing the interpretation
and justification found in secondary resources.
The legality of abortion is an important determinant for the possibilities
for women to terminate their pregnancy, but it is certainly not the only
determinant. Ketting and Van Praag (1986) and International Planned
Parenthood (2008) stressed the importance of legal barriers to abortion.
While abortion may be freely available in a country, pregnant women may
face obstacles in the access to abortion. For example, some countries do not
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allow minors to have an abortion without the consent of (one of the) parents.
Other barriers include - among others - the necessity of authorization for
the treatment by a second physician and the obligation for pregnant women
to receive pre-abortion counselling. To avoid future unwanted pregnancies,
some countries oblige physicians to inform women on contraceptives after
the abortion took place. In this study, we emphasize the importance of such
procedural barriers. Therefore, we provide not only an overview of the legal
conditions for abortion, but also an overview of historical changes in eleven
procedural barriers to abortion.
Existing comparative studies on abortion laws in European countries are not
detailed enough, cover a limited time-span and sometimes provide incomplete
or even fallacious information. Consequentially, existing research does not
provide a solid basis for cross-national analysis of the consequences of abortion
law restrictiveness. In this chapter, we therefore provide a cross-national
comparison of abortion laws that combines the level of detail provided by case
studies with the high comparability of cross-national comparisons, and solves
discrepancies in the interpretation of abortion policies. More specifically, we
ask:
Research Question I: Which changes in the conditions for
legally obtaining an abortion and the procedural barriers to abor-
tion occurred in Western European countries between 1960 and
2010?
To answer this question, we provide a detailed overview of all the legal
developments that aﬀected the legality of abortion and procedural barriers to
abortion in eighteen Western Europe8 in the past fifty years. Our goal is to
describe the way in which abortion laws have evolved in eighteen countries in
a way that allows for cross-national comparisons. However, we acknowledge
that it is impossible to devise a cross-nationally comparable categorization
of laws without losing information about idiosyncrasies of national laws. To
make transparent how we made decisions in our categorization, we begin by
describing the development of national laws and the specific provisions in each
of the national laws in detail (Section 2.3). Based on this information, we
provide an overview of abortion laws of eighteen Western European countries
between 1960 and 2010 (Section 2.4). In doing so, we categorize abortion
laws based on the grounds under which women can obtain an abortion.
Furthermore, we present an overview of procedural barriers.
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2.2 Five Sources of Information
To comprise cross-nationally comparable information of abortion laws be-
tween 1960 and 2010, we use information from five types of sources. Firstly,
the most obvious sources of information about the legal developments in
diﬀerent countries are the oﬃcial texts of national abortion laws. The legal
texts are published in the oﬃcial language(s) of the country that codifies
them, making the information less accessible to scholars not proficient in
that particular tongue. We consulted the original documents only if no good
English translation was available.
Secondly, English translations of almost all relevant laws (Penal Codes and
health-related laws) that were passed between 1948 and 1999 are disseminated
through the International Digest of Health Legislation, published quarterly
by the World Health Organization. The Digest appeared in print until 1999
- legal developments that occurred afterwards are published on-line (World
Health Organisation, 2011).
Thirdly, information about legal developments concerning abortion was
obtained from the Annual Review of Population Law, published annually
from 1974 to 1997 by the United Nations Population Fund and Harvard
Law School Library and currently updated and disseminated on-line by the
Harvard School of Public Health (President and Fellows of Harvard College,
2011). This database contains verbatim English translations of the original
texts of relevant constitutional provisions, legislation, and regulations, as
well as judicial decisions and legal pronouncements.
A fourth source of information about legal developments is the United
Nation’s 2002 Global Review of Abortion Policies. These documents briefly
summarize the development of abortion laws in various countries and typically
span some decades.
Fifthly, we consulted the relevant monographs and country studies and
cross-examined these sources with the primary legal texts. This allowed us
to solve the controversies in the literature on abortion laws.
2.3 Developments in Abortion Legislation in Eu-
ropean Countries
This section provides descriptions about the development of abortion leg-
islation in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany,
Finland, France, Germany after the reunification, Greece, Iceland, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
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2.3.1 Austria
Before 1960, the abortion law was part of the Penal Code of 1852 (Law No.
117). According to Article 16, Paragraphs 144-148 of this law, any woman
who intentionally attempted to cause the expulsion of her fetus or the delivery
of a stillborn child had committed a crime (David et al., 1988). However,
since 1937, a provision was made to exempt women from punishment if an
abortion was the only way to save a pregnant woman’s life or to prevent
a lasting damage to her health (Austria, 1937). The abortion had to be
performed by a physician, unless there was immediate threat to the life of
the pregnant woman.
In 1974, Sections 96-98 of the Austrian Penal Code were reformed with the
adoption of Federal Law No. 60 of 23 January 1974, which came into eﬀect
in January 1975. The new law eﬀectively makes abortion available without
restrictions as to reason until twelve weeks of pregnancy. It is still in force.
The law requires procedures to be performed by a physician, and only after
medical consultation. Furthermore, in case of immediate threat, abortions
can only be performed with the express consent of the pregnant woman.
After the twelfth week of pregnancy, abortions can be performed to avert
a serious danger to the life or physical or mental health of the pregnant
woman; when a serious danger exists that the child may be aﬄicted with a
serious physical or mental defect; or when a woman under fourteen years of
age becomes pregnant. Such abortions may only be performed by physicians
after a medical consultation, and with express consent of the pregnant woman.
The Austrian law allows for emergency abortions - that is, abortions to save
a woman’s life - throughout the entire gestational period. An abortion can
be performed at any time during pregnancy by any person when it is carried
out to save the pregnant woman from immediate danger to her life, which
cannot otherwise be averted, under circumstances in which medical aid was
not available in time.
2.3.2 Belgium
In Belgium before 1990, abortion access was regulated by the 1867 Penal
Code (articles 348 and 350-352) that generally prohibited the performance
of abortions. Consequent to the general principles of criminal legislation
women who had abortions were exempt from prosecution on the grounds
of necessity (i.e. to save her life). In such cases, the law stipulated three
further conditions. Firstly, as per the medical code, three physicians were to
agree that a state of necessity existed. Secondly, all procedures were to be
performed in an approved institution or hospital. Thirdly, abortions were to
be performed only with the informed consent of the pregnant woman.
On April 3 1990, the Law on Pregnancy Termination was accepted by the
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Belgian Parliament. Under this law, abortion is still forbidden under the
Penal Code but is legalized under specified conditions (International Planned
Parenthood, 2009). Up to twelve weeks after conception or fourteen weeks
after the start of the last menstruation (International Planned Parenthood,
2009; Trommelmans, 2006), a state of distress must exist in the perception of
the pregnant woman. Because women are the sole judge of what constitutes
a state of distress, this clause implies that for pregnancies up to twelve weeks
of gestation, the law does not stipulate restrictions as to reason. There are,
however, further conditions. Firstly, a six day waiting period is mandatory.
Secondly, abortions may only be performed by trained physicians, who need
to be convinced about a woman’s conviction and are obliged to inform
women about the pros and cons of abortion procedures, as well as about
alternative contraceptive methods. Thirdly, all abortions must be performed
in health-care institutions that have an information department that provides
women who want to have an abortion with information regarding their rights,
about legally guaranteed assistance and benefits to families, unmarried and
married mothers and their children, about adoption of the child should it
be born. Fourthly, hospitals should further grant assistance and advice to
women regarding psychological and social problems posed by their situation.
Fifthly, physicians and other personnel cannot be forced to participate in
the treatment. If a physician refuses to participate, (s)he needs to address
this issue at the first meeting with the pregnant woman.
After the twelfth gestational week, abortions are allowed only if continuing
the pregnancy would gravely endanger the woman’s health, or when it is
unequivocally established that the child, if born, would be aﬀected by a
serious pathological condition. Two physicians must agree that women meet
the grounds for the procedure. Further conditions regarding abortions are
identical to the conditions for first trimester abortions.
2.3.3 Denmark
In 1956, Law No. 177 of 23 June 1956, titled On measures to be Taken
in Cases of Pregnancy, Etc. was enacted (Roemer, 1967; World Health
Organisation, 1957). Under this law, abortion was permitted if the pregnant
woman’s life or health is seriously endangered, if the pregnancy resulted
from rape (not after sixteen weeks of gestation), in cases of fetal impairment
(not after sixteen weeks of gestation), and on several social-medical grounds.
These social-medical reasons included all conditions in which a woman lived,
including living conditions, physical and mental illness and infirmity, or
medical reasons that imply that a woman was incapable of taking care of
the child. Abortions were to be performed only by licensed physicians, and
only in designated hospitals. The decision to abort was not made by the
pregnant woman, but by a committee. For women under eighteen years old,
parental consent was required for all abortions that are requested for other
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reasons than serious danger to life or health.
Law No. 120 on the Interruption of Pregnancy Etc. of 24 March 1970 allowed
abortions for various social reasons, such as having four or more children
or being over thirty-eight years of age. Abortion availability remained
conditional upon approval by a committee consisting of two physicians and a
psychiatrist. The law imposed a gestational limit of twelve weeks of pregnancy
(World Health Organisation, 1970, p. 574). The woman had to be informed
about the treatment and the involved risks (World Health Organisation,
1971b).
Law No. 350 of 13 June 1973 made first-trimester abortion available on
request. The law required abortions to be performed by a physician in a
state or communal hospital or in a clinic attached to a hospital. Furthermore,
women were to be informed about the procedure and of the possibilities
for assistance if a woman would decide to carry the pregnancy to term.
Pregnancies older than twelve weeks after conception (ten weeks after the
last menstrual period) could be terminated if an abortion was “necessary
to avert a risk to [a pregnant woman’s] life or of serious deterioration to
her physical or mental health, and this risk is based solely or principally on
circumstances of a medical character” (United Nations, 2002). Abortion was
legally permitted if the pregnancy, childbirth or child would constitute a
risk to the woman’s health, because of an existing or potential physical or
mental illness, and also when the conditions under which women were living
were insuﬃcient to guarantee health. It was also legal to abort a pregnancy
that resulted from a criminal act. Abortions were also permitted in cases of
grave fetal impairment, and when the woman was incapable of giving proper
care to the child because of a physical or mental disorder, or immaturity.
Pregnancies following rape could also be aborted after the gestational limit of
twelve weeks had passed. Furthermore, abortion would be legally permitted
if “it can be assumed that pregnancy, childbirth, or care of a child constitute
a serious burden to the woman, which cannot otherwise be averted,” taking
into account a number of socioeconomic circumstances. These mid term
abortions were to be approved by a committee, and all procedures were
to be performed by a physician in a designated hospital or clinic. Women
were to be informed of the nature and risks of the procedure and of the
possibilities for assistance if the pregnancy should continue to term, and is
oﬀered counselling. The 1973 law also demanded parental consent for all
women under eighteen seeking an abortion. However, the committee might
decide to ignore parental consent (United Nations, 2002). Physicians, nurses
and midwives were excused from carrying out or participating in induced
abortion procedures if abortion was contrary to their ethical or religious
views.
2.3. DEVELOPMENTS IN ABORTION LEGISLATION IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 33
In 2000, Law No. 430 of 31 May 2000 was adopted. According to this law,
after twelve weeks of pregnancy, abortion on a viable fetus is only permitted
if the reasons were suﬃciently important, and also prescribed that women
were to be oﬀered counselling prior to and after the treatment.
2.3.4 The Federal Republic of Germany
The German Penal Code of 1871 prohibited abortion without exception. The
1935 Law for the Prevention of Oﬀspring Suﬀering from Hereditary Disease
(section 14) allowed abortion only for medical reasons, including abortions to
save a woman’s life and physical health, as well as for reasons of suspected
fetal impairment. The provisions regarding medical reasons remained in
eﬀect in most West-German Bundesla¨nder after the general provisions of the
eugenic law were repealed after World War II. The existence of suﬃcient
medical reasons was to be tested by a doctor (Tietze, 1967; Eser, 1986).
In 1974, the German Parliament approved a law that made abortion available
on request during the first twelve weeks of pregnancy. The minimal condition
to be met was that women had consulted counselling services before having an
abortion (Eser, 1986). In 1975, and before the proposed law came into eﬀect,
the Federal Constitutional Court ruled that the performance of abortions
on request was unconstitutional and in violation of the constitutionally
guaranteed right to life. The court thereby confirmed the constitutional right
to life for unborn fetuses (Eser, 1986; United Nations, 2002).
On May 21, 1976, the German Parliament passed legislation that permitted
abortion under specific circumstances (World Health Organisation, 1976,
pp. 562-565). Under Penal Code paragraph 218, women who had an abortion
were exempt from prosecution under certain conditions. Abortions were
allowed up to the 22nd week after conception (or the 24th week after the
last menstrual period) in cases of plausible physical abnormalities in the
fetus (Eser, 1986; Ketting and Van Praag, 1986). Abortions were allowed up
to the end of the twelfth week after conception (or the 14th week after the
last menstrual period) in cases of rape or sexual assault, or if the pregnant
woman was in a state of intolerable distress. This latter condition is usually
interpreted as a socioeconomic indication, for it also included present and
future living conditions (Ketting and Van Praag, 1986; United Nations, 2002).
Eser remarks that no gestational age was imposed for abortions for health
reasons, including socio-medical and psychological reasons. In theory, such
abortions could be performed “theoretically even just before birth” (Eser,
1986, p. 376).
Further conditions involved the requested abortion to be approved by a
physician. In cases of declared intolerable distress, it was not the pregnant
woman, but rather the physician who was responsible for determining whether
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the continuation of the pregnancy would lead to a state of intolerable distress
for that woman. The law required that the physician that was to evaluate
the nature of the distress situation was not the one performing the abortion
(United Nations, 2002). In addition, a three day waiting period was required.
Furthermore, counselling about alternatives was mandatory. Abortions were
to be performed only in medical hospitals or, for abortions of pregnancies
during less than ten weeks, in private practices. Furthermore, physicians
were allowed to refuse to participate in the procedure (Ketting and Van
Praag, 1986).
2.3.5 Finland
As per Law No. 82 of 17 February 1950, abortion was permitted in Finland to
save the life or protect the physical and mental health of the pregnant woman,
in cases of fetal malformation and in the event of a pregnancy resulting from
rape. It was also permitted if the pregnant woman was less than sixteen
years of age at the time of conception. For abortions to save women’s life or
physical health, no gestational age was required. For other abortions, a four
month gestational limit was observed. If women were under sixteen years
old, that gestational period was extended until the end of the fifth month.
By Decree No. 232 of May 5 1950, the committee might require guardian
consent for minors and women who were legally incapable. For minors, this
means that parental consent might be required.
The 1970 Abortion Act (Law No. 239 of 24 March 1970) allowed the
termination of pregnancies of less than sixteen weeks old if the pregnancy or
delivery would serve to endanger her life or health, if child-bearing or rearing
would be hard because of inadequate living conditions, if the pregnancy
was the result of rape, if the woman was younger than seventeen or older
than forty, if the woman already had three children, if there were reasons to
suspect fetal impairment, or if at least one of the parents was unable to care
for the child.
Abortions in cases of fetal impairment were to be authorized by the State
Medical Board. In special circumstances, abortions between sixteen and
twenty weeks of gestation could be terminated (World Health Organisation,
1970, p. 701). Abortions following sexual oﬀence were to be performed only
if legal action in respect to the crime has been taken. In all other cases, two
physicians were to provide a written recommendation. Abortions were to be
performed by a licensed physician in selected hospitals, with the exception of
abortions that had to be performed to save the life of the pregnant woman.
Women requesting an abortion were to request the procedure themselves,
and be provided with information on the procedure prior to the abortion
and information on contraception following the abortion.
Law No. 564 of 19 July 1978 amended Section 5 of Law No. 239. Under this
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law, abortions could be performed on pregnancies with gestational lengths
between twelve weeks and twenty weeks, if the woman had a disease or
physical defect, or if the woman seeking an abortion was younger than
seventeen years old, or in case of other special reasons, to be reviewed and
decided upon by a medical board. Law No. 572 of 12 July 1985 again
amended Section 5 of Law No. 239 to include fetal impairment as a legally
permitted reason for terminating pregnancies between twelve and twenty-
four weeks of gestation. Law No. 328 of 6 April 2001 made it possible that
legal guardians submitted a request for an abortion if a woman was deemed
mentally incompetent to issue a request (President and Fellows of Harvard
College, 2011).
2.3.6 France
In France, abortion was illegal under Article 317 of the Penal Code. Decree
55-512 of May 1955, embodying the code of medical ethics, permitted a
therapeutic abortion if abortion was the only way of saving the life of the
pregnant woman. The physician in attendance must obtain the written
certificates of two medical consultants stating that an abortion is the only
way of saving the pregnant woman’s life (Roemer, 1967). If conscience
objections make it impossible for a physician to advise an abortion, he or
she may reject to do so, if the ongoing of the treatment by another physician
is ensured (World Health Organisation, 1971b).
In 1975, Law No. 75-17 of 18 January 1975 came into eﬀect, after being
accorded in 1974. This law suspended Penal Code 317 for a period of five
years. Abortion was made available on request in case of situations of distress
for pregnant women to the end of the tenth week of gestation.9
Further conditions were stipulated. Firstly, the procedure was required
to take place in a private or public hospital. Further, the procedure must
be performed by a physician. A physician may refuse to participate in the
treatment, but needs to express this to the pregnant woman during the first
meeting. The responsible physician must inform the pregnant woman about
the risks involved and provide her with information about legal assistance to
families and mothers, and also inform the pregnant woman of possibilities for
adoption. Also, women must consult with a family counsellor, pose a written
request, and observe a waiting period of one week. Post-abortion counselling
on contraceptives is to be proposed. Furthermore, unmarried minors require
parental consent. Pregnancies that seriously endanger women’s lives can
be aborted only after certification by two physicians. The same proviso is
made if there is a strong possibility that the unborn child is suﬀering from a
particularly serious disease (World Health Organisation, 1975, p. 354).
With the adaptation of Law No. 79-1204 of December 31, 1979, the legaliza-
tion of abortion as proposed by the temporary 1975 law was made permanent.
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Only minor changes were made. In addition to several clarifying guidelines,
two new conditions were introduced. If the obligatory waiting period of one
week caused the gestational limit to be exceeded, the physician may shorten
the waiting period to two days.
In 2001, Law No. 588 regulated further conditions for abortions. The
gestational limit for legal abortions was lengthened to twelve weeks. Abortion
remained available without restrictions pertaining to reasons. Women should
consult a doctor and after a waiting period of one week send a written request
to a committee of two medical doctors and a social worker. Again, if the
required waiting period would cause the gestational limit to be exceeded, the
waiting period can be shortened to two days. Pregnancies older than twelve
weeks may be terminated if the continuation of pregnancy poses a serious
risk to the health of the woman or if a strong probability exists that the
child, if born, will suﬀer from a severe and incurable illness. Minors seeking
abortion require parental consent and are obliged to seek advice from a social
worker.
2.3.7 Germany
After the formal re-unification of Germany in 1990, Germany did not have a
federal abortion law for two years. Pending the enactment of a federal German
abortion law, former East-German federal states adhered to the abortion law
of the German Democratic Republic and former Western-German federal
states kept the former Federal Republic of Germany’s abortion laws.
On 27 June 1992, the German abortion law (Gesetz zur Vermeidung und
Bewa¨ltigung von Schwangerschaftskonflikten) was passed - it came into eﬀect
on 5 August 1992. Under this law, abortions were available on request up to
the end of the twelfth week of pregnancy. Women had to undergo counselling
by a physician and a three-day waiting period was mandatory. However, if
the pregnant woman insisted on being in a state of distress after having met
these requirements, she was to be granted the right to abort her pregnancy.
Up to the 22nd week of pregnancy, abortions were legal in cases of fetal
impairment. During the entire pregnancy, abortions were legal to save a
woman’s life and in cases of grave danger to physical or mental health (United
Nations, 2002).
On May 28 1993, the German Constitutional Court ruled that the new
German law was unconstitutional for violating the right to life that was
guaranteed by the German constitution. Following this ruling, abortions for
non-medical reasons were considered illegal. However, the Court also ruled
that women who were having illegal abortions and the practitioners perform-
ing those abortions were not to be prosecuted (United Nations, 2009). On 21
August 1995, the German Parliament adhered to the Constitutional Court’s
2.3. DEVELOPMENTS IN ABORTION LEGISLATION IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 37
ruling and enacted the abortion law that is currently still in force. Under this
law, abortion is illegal but women and physicians are not punishable under
certain circumstances. Pregnancies up until the twelfth week of gestation
can be aborted in cases of rape or sexual crimes, and if the pregnant woman
experiences a state of distress. In the latter case, counselling is compulsory
(International Planned Parenthood, 2009). This prescribed counselling is
designed and intended to inform the women that the unborn child has a
right to life, and subsequently aim to convince her to continue their preg-
nancy. However, if the woman insists, the abortion can be performed without
prosecution.
Abortions was legally performed during the entire pregnancy in order
to save the pregnant woman’s life and to safeguard her physical or mental
(emotional) health. According to one source, this includes mental health
risks caused by fetal malformation and general health risks associated with
an unfavourable socioeconomic situation (International Planned Parenthood,
2009). However, explicit references to fetal impairments were stricken from
the law in deference to Germany’s national socialist history (United Nations,
2002).
Other conditions mandate that the abortion must be performed in a
hospital or other authorized facility, and can only be performed with the
consent of the pregnant woman. In case of abortions for medical reasons, the
abortion needs to be approved by a physician other than the medical doctor
performing the procedure. A waiting period of three days is compulsory.
2.3.8 Greece
Under the Greek Penal Code of 1950, abortion was allowed if it was necessary
to save the life of the pregnant woman or preventing a serious and lasting
injury to her health; or if the pregnancy was the result of rape, or incest or
of the seduction of a girl younger than fifteen years old. In 1978, Law No.
821 of 14 October was passed. Next to the reasons already mentioned in
the Penal Code, abortions were also allowed in cases of a risk to the mental
health of the pregnant woman and the pregnancy was in its first trimester.
The risk had to be ascertained by two physicians (Heiss, 1967). Pregnancies
could be terminated up until the 20th week if serious fetal malformations
were detecred (World Health Organisation, 1979, pp. 560-563).10
Law No. 1609 of 28 June 1986 allowed pregnancy termination on request for
first trimester pregnancies (United Nations, 2002). Up until the nineteenth
week of gestation, pregnancies that were the result of rape, incest or the
seduction of a minor could also be terminated legally. If evidence of fetal
malformation was present, pregnancies could be terminated until the twenty-
fourth week of pregnancy. During the entire gestational period, abortions
could be performed in cases of unavoidable risk to life of woman, or in cases
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of serious and permanent harm to the woman’s physical or mental health. All
abortions have to be carried out by an obstetrician or gynaecologist, assisted
by an anaesthetist in a comprehensive care unit. A medical certificate is
needed in case of abortion on medical grounds. If the pregnant woman is a
minor (i.e., under sixteen years), the consent of one of the parents or legal
guardian is necessary.
2.3.9 Iceland
Potts et al. (1977) state that from 1935 to 1975, abortion in Iceland was
regulated by Law No. 38 of 28 January 1935. This law stipulates that
abortions of pregnancies earlier than eight weeks of gestation were legal if
women had given birth to many children in short intervals, if a short time
had passed since last confinement, and if women’s domestic conditions were
diﬃcult because of a large number of children, poverty or serious health-
problems of other members of the family. In practice, a gestational limit of
twelve weeks was observed. Abortions for medical reasons were permitted
until twenty-eight weeks of gestation. Conditions for having an abortion
included the requirement that two doctors had to certify the need for the
abortion, and that the abortion must be carried out in a registered place.
On 22 May 1975, a new law on abortion came into force (World Health
Organisation, 1977, pp. 614-620). Abortions must be performed as early
in the pregnancy as possible, preferably before the end of the twelfth week
of gestations, but no later than the 16th week. Early term abortions are
allowed if a threat exists to life or to mental or physical health of the pregnant
woman, when the pregnancy is the result of a crime, in cases of serious fetal
defects and when a woman is too young or mentally ill to take care of a
child. In addition, abortions on social grounds are allowed, including the
grounds for abortion specified by the 1935 law. Further conditions that are
legally required include a mandatory counselling before and after having
an abortion. Furthermore, abortions must be performed in a hospital, and
written reports need to be made by either two medical doctors or one medical
doctor and one social worker. Beyond sixteen weeks of gestation, pregnancies
can only be terminated for unmistakable medical reasons, for example if
the life and health of the woman are endangered by continued pregnancy or
child birth, or if there exists a substantial risk of malformation, hereditary
defects or damage to the fetus. If a woman is younger than sixteen or has
been declared legally incompetent, her parents or guardians have to consent
for the termination of a pregnancy. This requirement can be waived if there
exists good reasons to do so.
2.3. DEVELOPMENTS IN ABORTION LEGISLATION IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 39
2.3.10 Ireland
Before 1983, abortion in Ireland was part of the Oﬀences against the Person
Act of 1861. This act states that “unlawful” abortion is a crime, with both
the person performing the abortion and the pregnant woman subject to
imprisonment. The act does not state which abortions, if any, will not be
considered unlawful.
On 7 October 1983, the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution Act was
adopted. This amendment constitutionally reaﬃrmed the illegality of abor-
tion in Ireland by inserting the following in Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution
of Ireland: “The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with
due regard to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to
respect, and, as far as is practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate that
right.”.
A number of court proceedings are further particularly relevant to the legal
status of abortion in Ireland. On 19 December 1986, a court ruling in the case
of “Attorney General (Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ltd.)
versus Open Door counselling Ltd.” eﬀectively banned the dissemination of
information about abortion services in the United Kingdom from Ireland. On
March 5 1992, the Supreme Court of Ireland ruled in the case of “Attorney
General v. X and Others” and granted a fourteen year old schoolgirl who got
pregnant as a result of rape the right to travel to the United Kingdom to have
an abortion. Also in 1992, the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution
was approved to aﬃrm the right to make public information on abortion
services outside Ireland available to the Irish. This constitutional amendment
was given eﬀect by Act No. 5 of 1995. These legal proceedings did not alter
the legal status of abortion.
2.3.11 Italy
Before 1975, abortion in Italy was regulated by Article 545 of the Italian
Penal Code of 1930. This code prohibited the performance of abortions. The
only exceptions were made for abortions that were necessary to save the life
of the pregnant woman. On February 18, 1975, Constitutional Court rulings
deemed that laws prohibiting abortions to end pregnancies for physical health
reasons were unconstitutional, which lead to a legalization of abortions for
reasons of physical health (United Nations, 2002).
On January 21 1977, a new Abortion Bill was adopted by the Italian Chamber
of Deputies. This Bill was rejected by a very narrow majority in the Senate.
Subsequently, the bill was introduced again in the House of Deputies (Rust
Bullfinch, 1984).
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On 22 May 1978, passing of Law No. 194 on the Social Protection of
Motherhood and the Voluntary Termination of Pregnancy liberalized abortion.
Abortions carried out during the first 90 days of gestation are allowed if the
pregnant woman finds herself in a state of emergency. Further conditions
require that a woman must apply to an authorized health or welfare agency or
physician of her choosing. Agencies are required to actively oﬀer alternative
strategies to deal with undesired pregnancies, and physicians are legally
required to inform women seeking an abortion about their rights, as well
as to alternatives. If the woman persists, physicians are required to issue a
certificate that attests to the pregnancy and to the requested abortion. The
law now requires a mandatory waiting period of seven days in non-urgent
cases, after which a woman can present the certificate to a certified clinic and
obtain an abortion. In principle, parental consent is required for all abortion
requests made by minors. However, “if there are serious grounds rendering
it impossible or inadvisable to consult the persons having parental authority
or the guardian, or if those persons, being consulted, refuse their consent or
express conflicting opinions” (United Nations Fund for Population Activities,
1978, p. 130), the parental consent requirements can be disregarded. In this
case, the consent of the magistrate accountable for guardianship is necessary.
After 90 days of gestation, Law No. 194 allows abortions if the pregnancy
or child-birth seriously endangers women’s lives, their physical health, their
mental health, if it is probable that the fetus is malformed or impaired, and
in cases of rape.
2.3.12 Luxembourg
For almost an entire century, abortion in Luxembourg was regulated under the
1879 Penal Code Section 348-353, prohibiting the termination of pregnancies
altogether (Luxembourg, 1879). However, if the continuation of the pregnancy
would risk the life the pregnant woman, abortion was legal during the entire
pregnancy on grounds of necessity (United Nations, 2002).
On 15 November 1978, revisions concerning the termination of pregnancy
were made to the Penal Code. According to the Luxembourg Penal Code
Section 348-353 abortion is prohibited, but there are several exceptions under
which abortion is not punishable (Luxembourg, 1978). Section 353 states
that abortion is not punishable during the first twelve weeks of the pregnancy
when the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman is at risk due to
the pregnancy, when there is a serious risk that the child will suﬀer from
a serious illness, physical deformities, or significant mental impairment, or
when the pregnancy results from rape. After twelve weeks of pregnancy,
abortion is lawful if the woman’s life or health is seriously at risk. In this
case, two qualified physicians must produce a written certification of these
medical indications.11
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The 1978 Penal Code also includes other provisions that need to be met
in the case of first trimester pregnancies. A gynaecologist or obstetrician
must inform the pregnant woman on the medical risks of the procedure. The
procedure will not be performed within one week after this consultation.
Furthermore, written consent of the pregnant woman is necessary or, when
the pregnant woman’s life is in danger, when she is a minor or unable to
express her will, the written consent of a legal representative. Two licensed
physician must grant authorization for the abortion. Physicians are not
obliged to carry out the abortion, unless the life of the pregnant woman is
immediately at risk.
2.3.13 The Netherlands
Before the abortion reform of 1981, abortion was regulated in the Penal
Code Chapter 19, Section 295-298, which was introduced on 15 April 1886.
According to the Penal Code, abortion was illegal, but on grounds of necessity,
not punishable when the pregnancy was terminated to preserve the life of the
pregnant woman (De Bruijn, 1979; Ketting, 1978; Ketting and Van Praag,
1983; Van Tienhoven van den Bogaard, 1887).
On the first of May 1981, the Law on the Termination of Pregnancy was
adopted. The law came in force on 1 November 1984. According to this law,
abortion is available until the fetus is viable if the woman states that she is
in a situation of distress (The Netherlands, 1981).12
Between 1984 and 2010, the period until the fetus is viable was set at
twenty-four weeks. In order to have an abortion, the pregnant woman should
state to a physician that she considers herself to be in a state of distress,
and that the termination of the pregnancy is the only way to end this state.
The pregnant woman will be informed on other solutions to end the state of
emergency, such as adoption. The abortion will take place after a five-day
waiting period. After this period, the physician ensures that the woman is
still requesting the abortion, has made the decision carefully and voluntarily,
and is aware of her responsibility for unborn life and the consequences for
her and her relatives. If the pregnancy is in a later stage, abortion is not
punishable if the life of the pregnant woman is in danger, or if it is reasonable
to assume that the fetus will die during or directly after birth. Pregnant
women under the age of sixteen formally need parental approval for the
abortion (The Netherlands, 1995), although this is not necessary in practice
(Ketting and Van Praag, 1986).
2.3.14 Norway
Anno 1960, abortion in Norway was regulated in Section 245 of the Penal
Code, which prohibited unlawful abortions. A circular of the Ministry of
Justice from 1899 states that abortion is lawful in case of serious danger to
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the life or health of the pregnant woman, or if the fetus would not be able to
survive the birth (Heiss, 1967). Løkeland (2004) gives a similar description
of the legal status of abortion.
Law no 2 of 11 November 1960 broadened the grounds for a legal abortion,
but did not come into force before February 1964 (World Health Organisation,
1965, 1971a). Under this new law, abortion was available on medical, eugenic
and juridical grounds during the first three months of the pregnancy. Abortion
was allowed in the event that there was serious risk to the pregnant woman’s
life or health. In assessing this risk, living conditions that could lead to
physical or mental health problems must also be taken into consideration.
Furthermore, abortion was available when there were indications of serious
physical or mental deficiencies to the fetus, or when the pregnancy resulted
from a crime. After the first trimester, abortion is only allowed if there is
serious threat to the life or health of the pregnant woman. A medical board
- consisting of two physicians, of whom one is not working in the hospital
where the abortion takes place - must authorize for the termination of a
pregnancy. If the request for abortion is not granted, the request could be
made at another hospital. Consent of a parent or representative was not
necessary if the pregnant woman was a minor, but “one of her parents or
her guardian or administrator may, if necessary, make a statement of his or
her opinion concerning such application” (World Health Organisation, 1965,
pp. 148-149).
Law no 50 of 13 June 1975 allowed the board of approval to take social
grounds into consideration as well (Cook and Dickens, 1978; Løkeland, 2004).
This is formulated in the law as “the woman’s total situation should be
considered (. . . ) In this respect, the woman’s own assessment of the situation
should carry great weight” (United Nations Fund for Population Activities,
1975, p. 46). Thus, while the medical board was still responsible for granting
the abortion, the pregnant woman’s opinion became more important in this
decision. The abortion should take place preferably in the first twelve weeks
of the pregnancy. Between twelve and eighteen weeks, the grounds for an
abortion “should be interpreted more strictly” and could only be terminated
for “particular strong reasons” after eighteen week and if the fetus was not
viable (United Nations Fund for Population Activities, 1975, p. 47). The
role of the parents in case the pregnant woman was a minor was similar to
the 1960 abortion law.
Abortion has been available upon request during the first twelve weeks of
the pregnancy since the first of January 1979 (United Nations Fund for
Population Activities, 1978; World Health Organisation, 1979, 1980). Law
No. 16 of 16 June 1978 came into force directly. Amendments No. 65 and
No. 66 stipulate that abortion is lawful during the first eighteen weeks on
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medical grounds, both physical and mental, on grounds of living conditions,
in case of fetal defects, when the pregnancy resulted from a crime or if the
pregnant woman suﬀered from mental illness. If the fetus is viable, abortion
is not granted. Similar to the 1975 law, the woman’s own assessment of the
situation should be taken into consideration. After eighteen weeks, abortion
is available on “particularly important grounds”, unless there are reasons to
believe that the fetus is viable. Abortion is lawful during the entire pregnancy
if the life of the pregnant woman is in danger.
After twelve weeks of pregnancy, a board consisting of two physicians
needs to approve the abortion. This board consists of two physicians, of
whom one is not working for the hospital where the procedure shall take
place. In addition, one of the physicians needs to be a woman. The request
is only granted if the board reaches a unanimous decision. If the request
for an abortion is not granted, the request shall be automatically forwarded
to an appeal board, consisting of two physicians and a social worker. The
request is granted when the majority of this board believes that the abortion
is lawful.
The law mandates that a woman seeking an abortion is provided with
information on the procedure and possible complications of that procedure,
and is informed that she has the right to have support in the decision-making
process. Parental consent is not necessary, but if the pregnant woman is
younger than sixteen years old or mentally retarded, the parents have the
right to express their opinion on the termination of the pregnancy. Minors
who have reasons not to inform their parents need the consent of a county
medical oﬃcer. Furthermore, if the woman is incapable of giving consent, a
legal representative has to give his or her consent.
2.3.15 Portugal
Until 1984, abortion in Portugal was regulated by Section 358 of the Criminal
Code of 16 September 1886, prohibiting abortion with exception of abortions
to preserve the life of the pregnant woman (United Nations, 2002).
On 11 May 1984, the abortion law was liberalized when Law No. 6 was
adopted (Portugal, 1984). Section 139-141 of said law stipulated that abortion
was permitted up to twelve weeks of pregnancy if the abortion was the result
of a crime, or to avoid physical or mental health to the pregnant woman.
If there existed a serious risk that the child, if born, would suﬀer from
malformation or a serious disease, abortion was permitted until sixteen weeks
of pregnancy. Abortion was permitted during the entire pregnancy when
the life of the pregnant woman was in danger, or in case of “serious and
irreversible damage to the body or the physical or mental health of the
pregnant woman” (United Nations Fund for Population Activities, 1984,
p. 356).
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There were some additional conditions that needed to be met. The health
reasons needed to be confirmed by two physicians or, in case of crime, the
authorization was based on evidence of the criminal act. Written consent of
the pregnant woman was required. Furthermore, a legal representative must
give his or her consent if the pregnant woman was under the age of sixteen
years or incapable of expressing her consent, although this condition was
“depending on the circumstances” (World Health Organisation, 1985, p. 769).
Both the written consent and the authorization of the physicians were to be
filed three days before the procedure (United Nations, 2002; United Nations
Fund for Population Activities, 1984).
In 1997, Law No. 90 was adopted (Portugal, 1997). The law extended the
time limits for abortion on the ground of fetal impairment to twenty-four
weeks, and if the pregnancy was the result of a crime, to sixteen weeks.
Since 17 April 2007, abortion is available upon request during the first ten
weeks of the pregnancy (Portugal, 2007). Law no. 16 states that, after the
gestational limit is exceeded, abortion is permitted during the first twelve
weeks for physical and mental health reasons. Abortion is also permitted
during the first sixteen weeks if the pregnancy is the result of a crime, and
during the first twenty-four weeks when there is a risk that the child will
be born with an incurable disease or malformation. The woman shall be
oﬀered information to help her make the decision to terminate the pregnancy.
Furthermore, there is a three-day waiting period between the first consultation
and the treatment. The additional conditions for abortion - such as parental
consent or the approval of two physicians - do not diﬀer from the law of 1983.
Abortion is permitted during the entire gestational period to preserve the life
of the pregnant woman. The abortion can be performed immediately and
without the consent of the woman if she is unable to express her consent and
if it may reasonably be assumed that she would normally have granted it.
In such cases, the circumstances must be recorded on the medical certificate.
2.3.16 Spain
Until 1985, abortion was regulated by the Penal Code of 1944. Abortion
was prohibited altogether in Articles 411 to 417 (World Health Organisation,
1974, pp. 579-580). Abortion was, however, allowed to save a pregnant
woman’s life on the ground of Article 8 Section 7 on emergency (Heiss, 1967).
The abortion law was reformed when Organic Law No. 9 of 5 July 1985 was
adopted, which came into force on 2 August 1985 (Spain, 1985). Abortion was
permitted during the first twelve weeks of the pregnancy when the pregnancy
was the result of a crime. The pregnancy could be terminated during the
first twenty-two weeks of the pregnancy if there was serious damage to the
fetus. During the whole gestational period, abortion was allowed when the
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pregnancy imposed a serious risk to the pregnant woman’s life or physical
or mental health. If the pregnancy resulted from a crime, the crime must
have been reported to the police. The woman was to give her consent to
the termination of the pregnancy. Two physicians were required to certify
the grounds for abortion in case of fetal impairment, or when the pregnant
woman’s health was at risk. When there was an immediate threat to the life
of the woman, the procedure could be performed without the consent of the
pregnant woman and a second physician. The law did not stipulate anything
on specific procedures for minors.
The abortion law in Spain was again altered on 3 March 2010, when the
Organic Law No. 2 was accepted. Abortion became available on request
during the first fourteen weeks of gestation (Spain, 2010). Abortion on
medical grounds is no longer permitted during the entire pregnancy. Organic
Law No. 2 of 3 March 2010 restricts abortion on these grounds to twenty-two
weeks of gestational age. The termination of pregnancies for reasons of fetal
impairment is restricted to this time limit as well. Article 13 of the law
states that pregnant woman of sixteen and seventeen years old need the
consent of at least one parent or legal representative. This consent is not
necessary if it will lead to a serious conflict between the woman and her
parent(s). Furthermore, the law does not discuss whether minors younger
than sixteen years need parental consent. The pregnant woman must be
provided with information regarding the procedure, as well as her rights and
family benefits. Counselling before and after the procedure must be oﬀered
to the pregnant woman. Abortions may not be performed within three days
after the first appointment. Furthermore, if the abortion is terminated on
medical grounds, the opinion of two physicians is necessary. During the
whole gestational period, abortion can be performed to save the pregnant
woman’s life. Written consent of the pregnant woman or the approval of a
second physician is not necessary if the danger is immediate. The law came
into eﬀect on 5 July 2010.
2.3.17 Sweden
Before 1974, the Swedish Abortion Act determined the legality of abortion
in Sweden. This act was adopted in 1938 and came in force in 1942. In this
Act, abortion was permitted in the first twenty weeks of the pregnancy if the
pregnancy resulted from a crime and in case of fetal impairment (Tietze, 1967;
United Nations, 2002). Permission to have an abortion needed to be granted
by the health authority board, and the procedure was required to take place
in a hospital or designated clinic. After the first twenty weeks of pregnancy,
abortion was legal if to preserve the life or health of the pregnant woman.
Minors could not obtain an abortion without parental consent (Eugenic
Society, 1939). Amendments to this abortion act were made in 1946 and
46 2. DEVELOPMENTS IN WESTERN EUROPEAN ABORTION POLICIES
1963 (Ketting and Van Praag, 1983; Tietze, 1967; United Nations, 2002).
Since 1946, women seeking abortion had to consult a social worker prior to
the abortion. Furthermore, the twenty-week gestational limit was replaced
by a twenty-four-week limit. In 1963, the reasons for an abortion in case of
fetal impairment were broadened (World Health Organisation, 1966, p. 152).
Law 595 was adopted on 14 June 1974 and came into eﬀect on the first of
January 1975 (United Nations Fund for Population Activities, 1974). This
law altered the Abortion Act. Section 1 stating that during the first twelve
weeks of the pregnancy, abortion was available upon request when “it can be
assumed that the operation, because of the woman’s illness, would seriously
endanger her life or health’ (United Nations Fund for Population Activities,
1974, pp. 68-69). Section 2 stated that abortion was also available on request
between twelve and eighteen weeks, but added as an extra requirement a
mandatory investigation on whether the procedure would risk the life or
health of the pregnant woman. If the request was not approved, the National
Board of Health and Welfare decided whether the abortion could take place.
After eighteen weeks abortion was allowed in case of serious risk to the
pregnant woman’s life or health. The National Board of Health and Welfare
was also to make this decision. Abortion was not granted if there was reason
to believe that the fetus was viable. If the woman was a minor, parental
consent was not needed (Ketting and Van Praag, 1986). Abortion is only
available for Swedish residents, unless the National Board states otherwise
(United Nations, 2002).
On 18 May 1995, Law No. 660 amended the 1974 abortion law. The
amendment includes a section that states that the woman should be oﬀered
counselling after she had an abortion (World Health Organisation, 1996,
pp. 36-37). Furthermore, Section 2 of the abortion act was repealed, and the
time limit in Section 1 was broadened to eighteen weeks.
2.3.18 Switzerland
Prior to the 2002 Abortion Law, abortion in Switzerland was regulated
by the Penal Code of 21 December 1937. According to Sections 118-120,
abortion was only legal to preserve the life of the pregnant woman, or when
the health of the pregnant woman was seriously at risk (Heiss, 1967; United
Nations, 2002; World Health Organisation, 1971a). The pregnant woman had
to give consent, and if she was not capable of doing so, a legal representative
was required to give consent. Furthermore, abortions were to be performed
in hospitals or designated clinics (Ketting and Van Praag, 1986). The
physician was only allowed to terminate pregnancies with approbation from
another physician, except when there was immediate danger to the life of the
pregnant woman. Although the Penal Code did not state that minors need
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parental consent for an abortion, this requirement diﬀered across cantons.
For instance, the Canton of Geneva required parental consent, according
to the regulations of 12 December 1953 (World Health Organisation, 1955,
p. 739).
After a referendum on a new abortion law, an amendment liberalizing
abortion was added to the Penal Code on 23 March 2001 and came into
force on September 2002 (Switzerland, 2010). Abortion became available on
request during the first twelve weeks of the pregnancy if the pregnant woman
states to a physician that she is in a state of emergency. The consent of the
pregnant woman is a necessary prerequisite for an abortion. If the woman is
incapable of giving this consent, a legal representative has to provide consent.
The physician needs to counsel the pregnant woman prior to the treatment.
Parental approval is not necessary for minors, but pregnant women under
the age of sixteen have to attend additional counselling. After twelve weeks
of pregnancy, abortion is permitted to prevent physical suﬀering or a state of
deep distress, which will be greater if the pregnancy continues. The physician
must certify whether these conditions are met. Abortions are required to
takes place in hospitals or designated clinics.
2.3.19 The United Kingdom
Before the Abortion Act of 1967 came into force, abortion was regulated in
the United Kingdom by Oﬀences Against the Person Act 1861, the Infant
Life (Preservation) Act 1929 and the decision in the court case of Rex versus
Bourne. Sections 58 and 59 stated that abortion was prohibited, but the
Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 defined child destruction as “the killing
of a child capable of being born alive (gestation age of twenty-eight weeks or
more) unless the act that caused the death of the child was done in good faith
for the sole purpose of preserving the life of the mother” (United Kingdom,
1929). Following from this act, abortion was legal when the pregnant woman’s
life was in danger.13
In 1938, the court reviewed an abortion in the court case Rex versus Bourne.
A young girl became pregnant as a result of rape, and the court ruled
that her abortion was not illegal since it had prevented her from becoming
a “physical and mental wreck”(United Nations, 2002). Following from the
court’s interpretation of the abortion law, abortion was permitted on grounds
of physical or mental health. In 1945, the Criminal Justice Act came into
eﬀect in Northern Ireland. This act stated that abortion was prohibited, and
could only be performed in case of serious risk to the life of the pregnant
woman (Northern Ireland, 1945). In practice, abortion was allowed for
physical and mental health reasons as well, following the court ruling in Rex
v Bourne (Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety, 2010).
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On 27 October 1967, the Abortion Act was passed by the Parliament of the
United Kingdom. Coming into force on 27 April 1968, this act broadened
the grounds on which women could have an abortion. The law is eﬀective in
England, Wales and Scotland, but not in Northern Ireland, where abortion
is still regulated by the Criminal Justice Act 1945. Abortion became not
punishable within the first twenty-eight weeks of gestation if “the continuance
of the pregnancy would involve (. . . ) injury to the physical or mental health
of the pregnant woman or any existing children of her family, greater than if
the pregnancy were terminated” (United Kingdom, 1967). Two physicians
have to grant authorization for the abortion. Physicians with conscientious
objections are not required to participate in the procedure. After twenty-eight
weeks of gestation, abortion remained regulated according to the Infant Life
(Preservation) Act. The law does not state whether minors are allowed to
have an abortion without the consent of their parents. However, the so-called
Fraser guidelines, resulting from the 1985 case Gillick v West Norfolk and
Wisbech Area Health Authority, apply. These guidelines state that parental
consent is not necessary if the woman is able to understand the physicians’
advice, she is able to make the decision, it would harm her physically or
mentally if the pregnancy was not terminated, she is not willing to tell her
parents and if informing her parents would be problematic for the pregnant
woman.
On 24 April 1990, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act was adopted.
This included an amendment of the Abortion Act (United Kingdom, 1990).
This section repeals the Infant Life (Preservation) Act. The time limit for
an abortion - when there is risk to the physical or mental health of the
pregnant woman or her existing children - is lowered from twenty-eight weeks
to twenty-four weeks. After twenty-four weeks, abortion is now permitted
to preserve the life of the pregnant woman, in case of serious injury to her
physical or mental health, or if there is risk that the child will be born
seriously handicapped. The law does not specify the diﬀerence between
serious injury and risk to the pregnant woman’s health.
2.4 Cross-national Classification of Abortion Leg-
islation
After having described in detail how the legal status of abortion in various
Western European countries has developed over the years, we now turn to
classifying the laws into categories that allow for a cross-national comparison
of the level of permissiveness. As is obvious from the country descriptions
in the previous section, restrictions may limit access to abortion. The most
basic way in which laws aim to limit access to abortion is by limiting the
number of reasons for legal abortion. Table 2.1 classifies the abortion laws
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of eighteen Western European countries between 1960 and 2010 in nine
categories that show the various legal restrictions on abortion. We categorize
countries according to the letter of the law as published in the actual texts of
the law, as well as publications of court decisions and other relevant statutes.
It should be noted that the law can be interpreted more liberally than the
level of restrictiveness would seem to indicate. For example, the Belgian
College of Prosecutors General agreed not to prosecute abortion between
1973 and 1981 (Trommelmans, 2006). At that time, Belgium had a very
restrictive abortion law, allowing abortion only to save a woman’s life. The
Prosecutors’ treaty de facto legalized abortion on request. However, abortion
laws can also be more restrictive than would appear from the law. For
example, in Italy the reluctance of medical practitioners to provide abortion
services makes abortion less available than it would be in other countries
that also allow abortion for socioeconomic reasons (International Planned
Parenthood, 2009). We divide the legality of abortion in Western European
countries between 1960 and 2010 in nine commonly used categories (United
Nations, 2002). These categories are:
1. Pregnancy termination is not permitted under any circumstances
2. Pregnancy termination is permitted to save a pregnant woman’s life
3. Pregnancy termination is permitted if a pregnant woman’s physical
health is in danger
4. Pregnancy termination is permitted if a pregnant woman’s mental
health is in danger
5. Pregnancy termination is permitted if the pregnancy results from rape
or incest
6. Pregnancy termination is permitted if the fetus is impaired or non-
viable
7. Pregnancy termination is permitted if a pregnant woman cannot aﬀord
to carry the pregnancy to terms for socioeconomic reasons
8. Pregnancy termination is permitted if a pregnant woman states that
the pregnancy puts her in a state of distress
9. Pregnancy termination is permitted without restrictions pertaining to
reason
In the first category, abortion is never permitted. This is the most restrictive
legal category. The only case of this legal regime is found in Ireland until
1983.
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The second category allows abortion to save the life of the pregnant
woman. Laws allowing abortions under life-threatening conditions have
been or still are part of Penal Codes, for example in France, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain. Historically, the legal
grounds for avoiding criminal charges in cases where the woman’s life is en-
dangered by a pregnancy follow from the general legal principle of “necessity”
(Glendon, 1987).
The third category allows abortion to protect a woman’s physical health.
Some of the laws allow abortion for health reasons without explicitly requiring
that the threat to a woman’s health is physical in nature. In theory this
allows for a liberal interpretation of the concept of “health”, including mental
health and social factors that are health related. However, as Boland and
Katzive (2008) observe, many governments in principle have a restrictive
position on abortion. Following these authors we classify laws that allow
abortion for health reasons without explicitly mentioning mental health as
laws allowing abortion to protect physical health only.
Countries in the fourth category of laws allow abortion for mental health
reasons. While most European countries do allow abortion for mental health
reasons, all countries that allow abortion for such reasons also allow abortion
for reasons that are not directly related to the pregnant woman’s health or
life.
We also distinguish a number of countries that allow for abortion when
the pregnant woman was raped (category 5), or when the fetus is not viable
or malformed (category 6). In 1935, Iceland was the first Western-European
country to allow for abortion in cases where the broader social and economical
situation of a pregnant woman does not allow her to rear a child (category
7).
In the eighth category, we distinguish abortion laws with a so-called
distress model (e.g., Eser and Koch, 1988). Abortion is permitted during
the first weeks of the pregnancy if the pregnant woman states that she is in
a state of distress. In contrast with laws in the previous categories, these
laws do not necessitate the approval of physicians or a medical board.
Laws in the ninth category allow abortion on request without restrictions
as to reasons. Scandinavian countries were the first Western European
countries to allow abortion on request: Finland in 1970, Denmark in 1973,
Sweden in 1974, and Norway in 1978. Such laws do not require a state of
distress and also leave the final decision to abort to the pregnant woman
herself, as opposed to a committee or a medical doctor.
It is important to note that all European countries that allow women
to make the final decision (i.e., abortion laws in category 8 and 9) do so
only during a limited period of the pregnancy. In other words, even the least
restrictive laws impose gestational limits.
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In Table 2.1, we indicate this gestational limit by citing the number of
weeks that a pregnancy can be legally aborted. Most commonly, abortions
are available on request for pregnancies in the first trimester. When the
gestational limits have passed, abortions can often still be justified for other
reasons. However, the request for such abortions must usually be approved,
either by a medical doctor or a special committee. Abortions in the second
and third trimester may also be subject to gestational limits. For example, the
Greek law of 28 June 1986 allows abortion on request in the first twelve weeks
of a pregnancy. After that period, abortions that are the consequence of rape
can be terminated until the nineteenth week of pregnancy, and pregnancies
that involve fetal malformations can be aborted in the first twenty-four weeks.
As in most other European countries, abortions to save women’s life or to
protect her physical or mental health are permitted regardless of the length
of gestation.
In addition to the categorization of the permissiveness of abortion laws,
there are numerous other ways of restricting the access to abortion. Laws
may require that abortions can only be performed in hospitals or specialized
facilities. Laws may also call for the authorization of (at least) a second
physician. Besides the authorization of physicians, abortion laws may require
women who need an abortion to have consent of a third party, such as
the partner, or parents in the case of minors or mentally disabled women.
Furthermore, some laws waive this requisite if it is in the best interest of the
woman, while others do not require the consent of partner or parents, but
allow them to express their opinion. Laws may also mandate a waiting period
when there is no immediate thread to the pregnant woman. Physicians can be
allowed to refrain from the procedure on religious or ethical grounds. Table
2.2 gives an overview of these procedural barriers to abortion in Western
European abortion policies over time.
Laws that generally prohibit abortion a priori do not stipulate barriers to
legal abortion. This often holds for abortion laws allowing abortion to save
the life of the pregnant woman. In situations where there is an immediate
threat to the life of the woman, laws often have no obligations regarding the
location of the procedure, nor are there regulations on the consent of the
pregnant woman. Authorization of a second physician, if necessary, can be
waived. In such cases, physicians are not allowed to refuse to participate in
the abortion when they have conscientious objections to the termination of
pregnancies.
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Table 2.1: Cross-National Comparison of Developments concerning the Legality of
Abortion in Eighteen Western European Countries between 1960 and 2010a
Country Year Year Never Save Phy- Fetal Sex- Mental Socioec- Dis- On
adop- in act permit- life sical impair- ual health onomic tress re-
ted ted health ment crime grounds model quest
Austria 1937 1937 X X
1974 1975 X X X X 12b
Belgium 1867 1867 X
1990 1990 X X X 12
Denmark 1956 1956 X X 16 16 X
1970 1970 X X 12 12 X 12
1973 1973 X X X X X X 12
FR Germany, the 1933 1934 X X X
1976 1976 X X 22 12 X 12
Finland 1950 1950 X X 16c 16c 16c
1970 1970 X X 16d 16d 16d 16d
1978 1978 X X 12d 12d 12d 12d
France 1955 1955 X
1974 1975 X X 10
2001 2001 X X X 12
Germany 1992 1992 X X 22 X 12
1995 1995 X X 12 X X 12
Greece 1950 1950 X X X
1978 1978 X X 20 X 12
1986 1986 X X 24 19 X 12
Iceland 1935 1935 28 28 28 8
1975 1975 X X X 16 16 16
Ireland 1861 1861 X
1983 1983 X
Italy 1930 1931 X
1975 1975 X X
1978 1978 X X X X X 12e 12e
Luxembourg 1879 1879 X
1978 1978 X X 12 12 12 12
Netherlands, the 1886 1886 X
1981 1984 X X 24f
Norway 1902 1902 X X X
1960 1964 X X X X X
1975 1975 X X X X X 12
1978 1979 X 18 18 18 18 18 12
Portugal 1886 1886 X
1984 1984 X X 16 12 X
1997 1997 X X 24 16 X
2007 2007 X 12 24 16 12 10
Spain 1944 1944 X
1985 1985 X X 22 12 X
2010 2010 X 22 22 22 14
Sweden 1946 1946 X X 24 24 24
1974 1975 X X 18
Switzerland 1937 1942 X X X
2001 2002 X X X 12
United Kingdom, the 1929 1929 X
1967g 1968 X 28 28 28
1990g 1991 X X X X 24
a X: allowed during the entire gestation duration; numbers: upper gestational limitation (weeks) until
which abortion is permitted. b Abortion after 12 weeks when under the age of 14 c 20 weeks if minor.
d 20 weeks in very special cases. e 90 days. f 24 weeks measured as “24 weeks since last
menstruation”. g Law is not eﬀective in Northern Ireland.
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Table 2.3: Cross-National Comparison of Developments concerning the Provision
of Information and Counselling in Eighteen Western European Countries between
1960 and 2010a
Country Year Year Risk of Inform on Help with Information (After)
adopted in act procedure alternatives final on contra- care
decision ceptives
Austria 1937 1937 No No No No No
Belgium 1867 1867 No No No No No
1990 1990 Yes Yes (. . . ) Yes (. . . )
Denmark 1956 1956 Yes No No No No
1973 1973 (. . . ) Nob (. . . ) (. . . ) (. . . )
2000 2000 (. . . ) (. . . ) (. . . ) (. . . ) Nob
FR Germany, the 1933 1934 No No No No No
1976 1976 Yes Yes (. . . ) (. . . ) (. . . )
Finland 1950 1950 Yes No No No No
1970 1970 (. . . ) (. . . ) (. . . ) Yes (. . . )
France 1955 1955 No No No No No
1974 1975 Yes Yes (. . . ) (. . . ) (. . . )
Germany 1992 1992 Yes Yes No No Noc
Greece 1950 1950 No No No No No
Iceland 1935 1935 No No No No No
1975 1975 Yes Yes (. . . ) Yes (. . . )
Ireland 1861 1861 No No No No No
Italy 1930 1931 No No No No No
1978 1978 Yes Yes (. . . ) Yes (. . . )
Luxembourg 1879 1879 No No No No No
1978 1978 Yes (. . . ) (. . . ) (. . . ) (. . . )
Netherlands, the 1886 1886 No No No No No
1981 1984 Yes Yes Yesd Nob Nob
Norway 1902 1902 No No No No No
1975 1975 Yes Yes (. . . ) (. . . ) (. . . )
1978 1979 (. . . ) (. . . ) Nob (. . . ) (. . . )
Portugal 1886 1886 No No No No No
2007 2007 Yes Yes No No No
Spain 1944 1944 No No No No No
2010 2010 Yes Yes No Yes Nob
Sweden 1946 1946 No No No No Yes
1974 1975 (. . . ) (. . . ) (. . . ) (. . . ) No
1995 1995 (. . . ) (. . . ) (. . . ) (. . . ) Nob
Switzerland 1937 1942 No No No No No
2001 2002 Yes Yes (. . . ) (. . . ) (. . . )
United Kingdom, the 1929 1929 No No No No No
a (. . . ): Regulation unchanged. b Shall be oﬀered. c Shall be oﬀered at the request of the
pregnant woman. d If necessary.
Laws may also stipulate that women receive information or counselling.
In Table 2.3, we provide a summary of the changes in these regulations
of Western European abortion laws. The column Risks of the procedure
summarizes whether the abortion law explicitly demands that the physician
informs the pregnant woman on the medical consequences and risks of the
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treatment. Pregnant women may be obliged to be informed on alternatives
to abortion. Society might oﬀer benefits or social care for young parents
to overcome economic grounds for an abortion, and adoption can be an
alternative to an abortion. Furthermore, social workers might be able to
help with the final decision, when this is necessary. To avoid unwanted
pregnancies, the woman might be oﬀered information on contraceptives prior
or after the procedure. (After)Care may be obliged to avoid emotional
problems that can be caused by the treatment.
2.5 Conclusions
So how do the descriptions and categorizations in the previous sections answer
the question we set out in this chapter: Which changes in the conditions
for legally obtaining an abortion and the procedural barriers to abortion
occured in Western European countries between 1960 and 2010? In general,
it can be concluded that induced abortion laws in Europe have become
increasingly less restrictive during the past fifty years. In the early 1960s
access to abortion was highly restricted in most Western European countries.
During the fifty years we observed, most countries have progressively lifted
restrictions pertaining to the availability of abortion. However, sometimes
countries adopted more restrictive abortion laws: Denmark in 1973, Finland
in 1978, and the United Kingdom in 1990. These countries reduced the
length of the period in which abortion was allowed for socioeconomic reasons.
In 2011, thirteen of the eighteen European countries we discussed have
laws that allow abortion if the pregnant woman states that she is in a state
of distress, or on request during the first trimester of her pregnancy. With
the exception of Ireland, all countries in this review allow early abortion at
least for socioeconomic reasons today.
While the legality of abortion greatly influences the extent to which women
can obtain an abortion, procedural barriers can limit the access to abortion.
When there is no immediate threat to the life of the pregnant woman,
abortion can only take place in hospitals or authorized facilities. Nowadays,
the authorization of (at least) a second physician is necessary in thirteen
of the eighteen countries survey when the abortion is performed on (socio-
)medical grounds. The access to abortion can be restricted for minors. In
nine of the countries, minors need the consent of a parent or guardian when
they seek for an abortion. However, in most of these countries, the physician
may refrain from this, if he or she finds it necessary. In none of the countries,
the consent of the partner is necessary. With regard to the role of the spouse,
Iceland is the only country that allows the spouse to participate in the
application for an abortion. Seven countries have specified a waiting period,
ranging from three days to one week. Half of the countries have laws that
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specifically state that the physician is allowed not to participate on ethical
or religious grounds.
After requesting an abortion, women in nine countries are informed on
alternative options, such as adoption. Informing the woman on contraceptives
to avoid future unwanted pregnancies is obliged in only four countries, and
in two other countries, woman are oﬀered to be informed on the use of
contraceptives. Five countries oﬀer (after)care to the women.
In this chapter, we provided with an overview of the diﬀerences in the legal
status of abortion over time and between countries that allows for additional
cross-national comparison. In Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, we set out to
explain the diﬀerences in the permissiveness of abortion policies over time
and between countries. In these chapters, procedural barriers will not be
taken into account. Diﬀerences in the procedural barriers between countries
and over time are rather small, making it diﬃcult if not impossible to study
with our methodological approach.
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Chapter 3
Explaining the Adoption of
Abortion Policies
in Eighteen Western
European Countries
between 1961 and 201014
3.1 Introduction
In Chapter 2, we showed that Western European abortion policies became
more permissive in the second half of the twentieth century. While most
countries relaxed the strictness of their abortion policies, we have seen large
diﬀerences in the timing of the adoption and the permissiveness of the
adopted abortion laws. In this chapter, we set out to answer the extent to
which political and societal characteristics account for the adoption of these
more permissive abortion laws.
Explanations of policy adoption tend to recognize two types of factors aﬀect-
ing legislative processes: political characteristics and societal characteristics.
When it comes to policy adoption, one of the most important political factors
is the composition of the government. Actions of politicians are assumed to
be inspired by their political ideology (Berry and Berry, 1990, 1992; Grogan,
1994). Indeed, research on morality policies has found evidence of the in-
fluence of political ideology on the permissiveness and adoption of revised
abortion laws in Western Europe. For instance, Wasserman (1983) concluded
in his study on worldwide abortion policies that a country’s abortion policies
are related to the ideology of the political parties in government: countries
with left-wing ideology are more likely to have permissive abortion laws
than countries with other political ideologies. Wasserman’s study, however,
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observed the abortion policies as they were in 1979 and the political ideology
of the 30 years prior to 1979. It is therefore unclear whether these parties
actually implemented these liberal abortion laws. Outshoorn (1996) also
provided convincing evidence of the influence of political party ideology on
the adoption of permissive abortion laws in Western Europe. She showed
that abortion law reform tends to be instigated by left-wing parties, and
that Christian parties adopt permissive abortion laws only when they are
part of a coalition government with left-wing or liberal parties. However,
Minkenberg (2002) argued that political parties may not be important when
it comes to morality policy. He stated that “[w]hen considering the variation
of abortion policies and strictly political institutions or variables [. . . ] no
identifiable patterns emerge” (Minkenberg, 2002, p. 229).
Societal explanations may also explain why some countries have more
liberal abortion policies than others. The literature on Western European
abortion policies provides evidence for the impact of these societal determi-
nants on the abortion policy in a country. Minkenberg (2002) and Fink (2008)
have stressed the importance of religious factors on the adoption of policies
when the policy debate resolves around moral issues. Indeed, studies on
abortion legislation suggest that the anti-abortion lobby in Europe prevented
- at least for a while - the adoption of permissive abortion laws (Girvin,
1996; Minkenberg, 2002; Wasserman, 1983). At the sime time, however,
there has been a strong demand for less strict abortion policies from interest
groups. One of the major demands of the second wave of feminism was the
liberalization of restrictive abortion laws. Not only have women’s movements
been important in generating attention to the abortion topic, their eﬀorts
have been influential in the policy adoption process as well (McBride Stetson,
2001).
In isolation, these two types of explanations fall short, and they provide
a view of the policy adoption process that is simplistic. Public pressure
may influence the adoption of policies, but lack the power to actually ratify
legislation. Politicians may have the power to adopt legislation, but they
cannot act independent from the public, as this will eventually lead to
electoral losses. Thus, policy adoptions cannot simply be explained at the
account of only political or only societal characteristics. This holds true
especially in the case of a controversial issue as abortion. Politicians tend to
avoid risks and to reduce the “political costs” of their decisions (Mooney and
Lee, 1995; Walker, 1969). Even when they are supportive of liberal abortion
policies, politicians may very well refrain from adopting such policy when the
opposition against such legislation is substantial. Adopting policies without
the support of pressure groups and the general public leads to larger costs
for politicians, since it could produce strong opposition and electoral losses
in subsequent elections. Societal explanations can thus increase or diminish
the likelihood that politicians will adopt a policy. In this study, we do not
merely study the influences of political and societal characteristics on the
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adoption of abortion reform, but we also scrutinize the interplay between
both types of explanations.
In order to improve our understanding of the role of political and societal
forces in abortion reforms in Western European countries, we pose the
following central research question:
Research Question II: To what extent do (a) political and (b)
societal characteristics influence the likelihood of abortion laws
being liberalized in Western European countries between 1961 and
2010?
We hypothesize on the influence of left-wing political parties and Christian
parties as political characteristics, and religion and the position of women
in society as societal characteristics. To answer the research question, we
constructed a country-year data file that oﬀers information on a wide range
of sources on the permissiveness of abortion laws, the composition of the
parliament, and the religious composition of the population, women’s posi-
tion in society, the strenght of physicians, and public opinion for eighteen
European countries between 1961 and 2010. We use logistic discrete time
event history models to answer the research question.
In so doing, we aim for scientific progress in fourfold. Firstly, we aim
to contribute to the literature on Western European abortion policies by
using a cross-national perspective, comparing the adoption processes of
abortion policies in eighteen Western European over a course of fifty years.
Western European abortion policies have received considerable attention
in the scientific literature. However, most of these studies focussed on the
adoption of abortion policies in one country (e.g., De Bruijn, 1979; Eser,
1994; Ketting, 1978; Mock, 1984; Trommelmans, 2006). When explaining
diﬀerences in the timing of adopting abortion policies between Western
European countries, it is necessary to study the abortion policies in more
than one country. Surprisingly, only a small number of studies seek to explain
the adoption of abortion policies in multiple countries. Some of these studies
provided a qualitative comparison of the abortion laws in a few countries
(e.g., Blofield, 2008; Engeli, 2009; McBride Stetson, 1996a; Outshoorn, 1996).
Other studies have a broader geographical scope, and provide a description
of the developments in European abortion policies (David, 1992; Glendon,
1987; Roemer, 1967; Tietze, 1967). In order to understand why countries
adopted permissive abortion policies, it is necessary to compare multiple
countries over a longer period of time.
Secondly, we will extent the research on morality policy theory by testing
whether the hypotheses of this theory, that have already been thoroughly
tested for the American context, hold true for the adoption of abortion
policies in Europe. These studies claim that abortion policies belong to a
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specific category of policies, namely the “morality policies” (Mooney and
Lee, 1995; Mooney, 1999; Tatalovich and Daynes, 2005). Unlike non-morality
policies, morality policies appeal to first principles, they are highly salient
and technical information on the subject is not necessary to take position
in the debate. Furthermore, morality policies address issues that are highly
evocative and relatively easy to form an opinion about. They are therefore
characterized by large public involvement. Due to its sensitive nature, it is
diﬃcult to reach agreement on morality issue (Mooney, 1999; Mooney and
Schuldt, 2008). It can be surmised that the forces at play in morality politics
are diﬀerent from those involved in non-morality politics (Mooney, 1999;
Smith, 2002; Tatalovich and Daynes, 2005).
Thirdly, we use multivariate analyses to test explanations of abortion
reform in Europe, which is a frequently used technique in studies on abortion
policies in U.S. states (Camobreco and Barnello, 2008; Mooney and Lee,
1995; Patton, 2007; Roh and Haider-Markel, 2003), but hardly ever applied
in research on European abortion policies. A major advantage of this
method is the possibility to simultaneously estimate the impact of diﬀerent
characteristics on the likelihood of a country’s abortion law being liberalized.
Up to now, only a few studies have applied quantitative methods to explain
diﬀerences in abortion policies in Europe (Field, 1979; Wasserman, 1983;
Brooks, 1992; Minkenberg, 2002) and those that have done so are fairly
simple in their analyses. A multivariate study using advanced methods to
explain the adoption of liberal abortion laws in Western European countries
is - to our knowledge - still lacking. A study with such approach is necessary,
since it oﬀers a stricter testing of the explanations for abortion reforms.
Fourthly, we hypothesize on the association between societal and political
characteristics. As we argued above, it is unlikely that policy adoption
is merely the result of either political or societal characteristics. We are
therefore not only interested in the question to what extent political and
societal characteristics influence the adoption of liberal abortion laws, but we
set out to gain knowledge about the interplay between political and societal
characteristics.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. First, we present
an overview of previous studies on the influence of internal characteristics
and formulate hypotheses in Section 3.2. In Section 3.3, we discuss the
construction of the data file, along with the measurements of the theoretical
concepts. In Section 3.4, we present and discuss the results of the event
history analyses, and finally the conclusions are discussed in Section 3.5.
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3.2 Expectations
3.2.1 Political Characteristics
In the decision making process, politicians are thought to be guided by
their political ideology. Unsurprisingly, this presumption has found much
support in studies on morality policies in the U.S. states. For instance,
having more Republicans in the legislative chambers is associated with a
smaller likelihood of adopting progressive morality policies, while having
more Democrats increases this likelihood (Patton, 2007).
However, the political system in the United States diﬀers from those that
operate in Western Europe. The United States has two dominant political
parties, while most Western European countries have a greater number of
influential parties. These multi-party systems include political parties based
on religion as well as parties with social democratic or liberal ideas. Left-wing
political parties generally take a positive stand towards permissive abortion
laws. Wasserman (1983) and Norris (1986) found that the dominant party
ideology in a country provides an important explanation for that country’s
abortion law and that a more socialist government is associated with the
introduction of more permissive laws on abortion. Furthermore, religious
political parties usually take a negative stand towards permissive abortion
policies. Religions have clear ideas about intervening in life and death, and
they generally have a negative attitude towards abortion (Hoﬀman and Miller,
1997; Welch et al., 1995). We thus assume that Christian parties are less
likely to adopt a permissive abortion law. We formulate the first hypothesis
as follows:
Hypothesis I: Abortion laws are more likely to be liberalized in
countries where [a] the share of left-wing parties in the parliament
is higher and [b] the share of Christian parties in the parliament
is lower.
3.2.2 Societal Characteristics
The anti-abortion movement has been highly influenced by religious groups.
While in general all religions denounce abortion, specific stances on abortion
diﬀers from denomination to denomination. Fundamentalist Protestants
and Catholics have strict pro-life attitudes, while liberal Protestants view
abortion more progressively (Hoﬀman and Miller, 1997; Welch et al., 1995).
Countries where churches are more influential are assumed to be more resis-
tant to permissive abortion laws. Indeed, studies in the United States have
found church membership among citizens to be negatively correlated with
progressive reforms of abortion laws. Roh and Haider-Markel (2003) found
that the percentages of Catholics and fundamentalist Protestants in a state
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have a negative influence on pro-choice voting in abortion initiatives. Mooney
and Lee (1995) found a similar eﬀect in their study on the abortion legislation
in the pre-Roe v. Wade period. Wasserman (1983) and Minkenberg (2002)
obtained equivalent results for European countries, with secular countries
being more likely to have permissive abortion laws. Therefor, we formulate
the second hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis II: Abortion laws are more likely to be liberalized
in countries with a smaller percent of members of the Catholic
church and Protestant churches
Feminists and women’s movements have advocated for equal rights for men
and women. One of the key demands of these movements during the second
wave of feminism was the right to have an abortions on request (McBride
Stetson, 2001). Feminist activists have added weight to this demand with
demonstrations and in some cases even the occupation of abortion clinics,
pressuring political parties to adopt liberal abortion policies. The women’s
movement is therefore widely recognized as an influential actor in the process
of abortion law liberalization (De Bruijn, 1979; Caldwell, 1986; Ferree et al.,
2002; McBride Stetson, 1996a,b).
Another demand of the women’s movements and feminists during the
second wave of feminism was the right for paid labour. Mincer (1963) argued
that, compared to women who do not seek to work, the costs of (unwanted)
pregnancies are higher for employed women. Employed women need time oﬀ
from their work, they need to arrange day-care for the child, and pregnancies
may hinder their career ambitions. Hence, employed women will be more
likely to support and demand permissive abortion policies. In countries
where the proportion of employed women is larger, the demand for abortion
policies will be greater. Several studies on abortion policies in the U.S. states
found that states with higher proportions of employed women have abortion
policies that are more liberal (Medoﬀ, 2002; Mooney and Lee, 1995).
In sum, the second wave of feminism demanded liberal abortion policies,
as well as the right for paid labour, which in turn increased the demand
for permissive abortion policies. We therefore argue that abortion policies
are more liberal in countries where women have been able to gain a more
equal position compared to men in education and on the labour market.
Hypothesis III thus reads:
Hypothesis III: Abortion laws are more likely to be liberalized in
countries where more women are higher educated and in countries
where more women participate on the labour market.
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3.2.3 Interplay between Political and Societal Characteris-
tics
Certainly, churches and women’s movements may function as agenda-setters
and they are capable of influencing politicians. This is supported by the
literature on abortion reforms in Western Europe (David, 1992; De Bruijn,
1979; Glendon, 1987). Studies confirm that pressure groups have had a
major influence on the abortion debate (Ferree et al., 2002; Glendon, 1987).
By putting pressure on politicians, they have - at least indirectly - played
a key role in determining the abortion laws adopted. However, churches
and women’s movements are unlikely to be directly responsible for the
liberalization of abortion law. After all, it is not up to interest groups to
adopt policies; these must be crafted by politicians. Nevertheless, evidence
from the United States oﬀers little support for the hypothesis that societal
determinants only indirectly influence the liberalization of abortion laws. For
instance, Mooney and Lee (1995), Patton (2007), Roh and Haider-Markel
(2003) found direct eﬀects of religion, and of women’s position on the adoption
of abortion laws.
In addition to scrutinizing the direct influences of societal characteristics,
it is important to examine the interplay of societal and political characteristics.
This interplay may explain under which societal circumstances political actors
are able to reach political goals. For instance, Wasserman (1983) concludes
that in Western Europe, a powerful Catholic church in a country reduces
the ability of left-wing parties to push through the adoption of permissive
abortion laws. Furthermore, pressure exerted by pro-choice movements and
demands for reproductive rights might explain why some governments with
Christian parties in power have adopted permissive abortion laws (Outshoorn,
1996). We thus expect that politicians are more likely to make a decision in
line with their basic political ideals when societal support for such a decision
is higher, and vice verse. We therefore formulate hypotheses IV and V.
Hypothesis IV: Abortion laws are more likely to be liberalized
in countries where the share of left-wing parties in the parliament
is higher. This eﬀect is (a) smaller when the percent of members
of the Catholic church and Protestant churches is higher and (b)
larger when more women are higher educated and more women
participate on the labour market.
Hypothesis V: Abortion laws are more likely to be liberalized in
countries where the share of Christian parties in the parliament
is lower. This eﬀect is (a) larger when the percent of members
of the Catholic church and Protestant churches is higher and (b)
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smaller when more women are higher educated and more women
participate on the labour market.
3.3 Data and Methods
3.3.1 Selection of Cases
We constructed a country-year file with country-level data for eighteen
Western European countries: Austria (AU), Belgium (BE), Denmark (DE),
Finland (FI), France (FR), (West) Germany (GE), Greece (GR), Iceland (IC),
Ireland (IR), Italy (IT), Luxembourg (LU), the Netherlands (NE), Norway
(NO), Portugal (PO), Spain (SP), Sweden (SWE), Switzerland (SWI) and
the United Kingdom (UK). This data set contains annual information for
each country ranging from 1961 and 2010.
3.3.2 Measuring the Adoption of Laws on Abortion
Although most countries in the dataset have adopted liberal abortion laws
in the period under study, the specifics of these laws diﬀer. Following Eser
(1994) and Minkenberg (2002), we distinguish two basic models of abortion
laws: the “indication model” and the “period model”. The indication model
allows abortion if certain conditions are met. Most often, the following
conditions are distinguished: abortion is available to preserve the health of
the pregnant woman, in case of fetal impairment, if the pregnancy resulted
from crime, and for socioeconomic reasons. Physicians or specialists judge
whether these conditions are met. The period model makes abortion available
on request during a given time period.15 Thus, we have recoded Table 2.1 of
Chapter 2 into two categories. The level of permissiveness is very diﬀerent for
the two models, with the latter being much more permissive than the former.
We estimate the likelihood of adopting a revised abortion law separately for
the indication model and the period model. The two dependent variables
measures whether (1) or not (0) such legislation was adopted in a country in
a given year.
Furthermore, since we estimate the likelihood of two diﬀerent events,
the risk set for these analyses diﬀers. A country is only at risk of adopting
the indication model if this country has not yet adopted either a period
model abortion law or an indication model abortion law covering all of the
aforementioned categories. If a country has already adopted a period model
abortion law it is no longer at risk of adopting that type of law.
We chose 1961 as the first year of observation for the models explaining
the adoption of an indication model abortion policy, because the information
we needed was not suﬃciently available prior to 1961. Furthermore, even
though some countries had introduced indication model abortion laws before
1961, most countries did so only after 1961, and no country had adopted the
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most permissive type of abortion law before 1961. We chose 1973 as the first
year of observation for the models explaining period model abortion laws,
since none of the countries adopted such policies prior to 1973.
During the period 1961-2010, 25 abortion laws were introduced. Twelve of
these adoptions concerned the adoption of an indication model; and thirteen
countries adopted a period model law between 1961 and 2010. One country
(Ireland) did not introduce any law broadening the grounds for legal abortion
during this period.16
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 present, respectively, the adoption of abortion laws
with an indication model and a period model. One (“1”) represents the
adoption of such a law, and zero (“0”) represents no adoption. Furthermore,
if a cell is empty, the country is no longer at risk of adopting that type of
law. Table 3.2 shows no information for the period 1961-1972, as there were
no adoptions of period model abortion laws in Western European countries
prior to 1973.
3.3.3 Measuring Political and Societal Characteristics
The share of left-wing and Christian parties in the government was measured
as the relative number of seats these parties held in the parliament. By so
doing, we measure whether parties were present in the government, and how
strong their influence was in the parliament. Data were obtained from the
Comparative Political Dataset I 1960-2006 (Armingeon et al., 2008) and the
Parliament and Government Composition Database (Doring and Manow,
2010). Left-wing parties are parties in the socialist, communist, green, and
left-socialist party families. The share of Christian parties in the government
was measured as the relative number of seats that religious parties held.
Between 1961 and 2010, all religious parties with a seat in parliaments in
European countries were Christian.17
The religious make-up of a population was measured by two variables:
the percentage of Catholics and the percentage of Protestants in a country.
Church membership and church aﬃliation reflect diﬀerent aspects of the
importance of religion in people’s lives. We used data on church membership
from the World Churches Handbook (Brierley, 1997), as this variable indicates
people who had taken some active step to belong to a church (Brierley, 1997,
p. 10). Brierley (1997) provides data on church members every five years,
starting from 1960 until 1995. Data for 2000 and later are estimates given by
Brierley. For the intermediate years, we assumed a linear trend in between
the observations. Furthermore, we argue that societal determinants are
unlikely to instantaneously aﬀect policy adoption. Therefore, we measure
the percent of political parties in the previous year.
Emancipation was measured by two variables: women’s participation in
the labour force and university enrolment of women. Women’s labour market
participation is considered to be strongly linked with feminism and the
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Table 3.1: Adoption of Indication Model Abortions Law in Europe, 1961-2010
AU BE DE FI FR GE GR IC IR IT LU NE NO PO SP SWE SWI UK
1961 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1962 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1963 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1964 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
1965 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1966 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1967 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1968 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1969 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1970 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1971 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1972 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1973 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1974 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1975 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
1976 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1977 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1978 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
1979 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1980 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1981 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1982 0 0 0 0 0 0
1983 0 0 0 0 0 0
1984 0 0 1 0 0 0
1985 0 0 0 1 0 0
1986 0 0 0 0 0 0
1987 0 0 0 0 0 0
1988 0 0 0 0 0 0
1989 0 0 0 0 0 0
1990 0 0 0 0 0 0
1991 0 0 0 0 0
1992 0 0 0 0 0
1993 0 0 0 0 0
1994 0 0 0 0 0
1995 0 0 0 0 0
1996 0 0 0 0 0
1997 0 0 0 0 0
1998 0 0 0 0 0
1999 0 0 0 0 0
2000 0 0 0 0 0
2001 0 0 0 0 0
2002 0 0 0 0
2003 0 0 0 0
2004 0 0 0 0
2005 0 0 0 0
2006 0 0 0 0
2007 0 0 0 0
2008 0 0 0
2009 0 0 0
2010 0 0 0
emancipation of women in society (Bolzendahl and Myers, 2004). Therefore,
women’s labour force participation is a proxy for the level of emancipation
of a population in a given year. We lagged this variable by one year as well.
The figures were obtained from the Quality of Government (QoG) Social
Policy Dataset (OECD, 2006; Samanni et al., 2008) and OECD Statistics
(OECD, 2010). Unfortunately, little data are available on women’s labour
force participation in the 1960s. Missing values were replaced using data from
the Political Data Handbook (Lane et al., 1996), which provides information
on women’s employment between 1960 and 1990. These data are available
for every ten years. We assumed a linear trend for the missing years, and
used linear regression to impute the missing values from the QoG Social
Policy Data Set.
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Table 3.2: Adoption of Period Model Abortions Law in Europe, 1973-2010
AU BE DE FI FR GE GR IC IR IT LU NE NO PO SP SWE SWI UK
1973 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1974 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
1975 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1976 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1977 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1978 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
1979 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1980 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1981 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
1982 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1983 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1984 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1985 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1986 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1987 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1988 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1989 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1990 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1991 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1992 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1993 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1994 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1995 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1996 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1997 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1998 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1999 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2004 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2006 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2007 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
2008 0 0 0 0 0 0
2009 0 0 0 0 0 0
2010 0 0 0 0 1 0
Women’s university enrolment was measured using the weighted European
Values Studies, which provides information on education (European Values
Study Foundation, and World Values Survey Association, 2006). To estimate
the university enrolment of women, we calculated the number of women
between 25 and 30 years of age who achieved a degree at a university, and
divided it by the total number of women in that age category. A five-year
moving average was used to smoothen the estimates.
We include several other societal variables that have proven to be influ-
ential in the adoption of permissive abortion policies in the United States
(Mooney and Lee, 1995; Patton, 2007). The first of these variables is public
opinion, which is often considered as a key factor in decision-making pro-
cesses. This is especially true for moral issues such as abortion (Camobreco
and Barnello, 2008; Mooney and Lee, 1995; Norrander and Wilcox, 2001;
Patton, 2007; Roh and Haider-Markel, 2003). The European Values Studies
2006 provides information on the attitudes towards abortion in European
countries between 1981 and 2006. Respondents were asked to what extent
they thought abortion was justifiable. We have computed the country mean
values for each country in the available waves. Missing data between two
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waves were replaced with interpolated values. We replaced missing values
for countries in the years prior to the first observation with the value of
the first observation. Furthermore, missing values in the year after the last
observation are replaced with the value of the last observation. A higher
score on this variable indicates a more liberal position regarding abortion.
Similar to Mooney and Lee (1995) and Patton (2007), we include the
number of physicians per 1,000 inhabitants of the population to control
for the demand from physicians for abortion reform. Data were obtained
from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2010). Finally, we
included the permissiveness of the previous law as a dummy variable. The
permissiveness of the previous law might influence the likelihood of adopting
a more permissive abortion policy. For instance, the motivation to adopt
a more permissive abortion law might be lower in a country that already
relaxed the conditions under which an abortion is permitted than in a country
with the most restrictive abortion policy.
Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics of the Dependent and Independent Variables
Indication Model Period Model
Range Mean Range Mean
Dependent Variable
Adoption of Abortion Law 0-1 0.03 0-1 0.02
Political Characteristics
Left-wing Parties 0-57.8 18.00 0-63.6 18.70
Christian Parties 0-54.4 14.90 0-54.4 12.42
Societal Characteristics
Women in Labour Force(t−1) 13.7-96.5 45.95 13.7-96.5 55.26
Women’s University Enrolment(t−1) 0-29.2 6.77 0-26.7 8.72
% Catholics in Population(t−1) 0.0-88.5 41.38 0-96.7 48.86
% Protestants in Population(t−1) 0.0-73.0 12.08 0-96.7 33.65
Number of Physicians(t−1) 0.8-3.6 1.79 1.0-3.6 2.21
Public Opinion 1.7-8.0 4.75 1.7-8.0 4.44
Other Variables
Permissiveness Law(t−1)
To preserve ment. health / On soc. grounds 0-1 0.41 0-1 0.67
Year (1961=0) 0-49 16.55 0-37 15.43
Table 3.3 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables included in
the analysis. In the analyses, all non-categorical variables were centred at
their grand mean.
3.4 Results
We present event history models that estimate the eﬀects of the social and
political characteristics in logistic discrete-time models. Because the number
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of countries is relatively small, and so is the number of years under study,
we will be cautious in interpreting the results. A low number of events can
lead to an underestimation of the likelihood of an event (King and Zeng,
2001). To establish the robustness of the estimates, we examined the same
models with two other techniques: (1) using a weight-factor to increase the
weight of the events, and (2) using RElogit to estimate the models (Imai
et al., 2008). Since their results did not alter the conclusions, we do not
present their estimates here.
Table 3.4 presents the estimates of a country’s likelihood of adopting an
indication model abortion law and its likelihood of adopting a period model
abortion law.18 These models test hypotheses Ia, Ib, II and III.
Table 3.4: Probit Regression Coeﬃcients Explaining Adoption of an Indication and
Period Modela
Indication Model Adoption Model
Variables b s.e. b s.e.
Political Characteristics
Left-wing Parties 0.01 0.01 * 0.02 0.01 **
Christian Parties -0.02 0.01 * 0.03 0.02 **
Societal Characteristics
Women in Labour Force(t−1) -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03
Women’s University Enrolment(t−1) -0.02 0.03 0.10 0.04 ***
% Catholics(t−1) -0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.01 *
% Protestants(t−1) 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.01 *
Number of Physicians(t−1) 0.01 0.49 1.76 0.69 ***
Public Opinion 0.11 0.15 0.58 0.36 *
Permissiveness Previous Law(t−1)
To Preserve Life / Physical Health (ref) (ref)
To Preserve Mental Health / On S.E. Grounds -0.18 0.39 -1.18 0.58 **
Duration
Year 0.01 0.03 -0.30 0.12 ***
Year2 0.00 0.00 **
Intercept -2.17 0.71 *** 1.23 1.56
AIC 115.6 104.06
N 451 375
a * p< .1;**p< .05; *** p< .01; One-tailed test.
We expected to find a larger likelihood of adopting a permissive abortion
law in countries with a larger share of left-wing parties in government
(hypothesis Ia). Our results show that this is indeed the case: a more
permissive abortion law is more likely to be adopted when the proportion
of left-wing parties within the government is higher. This is true for the
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adoption of both an indication model law and a period model law. We find
mixed evidence of an eﬀect of Christian parties on the adoption of a more
permissive abortion law. We expected that a smaller share of Christian
governmental parties increases the likelihood to adopt a liberal abortion law.
We find that this is true for the adoption of an indication model abortion
law. However, in the model explaining the adoption of a period model, our
results show that a larger share of Christian governmental parties increases
the likelihood to adopt a period model abortion law. This is unexpected,
since religious parties are thought to denounce liberal abortion laws.
Hypothesis II reads that abortion laws are more likely to be liberalized
in countries with a smaller percent of the society being a member of the
Catholic church or a Protestant church. According to hypothesis III, liberal
abortion law reform is more likely to occur in countries where the population
is emancipated. The influence of the societal characteristics diﬀers for the
two abortion law models. For the indication model abortion law, we find
no influence of the societal characteristics at all. From these findings, we
must conclude that the adoption of indication model abortion laws is not
aﬀected by societal determinants, rejecting hypotheses II and III. The results
for the adoption of a period model abortion law shows a diﬀerent picture.
Here, we find that the adoption of period model abortion laws are more
likely to be adopted when the percentage of members of both the Catholic
church and Protestant churches is lower. These findings support hypothesis
II. Furthermore, our results show that the adoption of period model abortion
laws is more likely to occur in countries with high university enrolment rates
for women. However, we also find that the participation in the labour force
does not significantly aﬀect the likelihood of adopting a period model. The
two variables were included to capture the emancipation of a country. We
thus find mixed evidence for hypotheses III.
To test hypotheses IV and V, we estimated models with interactions between
the two political and the four societal characteristics for the religious make-up
and the emancipation of societies, including one interaction term per model
at a time. This procedure is done for both types of abortion policies. Hence,
we calculated sixteen models. Table 3.5 and 3.6 provide an overview of the
models with significant interactions.
Table 3.5 shows that parties with an ideological predilection for permissive
abortion laws are less moved to adopt this type of abortion laws by societal
variables that stimulate demand for such laws. Left-wing parties are less
likely to adopt this type of abortion law if women’s university enrolment
is higher (Model I) . Furthermore, we find that Christian parties are more
likely to adopt an indication model abortion law when the share of Catholics
in a society is larger. To interpret these findings, we must note that the
indication model abortion law is less permissive than a period model abortion
law. These findings may suggest that left-wing parties are less likely to adopt
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Table 3.5: Regression Coeﬃcients Explaining Adoption of an Indication
Model: Significant Interactions (N: 451)a
Model I Model II
Variables b s.e. b s.e.
Political Characteristics
Left-wing Parties 0.01 0.01 ** 0.01 0.01
Christian Parties -0.02 0.01 * -0.06 0.04 *
Societal Characteristics
Women in Labour Force(t−1) -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.02
Women’s Univ. Enrolment(t−1) 0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.03
% Catholics(t−1) 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.01
% Protestants(t−1) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Number of Physicians(t−1) 0.04 0.49 0.41 0.56
Public Opinion 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.16
Interaction left-wing parties and
. . .Women’s Univ. Enrolment(t−1)b -0.16 0.10 *
Interaction Christian parties and
. . .% Catholics(t−1)b 0.19 0.12 *
Permissiveness Previous Law(t−1)
To Preserve Life / Physical Health (ref) (ref)
To Preserve Mental Health / On S.E. Grounds -0.10 0.39 -0.69 0.50 *
Duration
Year 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.04
Intercept -2.23 0.72 *** -1.73 0.77 **
AIC 114.99 113.96
a * p< .1;**p< .05; *** p< .01; One-tailed test. b b-coeﬃcient and standard error
multiplied by 100 for presentational purposes.
an indication model abortion law when the demand for liberal abortion
is high, because these parties will then be more likely to adopt the more
permissive period model abortion law. Also, Christian parties might not be
able to avoid the adoption of a permissive abortion law, but with support
from society, they may adopt a more restrictive abortion policy than the
period model abortion law.
In Table 3.6, we present the significant interaction eﬀects between societal
and political characteristics on the likelihood to adopt a period model
abortion law. Firstly, we conclude that the influence of Christian parties
is not conditioned by societal characteristics. Furthermore, we find that
left-wing governmental parties positively influence the likelihood of adopting
permissive abortion policies. This influence of left-wing parties becomes even
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Table 3.6: Probit Regression Coeﬃcients Explaining Adoption of a Period
Model: Significant Interactions (N: 375) a
Model III Model IV
Variables b s.e. b s.e.
Political Characteristics
Left-wing Parties 0.02 0.01 ** 0.01 0.01
Christian Parties 0.04 0.02 ** 0.04 0.02 **
Societal Characteristics
Women in Labour Force(t−1) -0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03
Women’s Univ. Enrolment(t−1) 0.11 0.04 *** 0.04 0.06
% Catholics(t−1) -0.03 0.02 ** -0.03 0.01 **
% Protestants(t−1) -0.02 0.01 * -0.02 0.01 *
Number of Physicians(t−1) 2.04 0.78 *** 2.01 0.75 ***
Public Opinion 0.59 0.37 * 0.71 0.40 **
Interaction left-wing parties and
. . .Women in Labour Force(t−1) 0.17 0.10 **
. . .Women’s Univ. Enrolment(t−1)b 0.26 0.18 *
Permissiveness Previous Law(t−1)
To Preserve Life / Physical Health (ref) (ref)
To Preserve Mental Health / On S.E. Grounds -1.38 0.66 ** -1.16 0.61 **
Duration
Year -0.27 0.13 ** -0.30 0.13 ***
Year2 0.00 0.00 * 0.00 0.00 **
Intercept 0.53 1.73 1.30 1.60
AIC 102.85 103.49
a * p< .1;**p< .05; *** p< .01; One-tailed test. b b-coeﬃcient and standard error multiplied
by 100 for presentational purposes.
larger when the societal support for permissive abortion laws is higher. In
countries that are emancipated, left-wing parties are even more likely to
adopt permissive abortion laws than in countries that are to a lesser extent
emancipated.
We find no evidence that left-wing parties are influenced by the religious
make-up of a country, as suggested by hypothesis IVa. Further, we find
mixed evidence for hypothesis IVb. This hypothesis suggested that left-wing
parties are more likely to adopt a permissive abortion law when societies are
more emancipated. This is true for the adoption of period model abortion
law, but it does not hold for the more restrictive indication model abortion
law. Furthermore, hypotheses Va and Vb are refuted. These hypotheses
suggested that the influence of Christian parties was negative, and would be
more negative in highly religious societies and lesser emancipated countries.
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3.5 Conclusions and Discussion
3.5.1 Conclusions
This study centered on the adoption of liberal abortion laws in Western
European societies. The aim was to expand the literature by quantitatively
exploring the influence of political and societal characteristics on the timing
of countries’ adoption of more permissive abortion laws. We formulated the
following research question: To what extent do (a) political characteristics
and (b) societal characteristics influence the likelihood of abortion laws being
liberalized in Western-European countries between 1961 and 2010?
Regarding the political characteristics, more seats in parliament for left-
wing political parties is associated with a greater likelihood of permissive
abortion laws being adopted. However, we found mixed evidence of a direct
negative eﬀect of the share of Christian parties. Indication model abortion
laws are less likely to be adopted by Christian parties. Even though Christian
parties denounce permissive abortion laws, they appear unable to block the
adoption of period model abortion laws in practice. However, literature on
the influence of the governmental composition on abortion law adoption
suggests that abortion laws adopted by Christian parties are more likely to
be restricted (Outshoorn, 1996). Period model abortion laws have indeed
been adopted by Christian parties in the past decades, but we stipulate that
the period model abortion laws adopted by Christian parties most often were
not allowing abortion on request, but instead allowed abortion when the
pregnant woman finds herself in a state of distress. In sum, our results show
that political factors influence the adoption of permissive abortion policies
in European countries. This contrasts with the argument of some scholar
that abortion policies, or morality policies in general, cannot be explained
by political factors.
Societal characteristics appear influential in the adoption of a period
model law, the most liberal type of abortion law. Emancipated societies,
with more physicians and a public opinion in favour of liberal abortion reform
are likely to adopt a period model. Countries with a higher proportion of
members of the Catholic church and Protestant churches are less likely to
adopt a period model abortion law. However, we found no eﬀect of societal
characteristics on the adoption of an indication model abortion law. In sum,
we argue that Western European countries are more likely to adopt period
model abortion laws when societal support is high and resistance against
relaxing abortion policies is low.
We found encouraging evidence for the hypotheses on the interaction
between political and societal explanations on the likelihood of adopting per-
missive abortion laws. We expected left-wing politicians to favour adoption
of liberal abortion laws and Christian politicians to try to block such laws.
Our results suggest that politicians are especially encouraged to follow their
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ideological precepts when there is a parallel demand within society, especially
with regard to adoption of a period model abortion law. Politicians therefore
appear more likely to act on their ideological beliefs when there is less risk
or, in other words, when lower political cost is involved.
3.5.2 Discussion
Although we improved on research on abortion law reform in Europe by
analysing developments within societies using a multivariate approach, we
would have liked to do this even more thoroughly. First of all, the data
covers “only” 18 countries and 50 years. Moreover, we were unable to fully
capture the strength of pressure groups, such as women’s movements, and
public opinion on abortion for the years in the data set. We therefore
included indirect measures of these indicators. The influence of the women’s
movement is partly captured by women’s university enrolment and labour
force participation, as both characteristics reflect the position of women in
society. Public opinion is measured using data from the European Values
Studies. The first wave from this survey dates from 1981. Certainly, this is
problematic, as we have no data on public attitudes towards abortion prior
to 1981. Unfortunately, there is no cross-national survey with information
on abortion attitudes of residents in the eighteen European countries for
the period 1960 to 1980. Some national surveys do contain information on
abortion attitudes in this period, but these surveys diﬀer in the question
regarding abortion. We choose not to use these data, as they are not suitable
for cross-national comparison. Instead, we replaced missing values for the
period 1961-1980 on the public opinion indicator by the first known value.
Further research is needed to tackle these problems with measuring the
demand for permissive abortion policies.
Theories on policy adoption suggest that politicians are risk-avoiding (e.g.,
Walker, 1969). The risk involved in adopting a policy is higher if the public
disagrees with the legislation which could, for instance, result in electoral
losses. However, these costs may be diﬀerent in diﬀerent electoral systems,
depending on the directness of voter representation that a political system
embodies. Where representation is less direct, a politician may have little to
lose by ignoring a demand from the public or interest group. Future research
should focus on the influence of diﬀerent electoral systems on adoption of
(morality) policies. Are politicians more likely to act independent of public
demand in systems that have less direct voter representation?
One final remark refers to the argument that social determinants are
unlikely to be directly responsible for the policies adopted. We find, like many
other authors a direct eﬀect of societal determinants on policy adoption (e.g.,
Mooney and Lee, 1995; Patton, 2007; Roh and Haider-Markel, 2003). Indeed,
our findings show that the societal determinants condition the relationship
between the political factors and the policies adopted. Future research
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including more countries and years might focus on this conditioning eﬀect of
social characteristics on the adoption of morality policies.
In this chapter, we identified the internal actors and developments involved
in the process of adopting abortion policies in Western European countries
between 1961 and 2010. In Chapters 4 and 5, we study the extent to which
external explanations also account for the diﬀerences in the timing of adopting
a permissive abortion law. We explore the temporal diﬀusion patterns of
liberal abortion policies in Chapter 4, and examine spatial diﬀusion patterns
in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 4
Temporal Diﬀusion of
Abortion Policies
among Eighteen Western
European Countries
between 1968 and 201019
4.1 Introduction
As we have shown in Chapter 2, the legal status of abortion has changed
drastically in the past decades. Halfway through the twentieth century,
abortion laws in most Western European were firmly restrictive. Most laws
allowed the termination of a pregnancy only to preserve the life of the
pregnant woman, or when there was severe threat to her health (David,
1992). This is in great contrast with the legal status of abortion in most
Western European countries nowadays, where legislation permits abortion
during the first period of the pregnancy on socioeconomic grounds, in case of
severe distress or on request of the pregnant woman (Eser and Koch, 1988;
International Planned Parenthood, 2007, 2009; Ketting and Van Praag, 1983;
United Nations, 2002).
Most of the changes towards permissive abortion laws took place during
the period from the late 1960s to the early 1980s when many countries
adopted liberal abortion laws. This happened so rapid and in contrast with
the previous status of abortion that David spoke of “a social revolution
occurred in the realm of abortion legislation” (David, 1992, p. 5). After
this boost of policy adoptions, countries with restrictive abortion legislation
dating from the nineteenth century or early twentieth century also adopted
permissive abortion laws in the 1990s and 2000s. Nowadays, Ireland is the
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only Western European country where abortion is regulated under strict
laws prohibiting abortion.
Numerous studies have been devoted to the explanation of the developments
concerning abortion, focusing on a single country (e.g., Mock (1984) on
Austria, Trommelmans (2006) on Belgium. Eser (1986) on Germany, and De
Bruijn (1979) and Ketting (1978) on the Netherlands), comparing several
countries (e.g., Engeli (2009) and McBride Stetson (1996a)), Europe (e.g.,
David (1992), Minkenberg (2002), Outshoorn (1996), and Tietze (1967)),
Western societies (e.g., Field (1979), and Glendon (1987) or even all countries
worldwide (Wasserman, 1983). The studies restrict themselves to internal
explanations: they study the role of public opinion, interest groups and
political actors in the adoption of liberal abortions, as we have done in the
previous chapter.
Some studies have suggested that, next to internal determinants, the
decisions of policy makers in the process of adopting liberal abortion reform
were not independently made. For instance, after the Abortion Act was
adopted in the United Kingdom in 1967, which allowed women to have
an abortion on socialeconomic grounds, the World Health Organization
pinpointed to such possible interdependency by stating: “[t]he Abortion Act
of 1967 . . . is certainly likely to influence the legislation of many countries”
(World Health Organisation, 1971a, p. 45). Furthermore, it is argued that the
adoption of a permissive abortion law in Sweden and Denmark was influenced
by so-called abortion tourism: women from these countries went to Poland to
obtain abortions that were punishable in their home countries (Ketting and
Van Praag, 1983). De Bruijn (1979) describes how abortion laws of other
countries were used as arguments in the Dutch debate. Similarly, the Dutch
abortion law and abortion tourism from Germany to the Netherlands, was
an issue in the debate on abortion in Germany in the 1990s (Ferree et al.,
2002).
The notion that policy decisions are not independent is widely accepted in
the social and political sciences. The key idea is that a country’s likelihood
to adopt a policy increases when other countries have already adopted
such policy (Gray, 1973). Derived from Rogers’ theory of the diﬀusion
of innovation is the assumption that over time, the cumulative number of
innovations is characterized by an S-shaped curve; the social learning curve
(Rogers, 1995). At first, few adopt a new law. When the innovation becomes
more known, the number of adoptions increases rapidly. The increasing
number of adoptions legitimate the adoption by those that have not yet done
so. Those who were initially not motivated to adopt the innovation will be
increasingly willing to adopt it, which results in a flattening of the curve
when the majority has adopted the innovation. The diﬀerent adopters are
recognized in the literature as the pioneers and early adopters, the majority
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(divided in two groups: early and late adopters) and laggards - those adopting
last.
The temporal pattern is often found for policy adoptions (Berry and Berry,
2007; Gilardi, 2008; Gray, 1973) and iy is considered a strong indication
for policy diﬀusion. Some scholars questioned whether these patterns are
as likely to occur for policies that involve moral issues, such as abortion.
These morality policies are characterized by a heated debate on basic values,
with the subject of the debate being highly salient and relatively easy to
understand, leading to a strong participation of citizens. In turn, policy
makers are strongly responsiveness to public demands, and the policies are
highly observable. Morality policy scholars have argued that the often found
S-curve may not be applicable to morality policies (Boushey, 2010; Mooney
and Lee, 1999b; Pierce and Miller, 1999). Given their characteristics, morality
policies are likely to diﬀuse faster than non-morality policies. However, due
to their controversial nature, these policies are not likely to be adopted by all
countries. Therefore, morality policy researchers have hypothesized that the
cumulative number of morality policy adoptions does not follow the predicted
S-curve, but an R-curve. This R-curve resembles the large adoption rates in
the period shortly after the first country has adopted the morality policy,
followed by a period with little to no adoptions.
In this chapter, we study how the adoptions of liberal abortion policies
evolved over time, by identifying whether the temporal diﬀusion pattern
follows the predicted S- or R-curve. Studying the temporal changes in liberal
abortion laws provides us evidence for the diﬀusion of abortion policies
across Western European countries between 1968 and 2010. We define liberal
abortion polices as policies allowing women to have an abortion during the
first trimester on socioeconomic grounds or on request. We choose 1968 as
the first year under study, as this is the year after the first liberal abortion
law was adopted in Western Europe. Theories on policy diﬀusion explain
how policy actions in countries are influenced by policy decisions in other
countries, but they cannot explain why the first policy is adopted by a
country. We ask:
Research Question III: To what extent does the cumulative
number of liberal abortion law adoptions in Western European
countries between 1968 and 2010 follow an S-curve or an R-
curve?
To answer this research question, we constructed a country-year data set with
information on the permissiveness of abortion law, country characteristics
covering the political ideology, the composition, of the government, religiosity,
gender equality and public opinion for eighteen Western European countries
between 1968 - the year after the adoption of the United Kingdom’s 1967
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Abortion Act - and 2010. The countries in the data set are Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and
the United Kingdom. The data set covers 282 country-years. To study the
extent to which the diﬀusion pattern follows predicted curves over time, we
use probit event history analyses.
We aim for progress in the following ways. Firstly, we gain knowledge on
the interdependence of Western European policy makers in their decision to
adopt liberal abortion policies. Although some studies provide important
indications of policy diﬀusion, there is no study addressing the temporal
diﬀusion of abortion policies in Western Europe. In this chapter, we aim to
fill this lacuna in research on European abortion laws by formally testing
the temporal diﬀusion of abortion policies.
Secondly, we improve on previous research on temporal policy diﬀusion by
applying a more sophisticated method to test how policies diﬀuse over time.
Studies on temporal policy diﬀusion most often apply one of two methods to
study whether the cumulative number of adoptions meets the shape of an
S- or R-curve. Firstly, some studies provide with graphic presentations to
test hypotheses about the shape of the curve (e.g., Mooney and Lee, 1995,
1999b). Other studies provide a statistical test, predicting the cumulative
number in a particular year by the prior cumulative number of adopters
(e.g., Gray, 1973). Both methods fail to take internal determinants into
account. Berry and Berry (1990), Elkins and Simmons (2005) and Gilardi
(2005) convincingly argue the importance of including internal explanations
for policy adoptions in models for policy diﬀusion. A sudden spread of
policies may be the result of interacting policy makers, but it may also be
the result of policy makers responding to internal developments occurring in
the same period in diﬀerent countries. In this study, we control for internal
determinants by applying multivariate event history analysis.
The structure of the remainder of this chapter is as follows. Hypotheses on
temporal diﬀusion are derived in Section 4.2. In Section 4.3 we discuss the
data and methods for testing our hypotheses. In Section 4.4, the result of
the analyses are presented. Finally, we draw conclusions and reflect on our
findings in Section 4.5.
4.2 Expectations
Roger’s (1995) theory on the diﬀusion of innovations argues that if inno-
vations diﬀuse across members of a social system, the adoption rates show
characteristic temporal variation. The cumulative number of adopters follows
an S-curve over time, as presented in Figure 4.1. There are four phases in
the S-curve that distinguish diﬀerent groups of adopters. The first 16 percent
of adopters are known as the innovators and early adopters. The innovation
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spreads slowly. Following this group of adopters, we find the early majority
(the subsequent 34 percent of adoptions). During this phase, the number of
adoptions increases rapidly, with a turn-oﬀ point somewhere between 20 and
30 percent. The early majority is followed by the late majority (again 34
percent). This phase is characterized by a rapid but declining increase of
the number of innovations. Finally, the laggards form the last 16 percent
of adopters. The curve is now characterized by a low number of adoptions
during a long period of time.
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Figure 4.1: Example of the S-curve Distribution
Studies on policy diﬀusion assume that policies diﬀuse in similar temporal
patterns (Berry and Berry, 2007). Most often, the characteristic shape of the
curve is explained by the social learning theory (Gray, 1973; Mooney and Lee,
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1995; Rogers, 1995). Pioneering states adopt a new policy, and the majority
of the other states await to learn from the experiences in the pioneering
states. When policy makers in these states consider the new policy successful,
the policy gets adopted by a large number of states. The most hesitating
countries ultimately adopt the policy when most other countries have already
done so. Studies on the diﬀusion of policies often observe this S-shaped curve
(e.g., Gilardi, 2008; Gray, 1973; Mahajan and Peterson, 1985). For morality
policies, Mooney and Lee (1995) found that the adoption of pre-Roe versus
Wade abortion policies in the U.S. states has the predicted S-shaped curve.
We thus formulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis I: Over time, the cumulative number of liberal abor-
tion law adoptions follows an S-shaped curve
However, not all policies diﬀuse in the same way, and certainly, some policies
do not diﬀuse at all (Boushey, 2010; Gray, 1973; Savage, 1985). Morality
policy theory expects that the diﬀusion of morality policies shows a distinct
pattern. Morality policies are characterized as being highly salient, relatively
simple and visible. According to Rogers (1995), innovations with such
attributes are more likely to diﬀuse faster than other policies. Recently,
Nicholson-Crotty (2009) and Makse and Volden (2011) found that these
policy attributes are associated with high adoption rates.
A more detailed expectation is provided by Mooney and Lee (1999b).
Since policy makers are highly responsive to the demand of the public, the
learning process of policy makers is much shorter. Policy makers do not
await the experiences of the pioneering countries with the policy, but rapidly
adopt the policy when the demand for such policy is high. Therefore, the
authors claim that morality policies only diﬀuse in a high rate during the first
years after the first jurisdiction adopted the policy. However, since morality
policy are highly controversial and salient, policy makers refuting to adopt a
policy will not be influenced by the decisions made in other countries, but
only by internal determinants. This leads to a declining adoption rate after
the first boost of adoptions. Boushey (2010) argues that this will, in turn,
not produce an S-shaped curve, but rather an R-curve. Figure 4.2 present
the cumulative distribution of an R-shaped curve.
Figure 4.2 shows the fast number of adoptions in the first period after the
first adoption. However, after the bulk of countries adopted the policy,
hardly any new adoptions are made. This curve therefore resembles the
letter “r”. Following from this reasoning, we expect that the cumulative
number of liberal abortion law adoptions resembles this R-curve distribution.
This hypothesis is in contrast with hypothesis I. The cumulative number
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Figure 4.2: Example of the R-curve Distribution
of adoptions cannot follow both an R- and an S-shaped curve. Our second
hypothesis reads:
Hypothesis II: Over time, the cumulative number of liberal
abortion law adoptions follows an R-shaped curve
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4.3 Data and Methods
4.3.1 Methods for Testing Hypotheses on Temporal Diﬀu-
sion
Two approaches are popular in studies testing whether policies diﬀuse over
time as an S- or R-curve. The first and most straightforward approach is by
plotting the cumulative number of adoptions over time (e.g., Gilardi, 2008;
Mooney and Lee, 1999b). The shape of the observed curve then leads to
confirmation or rejection of the hypotheses. Certainly, a glance of the eye
can give a lot of information on the occurrence of a curve. However, this
approach lacks a formal rule testing whether deviations from the expected
curve are significant.
Such formal tests are provided in the early literature on temporal (policy)
diﬀusion (Gray, 1973; Mahajan and Peterson, 1985). The approach these
authors suggest is to predict the proportion of adopters at time t using the
proportion of adopters at t-1. By incorporating a quadratic term for the
cumulative number of adopters in the regression model, one can estimate
whether the cumulative number of adopters follows the S-shaped curve over
time (Berry and Berry, 2007; Gray, 1973; Mahajan and Peterson, 1985). The
adoption rate can than be modelled using the following formulas:
∆Nt = Nt −Nt−1 = bNt · (L−Nt−1), (4.1)
and an S-shaped curve can than be modelled with:
Nt = (b · L+ 1)Nt−1 − b · N2t−1, (4.2)
where ∆Nt is the rate of adoptions at time t, Nt is the total number of
adopters at time t and L is the proportion of potential adopters at t=0. The
b-parameter then is an estimation of the speed of the S-curve. Furthermore,
the rate of adopters for an R-curve can be estimated using
∆Nt = ln[
1
(1− Nt
N¯
)
], (4.3)
and the cumulative number of adopters is denoted as:
Nt = N¯ [1− exp(−at)]. (4.4)
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While a formal test like this has advantages over the descriptive test
described above, there is one major drawback. Following Elkins and Simmons
(2005), what might appear as diﬀusion patterns may also be caused by internal
developments occurring in diﬀerent countries. 20 Although this problem is
recognized by Gray (1973), these models do not solve this problem.
Therefore, to control for internal determinants while testing the changing
likelihood over time, we use event history models. Since its introduction
to the field of policy adoption research by Berry and Berry (1990, 1992),
event history analysis became a popular technique to test hypotheses derived
from theories on diﬀusion and internal determinants simultaneously. This
technique has often been applied to study spatial diﬀusion processes (e.g.,
Gilardi, 2008; Mooney and Lee, 1995; Simmons and Elkins, 2004), but not to
test diﬀerences in the likelihood to adopt over time.21 In this thesis, we argue
that theories on temporal policy diﬀusion must be formally tested while
controlling for internal explanations by specifying non-linear modifications
of a timevariable.
Firstly, we use binomial regression models to estimate the likelihood to
adopt a permissive abortion laws. This model is denoted as:
ln(
pˆ
1− pˆ) = b0 + b1 · X, (4.5)
with pˆ being the predicted value of the dependent variable, b being the
regression parameters and X being an independent variable.
An S- or R-curve occurs when the likelihood to adopt a policy varies over
time. Therefore, we study the extent to which the likelihood of adopting
can be explained by a non-linear modulation of duration. The S-shaped
curve is found when, as time passes by, the likelihood to adopt a policy
increases rapidly, but declines when a majority has adopted the policy. This
time-varying likelihood can be modelled by including quadratic or cubic
modifications of the variable year. Depending of the values of the estimated
b-parameters, this produces a parabolic or semi-parabolic eﬀect of time on
the likelihood to adopt a policy.22 Formulas 4.6 and 4.7 present quadratic
and cubic eﬀects of year. The “+ (. . . )” refers to the included internal
determinants.
ln(
pˆ
1− pˆ) = b0 + b1 · Y ear + b2 · Y ear
2 + (. . . ) (4.6)
ln(
pˆ
1− pˆ) = b0 + b1 · Y ear + b2 · Y ear
2 + b3 · Y ear3 + (. . . ). (4.7)
Secondly, the R-shaped curve for cumulative adopters is the result of a
time-varying likelihood to adopt a policy, with the likelihood being high
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in the first years after the first adopts, but then declining exponential as
time passes. This time-varying likelihood can be modeled with incorporating
a natural logarithmic transformation of the time-variable. Formula 4.8
includes the natural logarithmic transformation of the variable year. With
this modification of the variable year, we can estimate the extent to which
the cumulative number of adopters follows the R-shaped curve. A negative
b-parameter produces a likelihood to adopt that drops increasingly over time.
ln(
pˆ
1− pˆ) = b0 + b1 · ln(Y ear) + (. . . ). (4.8)
We also calculate a model with a linear eﬀect of duration. Both hypothesis I
and II expect that the eﬀect of time is non-linear. Therefore, we contrast
models with these modifications of the duration-variable with each other,
and with a model with a linear modification of time. Formula 4.9 is used to
calculate a linear eﬀect of time.
ln(
pˆ
1− pˆ) = b0 + b1 · Y ear + (. . . ). (4.9)
We compare the four models by consulting their goodness of fit. We turn to
the AIC values to conclude which model best explains the process of policy
adoption. The AIC is a measure for the goodness of fit of regression models
that controls for the number of parameters in the model. The lower the
value of the AIC, the better the goodness of fit. The AIC value is calculated
as follows (see Akaike, 1973, 1974):
AIC = −2ln(L)− 2K, (4.10)
where k is the number of parameters in the statistical model and L is the
maximized value of the likelihood of the estimated model. When comparing
the goodness of fit of both models, we need to determine whether the
diﬀerences between the AIC values of the four models are worth noting. We
can calculate whether the other models lead to the loss of information using
the formula
exp(
−∆AICi,j
2
), (4.11)
with AICi being the model with the lowest AIC value (Burnham and An-
derson, 2002, 2004). The outcome of this formula can be interpreted is the
likelihood that modelj is as likely to lead to as little information loss as
modeli.
Finally, we examine the eﬀect of time by calculating the predicted p for
each year (see Formula 4.5). Then, plotting the likelihood to adopt over
time, we can conclude whether the likelihood to adopt a permissive abortion
law meets the expected S- or R-curves.
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4.3.2 Measuring the Dependent Variable
In studies on (temporal) policy diﬀusion, scholars generally investigate the
adoption of a policy innovation. A policy innovation is defined as “a law
which is new to the state adopting it” (Gray, 1973, p. 1174). In this study,
we focus on the adoption of a law that allows women to have an abortion
policy in the first trimester for socioeconomic reasons, in case the woman
is in a severe state of distress23, or on request of the pregnant woman. In
Western Europe, no country adopted such policy prior to 1967, when the
United Kingdom first adopted such policy.24 In Table 4.1, we present an
overview of the abortion reform that took place since the United Kingdom’s
adotion of the 1967 Abortion Act. This table shows that all countries except
Ireland relaxed the grounds on which abortion is permitted.25 It is important
to note that we are not interested in explaining all adoptions of permissive
abortion laws between 1967 and 2010, but only a country’s first adoption of
a liberal abortion laws. Many countries adopted more permissive abortion
laws in later years. However, following the definition of an innovation, we
exclude these adoptions from our analyses.
Table 4.1: Adoptions of Permissive
Abortion Laws in Eighteen Euro-
pean Countries between 1967 and
2010
Country Year Categorya
The United Kingdom 1967 1
Denmark 1970 1
Finland 1970 1
Austria 1974 3
France 1974 2
Sweden 1974 3
Iceland 1975 1
Norway 1975 1
Germany 1976 1
Greece 1978 1
Italy 1978 2
Luxembourg 1978 1
The Netherlands 1981 2
Belgium 1990 2
Switzerland 2001 2
Portugal 2007 3
Spain 2010 3
Ireland
a Categories of permissiveness: 1) on
socioeconomic grounds, 2) in case of
distress and 3) on request
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4.3.3 Internal Determinants
When studying the diﬀusion of policies, it is important to tackle the problem
of what Elkins and Simmons (2005) termed “similar responses to similar
circumstances”. As we have shown in the previous chapter, internal expla-
nations obviously play an important role in explaining the occurrence of
abortion reform. Such characteristics are also often geographically clustered,
and must therefore be included in the models. Not including these variables
might lead to the conclusion that state legislators of diﬀerent countries have
influenced each other, while they merely responded to the same demand for
or against such policies.
We include political and societal determinants to account for internal
explanations of the adoption of a more permissive abortion law. Research has
shown that left-wing political parties are more likely to favour liberal abortion
laws (Norris, 1986; Wasserman, 1983), and most adoptions of permissive
abortion laws occurred when left parties were part of in the government
(Outshoorn, 1996). Christian parties most often favour restrictive abortion
laws, and are less likely to adopt permissive abortion laws. To take these
influence into account, we control for the strength of (a) left-wing parties
and (b) Christian parties in the government. Data on whether or not a
party was present in the government are gathered from the Parliamentary
Democracy Archive (CPDA, 2011; Strøm et al., 2008). The strength of
governing parties is measured by the shares of seats in parliament, derived
from the Comparative Political Dataset (Armingeon et al., 2008). Left-wing
parties are all parties belonging to socialist, communist, and left-socialist
party families. Christian parties are all parties beelong to the religious party
family.
Next to political determinants, the likelihood of adopting a more per-
missive abortion law depends on societal characteristics. To control for the
level of emancipation of the population, we include two variables. Women’s
university enrolment measures the proportion of women between 25 and
30 with a university degree, compared to their female peers who did not
obtained this degree. Data are derived from the European Value Studies
(European Values Study Foundation, and World Values Survey Association,
2006). Furthermore, we include the female labour force rate. We obtained
these data from the Quality of Government Social Policy Data Set (OECD,
2006; Samanni et al., 2008). Using linear regression, missing values were
replaced using data on the female labour force from the Political Data
Handbook (Lane et al., 1996).
To further control for the societal demand for liberal abortion laws, we
include two variables. First, similar to Patton (2007) and Mooney and Lee
(1995), we include the number of physicians per 1,000 inhabitants of the
population to capture the pressure from this group. Data were derived
from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2010). Public opinion
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measures the aggregated opinion towards abortion. Data were derived from
the European Value Studies (European Values Study Foundation, and World
Values Survey Association, 2006). These surveys ask the extent to which
people find abortion to be licit. A higher value on this variable indicates a
more liberal public opinion on abortion.
Research has found that the likelihood of adopting a more permissive
abortion law decreases if the proportion of Catholics and Protestants in the
population is larger (Minkenberg, 2002; Mooney and Lee, 1995; Wasserman,
1983). We therefore include the proportion Catholics and the proportion
Protestants in the countries. These variables were derived from the World
Churches Handbook (Brierley, 1997).
Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics for Dependent
and Independent Variables
Variables Range Mean
Dependent Variable
Policy Adoptiona 0-1 0.44
Internal Determinants
Left-wing Parties -35.46/28.14 0.00
Christian Parties -16.92/37.48 0.00
Women’s Univ. Enrolment(t−1) -7.29/21.87 0.00
Women in Labour Force(t−1) -36.53/46.23 0.00
Number of Physicians(t−1) -1.06/1.77 0.00
Public Opinion -2.88/3.36 0.00
Catholics in Population(t−1) -48.77/48.36 0.00
Protestants in Population(t−1) -35.16/27.05 0.00
Spatial Diﬀusion -0.42/0.58 0.00
Duration
Year 1.00-43.00 14.54
Table 4.2 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables in the data
set. We have mean-centred the non-categorical variables. For the year-
variable, we have only showed the descriptives for the linear measurement.
Quadratic, cubic and logarithmic transformations will also be included in
the models. All variables are time-varying.
4.4 Results
Before turning to the multivariate analysis of the temporal diﬀusion of
permissive abortion laws, we present descriptive statistics to explore the
sustainability of the hypothesis on temporal diﬀusion. Figure 4.3 shows the
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cumulative number of adoptions of permissive abortion laws and the number
of adopters per year between 1967 to 2010.
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Figure 4.3: Diﬀusion of Permissive Abortion Policies across Eighteen Euro-
pean Countries since the first adoption
This figure shows that the cumulative number of adoptions over time
indeed resembles a S-curve, rather than an R-curve. The curve start to
increase rapidly in 1973, when 28 percent of the countries adopted a permis-
sive abortion law. This is in line with Rogers’ expectation that the turn-oﬀ
point is somewhere between 20 and 30 percent. In the following decade,
the curve speedily grows from 28 to 72 percent in the late 1980s. After
this rapid follow-up of adoptions, the curve gets flattened in the late 1980s.
Similar to the period of the early adoptions, this period is characterized
by infrequent adoptions over a large period of time. We also note that the
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curve is somewhat truncated. This means that the ‘innovation’ is not fully
diﬀused over all countries. Figure 4.3 thus gives no reason to reject the
first hypothesis. The cumulative number of adoptions seems to follow the
described S-curve. However, as we discussed previously, a formal test of our
hypotheses is necessary to examine whether the pattern indeed follows the
S-shaped curve.
For a formal test of the hypothesis on temporal diﬀusion, we performed
probit regression analyses to explain the adoption of a permissive abortion
law. Following Rogers’ reasoning, we would not expect an incremental, linear
relation between time and the likelihood to adopt a permissive abortion policy.
Hypothesis I expects that the likelihood to adopt a permissive abortion policy
would approximate a bell-shaped curve over time, and thus an S-shaped curve
when speaking in terms of cumulative number of adopters, while hypothesis
II predicts a declining exponential eﬀect of time. In order to test the eﬀect
of time, we have calculated four models with diﬀerent modifications of our
time variable. We included a linear measure of time in Model I, a quadratic
modification of time in Model II, a cubic modification of time in Model III,
and a logarithmic transformation of time in Model IV. In Table 4.3, we
present the results for these analyses.
In Model I, there is no substantial significant linear eﬀect of time on
the likelihood to adopt a permissive abortion law. In Model II, we find no
significant influence of the quadratic modification of time. The strongest
eﬀects are found in Model III, with the cubic modification of time. Also, we
find no eﬀect of the logarithmic transformation of time. To conclude which
transformation of time best explains the adoptions of liberal abortion laws,
we turn to the AIC values.
Model III with the cubic modification of time has the best fit, while Model
II with the quadratic modification has the lowest fit. However, we need to
determine whether the diﬀerences between the AIC values of the four models
are worth noting. We can calculate whether the other models lead to a loss
of information using Formula 4.11. The outcome of this calculation indicates
how probable it is that modelj leads to as less information loss as modeli.
Thus, Model I is (exp((139.42-143.40)/2)=) 0.14 times as likely to minimize
loss as Model III, while Model II is (exp((139.42-145.40)/2)=) 0.05 times as
likely to minimize information loss as Model III. Hence, we conclude that
Model I and II are substantially worse in predicting the likelihood to adopt
a permissive abortion policy than Model III. The diﬀerences between Model
III and Model IV are smaller, but Model IV is still (exp((139.42-142.74)/2)=)
0.19 times as probable to minimize information loss as Model III. Based
on our findings in Table 4.3, we find that there is a non-incremental eﬀect
of time on the likelihood to adopt a permissive abortion law. However, to
conclude whether we find evidence for an S-shaped or R-shaped curve, we
must further investigate the influence of duration by controlling for internal
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determinants and by interpreting the estimated b-parameters.
Table 4.3: Probit Regression Coeﬃcients Explaining the Adoption of a Permis-
sive Abortion Law a
Model I Model II Model III Model IV
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
Duration
Year -0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.09 **
Year2 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 **
Year3b 0.02 0.01 **
logYear 0.11 0.12
Intercept -1.66 0.18 ** -1.66 0.24 ** -2.30 0.39 ** -1.86 0.31 **
AIC 143.40 145.40 139.42 142.74
a p< .1; * p< .05; ** p< .01; One-tailed test. b b-coeﬃcient and standard error multiplied
by 100 for presentational purposes.
In Table 4.3, we showed the estimates of duration on the likelihood
of liberal abortion reform without controlling for the influence of internal
determinants. To control for these influences, we have added the internal
determinants to our analyses. The results are shown in Table 4.4.
In contrast with our finding in Model I, we now find a small incremental
negative eﬀect of time in Model V, and a strong positive eﬀect of the
logarithmic transformation of time in Model VIII. Again, we find the strongest
eﬀects of time in the models with the cubic and the logarithmic transformation
of time.
Next, we study the AIC values of the four models. Model VII has the
smallest AIC-value, and therefore we contrast model VII with the other
models, using Formula 4.11. From these calculations, we can state that
Model V is 0.02 times as probable to minimize information loss as model VII,
Model VI is 0.01 times as probable and Model VIII is 0.20 times as probable.
Given these findings, we can now conclude that when controlled for internal
explanations, the cubic transformation best describes the influence of time
on the likelihood of liberal abortion reform.
But how do we interpret the influence of the cubic measurement of time?
Figure 4.4 shows a graphic representation of the eﬀect of duration. We
calculated the eﬀect of duration on the likelihood to adopt a permissive
abortion law as follows. The b-coeﬃcients for year, year2 and year3 are,
respectively, 0.43, -0.02, 0.0003. The b-coeﬃcient of the intercept is -5.99.
To calculate the likelihood of adopting a permissive abortion law, we use the
logistic function:
f(z) =
1
1 + exp−z
. (4.12)
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Filling in the formula for z, and keeping all other variables at their means,
we can calculate the probability that a country adopts a liberal abortion law
in a particular year using:
f(z) =
1
1 + exp−(−5.99+0.43xyear−0.02xyear2+0.0003xyear3
. (4.13)
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Figure 4.4: Non-incremental Eﬀect of Time on the Likelihood to Adopt a
Permissive Abortion Law
The first graph in Figure 4.4 shows the outcome of this formula. The sec-
ond graph shows the cumulative probability over time. Following hypothesis
I, this curve would approximate the shape of an S-curve, while hypothesis II
suggests this curve would approach an R-curve.
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For the period 1968 to 2000, Figure 4.4 shows a clear S-shaped curve.
Starting in 1966, the likelihood of adopting a permissive abortion policy
rapidly increases, and reaches its peak in 1980. After 1980, the predicted
likelihood policy almost drops to zero in the first years of the twenty-first
century. In the last years, the likelihood to adopt slightly increases. These
results reflect Rogers’ 1995 thoughts that innovations are firstly adopted by
a few early actors, followed by a period with many adoptions by the majority
and at last by the laggards, adopting relatively few innovations over time.
However, in contrast with the social-learning hypothesis is the suddenly
increasing likelihood to adopt permissive abortion policies in the first decade
of the twenty-first century. In this period, Switzerland (2001), Portugal (2007)
and Spain (2010) adopted liberal abortion policies. Possibly, country-specific
explanations account for this deviation of the S-curve.
Up until 2002, the Swiss criminal code allowed abortion only in case
of severe health problems, but access to abortion varied among cantons.
Although Switzerland was one of the last Western European countries to
liberalize its abortion law, abortion has been high on the political agenda
throughout the second half of the twentieth century. Attempts to liberalize
the Swiss abortion law in were narrowly defeated in the late 1970s and early
1980s. It was not until 2002 when abortion became liberalized after the Swiss
Federal government adopted an abortion law allowing abortion during the
first trimester of the pregnancy in case the pregnant woman finds herself in
a state of distress in 2001 (United Nations, 2002).
Similar to Switzerland, abortion has dominated the political debate in
Portugal and Spain for decades prior to the initial adoption of liberal abortion
laws in respectively 2007 and 2010. In 1983, Spanish parliament voted in
favour of a bill allowing abortion allowing abortion on health reasons, but
the law was successfully challenged in court before it could come into eﬀect
(United Nations, 2002). Nevertheless, a similar legislation was enacted in
1985. Portugal relaxed their strict abortion policy in 1984, allowing abortion
on health reasons as well. These abortion policies were not taken into account
in our analyses, as they did not meet the definition of an innovation.
4.5 Conclusions and Discussion
Central in this chapter is the diﬀusion of permissive abortion policies among
Western European countries between 1968 and 2010. In this period, most
European countries enacted liberal abortion legislation. The aim of this
study is to find out to what extent these adoptions were made independently,
or whether countries are interdependent in their decision-making process. In
order to do so, we have studied the temporal dimension of policy diﬀusion,
and asked: To what extent does the cumulative number of liberal abortion
law adoptions in Western European countries between 1968 and 2010 follow
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an S-curve or an R-curve?
Rogers’ (1995) theory on the diﬀusion of innovations suggests that inno-
vations diﬀuse over time, where the cumulative number of adoptions follow
a S-shaped curve. This curve reflects the process of social learning, start-
ing with a small number of adopters in the first, long period, than a large
number of adopters in a relatively short period, and ending with a small
number of adopters over a longer period. This study provides evidence
that abortion policy diﬀused in a similar way. The cumulative number of
adoptions resembles the predicted S-shaped curve when plotted over time.
More convincingly is the influence of time on the occurrence of a similar
policy. A cubic modification of time had a highly significant influence on
the likelihood to adopt such policy, meaning that the likelihood to adopt
changes over time according to the phases described by Rogers (1995).
This chapter shows that, when controlled for internal determinants - the
political and societal characteristics of a country - we still find evidence
for the temporal diﬀusion of permissive abortion policies. In contrast with
expectations from morality policy scholars, liberal abortion reform in Western
Europe spread in a similar temporal patterns as non-morality policies. We will
study whether other morality policies also diﬀuse according to an S-shaped
temporal pattern in Chapter 6.
In this chapter, we studied whether abortion reform diﬀused over time,
indicating that countries learn from each other. In the next chapter, we
will the hypothesis that countries influence each other more informative, by
specifying hypotheses on who influences whom.
Chapter 5
Spatial Diﬀusion of Abortion
Policies
among Eighteen Western
European Countries
between 1968 and 201026
5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, we found evidence for the diﬀusion of abortion
policies. Our results showed that over time the likelihood of adopting per-
missive abortion laws follows the predicted pattern of an S-curve. Legislators
are first hesitant to adopt permissive abortion policies, and become more
responsive as policies have been adopted in other countries. After a majority
of countries has adopted a liberal abortion policy, the adoption rate decreases.
Ultimately, all countries surveyed except Ireland adopted permissive abortion
laws. The temporal S-curve remained significant after controlling for internal
explanations for the adoption of liberal abortion policies. In so doing, we
were able to rule out that our evidence for policy diﬀusion was caused by
policy makers of diﬀerent countries were responding to similar demands
for permissive abortion laws. Nevertheless, observing the S-curve does not
provide us with indisputable evidence of policy diﬀusion. In this chapter,
we therefore set out to further investigate how liberal abortion reform has
diﬀused across countries by testing hypotheses on spatial diﬀusion patterns.
Several studies on European abortion laws suggested that these laws
have diﬀused across European countries. The 1967 Abortion Act of the
United Kingdom is though to have set a precedent for other countries (World
Health Organisation, 1971a). Dickens and Cook (1979) formulated the
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expectation that the UK Abortion Act influenced abortion policy decisions
in other Commonwealth countries. Other scholars have suggested that the
diﬀusion of policies occurred across nearby countries, with abortion tourism
to countries with liberal abortion laws influencing the debate in the countries
(e.g., De Bruijn, 1979; Ferree et al., 2002; Ketting and Van Praag, 1983).
Although these studies provide with important indications of policy
diﬀusion, there are no empirical studies addressing the diﬀusion of abortion
policies in Western Europe. In this chapter, we aim to fill this gap. The
question we set out to answer reads:
Research Question IV: To what extent is the adoption of
liberal abortion policies in Western European countries between
1968 and 2010 aﬀected by previous adoptions in (a) neighbouring
countries, and (b) culturally, linguistically and politically similar
countries?
To answer this research question, we constructed a dyad-year data with
information on the permissiveness of abortion law, country characteristics
covering the political ideology, the composition of the government, religious
composition of a country, gender equality and public opinion for eighteen
Western-European countries between 1968 and 2010. Liberal abortion laws
are defined as abortion laws allowing women to have an abortion on socioe-
conomic grounds, in a severe state of distress or on request. We choose 1968
as the first year under study, since the first liberal abortion law in Western
Europe was adopted in 1967 by the United Kingdom. The countries in the
data set are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Ultimately, our data
set covers 7,905 dyad-years. We answer the research question using directed
dyad-year event history analysis.
Our aims for this article are twofold. Firstly, we aim to gain knowledge
on the diﬀusion of permissive abortion laws in Western European countries.
In the previous chapter, we have shown evidence for a dependence between
the adoptions of liberal abortion policies. The adoption of a liberal abortion
law in one country influenced the likelihood of other countries to adopt
a liberal abortion policy. In this chapter, we not only ask whether the
adoption of countries were dependent of each other, but we also ask which
country is influenced by the adoption of which country. Walker (1969)
suggested that legislators tend to look at the political actions of regional
policy makers. Studying the diﬀusion of policies in American states, he
examined the diﬀusion across regional states. Legislators might also be
inspired by countries that might not be geographically close, but have strong
similarities on other characteristics, as argued by Beck et al. (2006). Their
claim is that social distances might be able to explain the spread of policies
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across countries as well. For instance, legislators in Catholic countries
might look at solutions oﬀered by legislators in other Catholic countries,
while legislators in Protestant countries might learn from legislators in
other Protestant countries. In this chapter, we formulate hypotheses on the
diﬀusion across neighbouring countries, as well as on the diﬀusion across
countries that are similar in other ways than geographical.
Secondly, we aim for progress by elaborating on Volden’s proposed method-
ological approach for studying policy diﬀusion. In his article on the Children’s
Health Insurance Program Volden (2006) introduced a dyad-year approach
for studying diﬀusion. While the dyad-year approach gives new opportuni-
ties for research on policy diﬀusion, the models of Volden heavily rely on
diﬀerence scores of two states. The use of such scores inherently leads to
problems with the interpretation of the results, since a diﬀerence score does
not diﬀerentiate between countries that both have a high score, or countries
that both have a low score on a particular variable. We will build upon
Volden’s dyadic approach for policy diﬀusion, but replace the diﬀerence
scores by connectivity variables - measuring whether countries are similar -
and internal determinants.
In Section 5.2, we formulate hypotheses on the spatial diﬀusion of abortion
policies. Section 5.3 discusses the data and methods we use for testing our
hypotheses. The results of these analyses are discussed in Section 5.4. We
answer the research question and implications of our findings in Section 5.5
5.2 Expectations
5.2.1 Regional Diﬀusion Hypothesis
In 1969, Walker introduced his regional diﬀusion model in his landmark study
on the adoption of policies (Walker, 1969). He argued that policy makers
make policies aimed to solve problems in society. However, solving such
problems is highly complex, and decision makers are never able to gather
all necessary information for making such decisions. To reduce the risk of
failing policies, policy makers make use of analogues. By looking at how
the same problems are solved by other actors, they formulate new policies.
One way to do so, Walker argued, is by examining the solution oﬀered by
legislators in other polities. If other countries have oﬀered solutions for a
problem a country is dealing with, policy makers are more likely to introduce
such solutions in their country too.
While policy makers tend to gain knowledge from decisions made in
other countries, it makes more sense to look at some countries than at
others. One often-formulated expectation reads that policies diﬀuse across
neighbouring polities (Walker, 1969; Berry and Berry, 1990; Mooney and
Lee, 1995; Volden, 2006). Policy makers are more likely to compare their
102 5. SPATIAL DIFFUSION OF ABORTION POLICIES
situation to the situation in countries that are nearby, since neighbouring
countries often deal with similar problems, and policy makers are more aware
of solutions oﬀered in local countries than in countries further away.
Hypothesis I: A country is more likely to adopt a liberal abortion
policy when a neighbouring country has already adopted such
policy.
5.2.2 Space is More Than Geography
Legislators might also be inspired by countries that are not geographically
close, but have strong similarities otherwise. This argument is put forward
by Beck et al. (2006). Their claim is that social similarities between coun-
tries might be able to explain the spread of policies across countries as
well. To illustrate this point, social-democratic legislators might look at solu-
tions oﬀered by other social-democratic legislators in other countries, while
Christian-democratic legislators may learn from other Christian-democratic
legislators. In this study, we formulate hypotheses on the diﬀusion across
neighbouring countries, as well as on the diﬀusion across countries that are
in other ways similar.
We can also interpret the concept of ‘nearby’ in a diﬀerent way. Policy
makers are thought of as consulting solutions oﬀered in countries, and
especially in those countries they have knowledge of. While it is plausible
that policy makers have more knowledge of neighbouring countries than of
countries far away, other interpretations of ‘nearby’ are possible. Since policy
makers are influenced in their decision making by their ideological preferences,
it is likely that they will compare themselves with countries with shared ties
such as similar ideologies, than with countries with diﬀerent ideologies. Policy
makers are thus more likely to consult the solution oﬀered for a given problem
in a country with a similar political ideology than a country with another
political ideology. Literature on policy diﬀusion supports this reasoning. For
example, successful Children’s Health Insurance programs diﬀused not only
across neighbouring states, but also across states with unified Republican
Governments (Volden, 2006). We therefore formulate the following general
hypothesis:
Space is more than geography hypothesis: A country is
more likely to adopt a liberal abortion policy when a country with
shared ties has already adopted such policy.
We further specify this hypothesis by filling in the nature of the similarities
between both countries. In Chapter 3, we found that the adoption of liberal
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abortion reform was influenced by political and societal characteristics. We
will therefore formulate hypotheses on political and societal similarities
between countries. At first, diﬀerent religions have diﬀerent, but clear, views
on abortion (Schenker, 2000). The Roman Catholic church has been known
for its strong stance against abortion, while Protestant churches are often
more liberal towards abortion. It is thus to be expected that when faced
with the decision to reform the abortion policy, policy makers from Catholic
countries might look at the solution oﬀered in other Catholic countries, and
policy makers from Protestant countries turn to policy makers in other
Protestant countries. This leads us to hypothesis II:
Hypothesis II: A country is more likely to adopt a liberal abor-
tion policy when a country with a similar religious tradition has
already adopted such policy.
Furthermore, when comparing with the situation in other countries, it is
necessary to exactly know what occurred in other countries. Therefore,
it is a major advantage if one is familiar with the language of the other
country, while large diﬀerences between the languages of diﬀerent countries
may function as an obstacle in gaining knowledge on each other’s legislation.
Policy makers are more likely to be aware of the legislation of other countries if
they have a clear and easy understanding of those laws. We thus hypothesize:
Hypothesis III: A country is more likely to adopt a liberal
abortion policy when a country with languages from the same
linguistic family has already adopted such policy.
Finally, European countries can be distinguished in their views on the
preferred extent of the welfare state. Esping-Andersen (1990) conducted
a typology in which liberal countries, conservative countries and social-
democratic countries are distinguished. These types of welfare states not
only have a distinct view on the welfare state, there view on the role of
the state might also be reflected in its abortion policies. The key notion of
liberalism is the freedom for the individual, leaving private choices as much as
possible to the people. Social-democratic thought is known for its permissive
stand on abortion. Conservatism might be associated with restricted views
on abortion. With their shared views on the role of the state, and perhaps
abortion, policy makers might seek for solution oﬀered by similar welfare
states when addressing the abortion issue. The fourth hypothesis therefore
reads:
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Hypothesis IV: A country is more likely to adopt a liberal
abortion policy when a country with similar views on the welfare
state has already adopted such policy.
5.3 Data and Methods
5.3.1 Structure of the Data Set
To test our expectations, we have constructed a dyad-year data set. The
records in this data set are directed connections between countries. A dyad
is a connection between two countries in a particular year. These ties have
a direction. For example, our data set consists of a dyad from Countryi to
Countryj in a given year, and a dyad from Countryj to Countryi in the same
year. Since we study eighteen European countries, we have seventeen dyads
for every year a country is at risk of adopting a more permissive abortion law.
Countries that have already adopted the most permissive abortion law27 are
no longer at risk of adopting this law, and are therefore not included in our
dyad-year data set. However, dyads that directed from countries that have
not yet adopted the most permissive abortion law to countries with the most
permissive abortion law are included. For instance, Denmark adopted the
most permissive abortion law in 1973. Starting in 1974, we have not included
dyads from Denmark to other countries, but dyads from other countries to
Denmark are still included. Ultimately, we have constructed a dataset with
10,047 dyads, covering connections between eighteen countries between 1968
and 2010.
Dyads in our data set cover information about two countries. Since the
dyads are directed, we will distinguish between information for Countryi,
the main country in the dyad, and Countryj , the connected country in the
dyad. Each dyad covers information on (a) whether or not a more permissive
abortion law is adopted in Countryi, (b) whether or not both countries are
similar in geographic, cultural, linguistic and political perspective, and (c)
political and societal characteristics of Countryi.
5.3.2 Measuring the Dependent Variable
Our dependent variable measures whether (1) or not (0) Countryi adopts
a liberal abortion law in year t. We consider liberal abortion laws to be
abortion laws allowing women to have an abortion on socio-economic grounds,
in case of distress or on request. In Table 5.1, we present an overview of the
liberal abortion reforms that took place since 1967. This table shows that
with the exception of Ireland, every country relaxed the grounds on which
abortion is permitted.
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Table 5.1: Adoptions of Permissive
Abortion Laws in Eighteen Euro-
pean Countries between 1967 and
2010
Country Year Categorya
The United Kingdom 1967 1
Denmark 1970 1
Finland 1970 1
Austria 1974 3
France 1974 2
Sweden 1974 3
Iceland 1975 1
Norway 1975 1
Germany 1976 1
Greece 1978 1
Italy 1978 2
Luxembourg 1978 1
Netherlands 1981 2
Belgium 1990 2
Switzerland 2001 2
Portugal 2007 3
Spain 2010 3
Ireland
a Categories of permissiveness: 1) on
socio-economic grounds, 2) in case of
distress and 3) on request
5.3.3 Measuring Nearbyness of Countries
Whether countries are nearby each other is measured in four ways. First, we
measure neighbouring countries as countries bordering a country. Second,
countries are classified based on their religious tradition. Data are gathered
from the World Churches Handbook (Brierley, 1997). Based on the reli-
gious composition of the population, we diﬀerentiate between five types of
religious traditions: predominantly Catholic countries, predominantly Protes-
tant countries, predominantly Anglican countries, predominantly Orthodox
countries, and mixed countries. Third, we categorize countries based on their
language. A shared language, or greater similarities between two languages,
increases the possibilities to communicate with each other. As European
countries often have their own language, we choose to group the languages in
diﬀerent linguistic subfamilies. These linguistic families share similarities in
word-use and grammar (Sto¨rig, 1988). We have grouped countries in seven
categories: North Germanic languages, West Germanic languages, Gallo
Romance languages, Greek, Iberian languages, and Italian languages. Fourth,
countries are distinguished based on their type of welfare state, following
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the typology of Esping-Andersen (1990). We distinguish between liberal
countries, conservative countries and social-democratic countries.
5.3.4 Internal Determinants
When studying the diﬀusion of policies, it is important to tackle the problem
of what Elkins and Simmons (2005) label “similar responses to similar
circumstances”. As we have shown in Chapter 3, internal explanations
obviously play an important role in explaining the occurrence of an abortion
reform. Such characteristics are also often geographically clustered, and must
therefore be included in the models. Not including these variables might lead
to the conclusion that state legislators of diﬀerent countries have influenced
each other, while they merely responded to the same demand for or against
such policies.
We include both political and societal determinants of Countryi to account
for internal explanations for the adoption of a more permissive abortion law.
We include variables measuring the share of the seats that left-wing political
parties and Christian parties have in the parliament. Three countries (Greece,
Portugal, and Spain) had dictatorial regimes in the first years under study.
We have therefore set the political variables of these countries to zero for
these years. Besides political determinants, societal indicators measuring
the resistance to and the demand for liberal abortion reform. The relative
proportion of Catholics and Protestants are included. Next, we include
women’s university enrolment and female labour force rate as a proxy for the
level of emancipation of the population. Other indicators for the support for
the relaxation of abortion policies in our models are the number of physicians
per 1,000 inhabitants of the population and the aggregated opinion towards
abortion. For more details on the measurements of these variables, we refer
to the Data and Methods sections of Chapter 3 and Chapter 4.
Table 5.2 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables in our models.
A column is included to specify whether the data applies to Countryi or
to both countries. Ultimately, we have information for 10,047 dyad-year
combinations.
5.4 Results
To test the hypotheses, we employ discrete time probit regression analysis
using the dyad-year data file. The model parameters are estimated using
R 2.13.0 (R Development Core Team, 2010). We present the b-coeﬃcients,
standard errors, and measurements for the model fit in Table 5.3 We present
five diﬀerent models. In Model I, we only include the internal determinants
explaining the adoption of a liberal abortion law. In Model II, we also include
the variable measuring whether Countryi and Countryj are geographically
connected. In Model III, we test whether abortion reforms diﬀuse among
5.4. RESULTS 107
Table 5.2: Descriptive Statistics for Dependent and Independent
Variables
Variables Information Time Range Mean
for Country. . . Varying
Dependent Variable
Similar Policy Adoption Countryi Yes 0-1 0.01
Diﬀusion Variables
Neighbouring Countries Both countries No 0-1 0.14
Similar Religious Tradition Both countries No 0-1 0.27
Similar Linguistic Family Both countries No 0-1 0.20
Similar Welfare State Both countries No 0-1 0.37
Internal Determinants
Left-wing Parties Countryi Yes 0.00/63.60 35.61
Christian Parties Countryi Yes 0.00/54.40 17.01
Women’s Univ. Enrolment(t−1) Countryi Yes 0.00/29.17 7.46
Women in Labour Force(t−1) Countryi Yes 15.20/96.46 50.61
Catholics in Population(t−1) Countryi Yes 0.06/97.19 48.83
Protestants in Population(t−1) Countryi Yes 0.05/97.13 35.20
Number of Physicians(t−1) Countryi Yes 0.80/3.63 1.89
Public Opinion Countryi Yes 1.74/7.97 4.61
Duration
Year Both Countries Yes 0-49 19.41
countries with a shared religious heritage, while including internal determi-
nants as well. In Model IV, the hypothesis on shared linguistic families is
tested simultaneously with internal explanations. Finally, Model V provides
with the test of the hypotheses on diﬀusion among similar welfare states,
while also including internal explanations.28
First, we see in Model I in Table 5.3 that most internal determinants
have a significant influence on the likelihood to adopt a permissive abortion
law. We find that liberal abortion laws are more likely to be adopted by left-
wing governmental parties, while Christian parties do not seem to influence
the adoption of such policy. Further, with the exception of women in the
labour force, we find that those societal determinants that reflect support for
the relaxation of abortion policies positively influence the adoption thereof.
Women’s university enrolment, the number of physicians and liberal public
opinion towards abortion increases the likelihood to adopt a permissive
abortion law. Further, indicators of oppression against liberal abortion
laws negatively influence abortion reform. The likelihood to adopt a liberal
abortion law is smaller in countries with relatively more members of the
Catholic Church or Protestant churches. These findings are to a large extent
similar to the findings in Chapter 3 regarding the adoption of a period model
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abortion law.
Table 5.3: Probit Regression Coeﬃcients Explaining the Adoption
of a Liberal Abortion Policy (N: 7,905) a
Model I Model II
b s.e. b s.e.
Political Characteristics
Left-wing Parties 0.01 0.00 *** 0.01 0.00 ***
Christian Parties 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Societal Characteristics
Women in Labour Force(t−1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Women’s Univ. Enrolment(t−1) 0.02 0.00 *** 0.02 0.00 ***
% Catholics(t−1) -0.01 0.00 ** -0.01 0.00 **
% Protestants(t−1) -0.01 0.00 *** -0.01 0.00 ***
Number of Physicians(t−1) 1.05 0.10 *** 1.05 0.10 ***
Public Opinion 0.26 0.05 *** 0.26 0.05 ***
Previous Policy Adoption by:
A Neighbouring Country 0.15 0.11 *
Time
Year -0.11 0.01 *** -0.11 0.01 ***
Year2 0.00 0.00 *** 0.00 0.00 ***
Intercept -0.91 0.12 *** -0.91 0.12 ***
AIC 1977.50 1978.20
a * p< .10; ** p< .05;*** p< .01; Two-tailed test.
In Model II, we include a measurement indicating whether or not a neigh-
bouring country has already adopted a liberal abortion law. First, we note
that the AIC value increases little. This means that this model is not better
in explaining the adoption of liberal abortion policies than Model I. Further,
Model II shows that the estimations for the internal determinants do not
seem to alter drastically. The neighbouring diﬀusion variable does have a
positive influence. From this we conclude that when a country adopts an
abortion policy, it is (exp(0.15)=) 1.16 times more likely to adopt a law
similar to the law of neighbouring countries than the law of another country.
This finding provides us with moderate evidence supporting hypothesis I,
which stated that the likelihood to adopt a liberal abortion law increases
when neighbouring countries have already adopted such policy.
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In Models III to V in Table 5.3, we test the extent to which countries are
more likely to enact abortion legislation that is similar to those of countries
that are connected in other ways. In Model III, we study the extent to
which abortion laws diﬀuse across countries with a shared religious heritage.
In Model IV, we test the third hypothesis, which expects that policies are
more likely to diﬀuse among countries with similar linguistics. Model V
shows the estimates to test hypothesis IV, which reads that liberal abortion
laws are more likely to be adopted when countries with shared views on the
welfare state have previously adopted such policies. The results of Models
III to V are rather similar. First, we note that these models are not better
in explaining the adoption of liberal abortion laws than Model I. The AIC
values of Model III to V are slightly higher than the AIC value of Model I.
Further, we find that the significant eﬀects of internal determinants do not
change after including the diﬀusion variables. Finally, and most important
to our hypotheses, we find that the adoption of liberal abortion laws is not
influenced by previous adoptions in countries with shared ties other than
geographical: none of the similarities between countries appeared to influence
the likelihood to adopt. Therefore, we must reject Hypotheses II, III and IV.
5.5 Conclusions and Discussion
5.5.1 Conclusions
In this chapter we studied the diﬀusion of permissive abortion policies across
Western European countries between 1968 and 2010. Literature on European
abortion policies suggested that the abortion reform of a country influenced
the likelihood of other countries to adopt a permissive abortion law. Litera-
ture on policy diﬀusion expects not only that the policy decision of diﬀerent
jurisdictions are interdependent, but also expect that some jurisdictions are
more likely to influence each other than others. In this study, we examined
whether countries with similarities in geographic, religious, linguistic, and
political/economical characteristics were more likely to influence each other
than other countries. We therefore asked: “To what extent is the adoption
of liberal abortion policies in Western European countries between 1968 and
2010 aﬀected by previous adoptions in (a) neighbouring countries, and (b)
culturally, linguistically and politically similar countries?”
Derived from Walkers’ (1969) notion that in their decision making process,
state legislators tend to look at the decisions made in nearby countries, we
have formulated hypotheses on the diﬀusion of more permissive abortion laws
across neighbouring countries. Also, Beck et al. (2006) argued that while
geographic patterns of diﬀusion are likely to emerge, diﬀusion may also occur
among countries with similarities other than geographical. We formulated
hypotheses on the diﬀusion among countries with similar religious heritage,
similar linguistics, and a shared view on the welfare state. To test these
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hypotheses, we have constructed a dyad-year data set and applied logistic
regression analyses to estimate the influence of other countries’ decisions on
the likelihood of a country to adopt a similar abortion policy.
This study shows that, when controlled for political and societal charac-
teristics of a country, we find evidence for a diﬀusion of permissive abortion
policies. A country is more likely to adopt a liberal abortion law when a
neighbouring country has adopted such law. We can thus conclude that
countries indeed influenced each other in their abortion reform adoption
process. Our findings suggest that policy makers are more prone to look at
solutions oﬀered in countries that are geographically nearby, as Walker (1969)
initially suggested. However, we found no influence of the policy action of
countries with shared ties, as suggested by Beck et al. (2006). A country was
not more likely to adopt a liberal abortion law when countries with a shared
religious heritage, with similarities in linguistics, or with a shared view on
the welfare state had previously adopted the policy.
5.5.2 Discussion
We were unable to simultaneously analyse the four variables for similarities
between countries. This can be problematic, as linguistic families and the
dominant religion of countries are often spatially clustered. Therefore, we
are modest in disentangling the three spatial patterns of diﬀusion we found.
Furthermore, these similarities might interact with each other. Policy makers
might be influenced by the actions of policy makers in neighbouring countries,
especially when there are no linguistic barriers and similar religious traditions
between the countries.
Furthermore, our findings do not necessarily provide evidence for Walker’s
regional diﬀusion these. We found evidence that neighbouring countries are
more likely to adopt similar policies. However, Walker’s argument is strongly
based on diﬀusion by learning: policy makers learn from the decisions made
by other policy makers. Whether this learning process was actually at play
in the abortion reform in Western Europe can be disputed. We discuss two
important arguments why social learning processes might not work in this
case.
Firstly, learning theories strongly rely on learning from successes and
failures from others. Due to the strong moral components in the abortion
issue, it is diﬃcult to state whether a country learned from the successes and
failures of other countries. We did therefore not regard the abortion reform
as a success or a failure.
Secondly, we began this chapter by formulating that the literature on
European abortion policies suggested the diﬀusion of abortion policies. One
major reason why countries influenced each other seems to be the occurrence
of so-called abortion tourism. It is likely that we found regional diﬀusion
eﬀects due to this phenomenon. It seems plausible that pregnant women
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living in a country with restrictive abortion policies are more likely to con-
sider travelling to a nearby country to obtain an abortion, than to a country
further away. Abortion tourism will than occur more often when neighbour-
ing countries adopt permissive abortion laws. Unfortunately, statistics on
abortion tourism hardly exist, and the figures that are available are unreliable.
Abortion tourism could therefore not be measured in this chapter. However,
while abortion tourism might pressure policy makers to address the abortion
issue, it does not explain why we found a spread of similar policies among
neighbouring countries.
With this chapter, we conclude the second part of this thesis. We studied
the extent to which internal explanations and policy diﬀusion explanations
account for the adoption of liberal abortion policies in Western European
countries between 1968 and 2010. Our findings in Chapter 3 show that
liberal abortion reform is explained by societal and political characteristics
of a country. However, we found evidence that the policy actions were inter-
dependent. Policy diﬀusion theories suggest that, over time, the cumulative
number of policy adoptions follows an S-shaped curve. In Chapter 4, we
found that the cumulative number of liberal abortion policy adoptions indeed
resembles this S-shaped curve. In this chapter, we found that liberal abortion
policies diﬀuse among neighbouring countries, but not among countries with
similarities in linguistics and religious heritage, but not among countries
with similar welfare state regimes.
In Part Three, we study the extent to which our findings in Part Two
can be generalized to other morality policies. In Chapter 6 and 7, we
study the temporal and spatial diﬀusion patterns of six morality and eleven
non-morality policies.
Part III
Comparing Morality and
Non-morality Policies

Chapter 6
Temporal Diﬀusion of
Policies among Seventeen
European Countries between
1961 and 201029
6.1 Introduction
Following the theory on the diﬀusion of innovations developed by Rogers
(1995) in the early 1960s, scholars in the field of policy diﬀusion have hy-
pothesized how “adopters influence those in the social system who have not
yet adopted” (Gray, 1973, p. 1176). As more jurisdictions have adopted a
certain policy, those who have not yet done so are more likely to adopt as
well.
An important characteristic of policy diﬀusion patterns is that the cumu-
lative number of adopters follows an S-shape curve when plotted over time
(Gilardi, 2008). This S-shaped curve (or S-curve) is believed to reflect the
social learning curve, visualizing a learning process, and is often found in
studies on diﬀusion of policies, as well as in work on innovations in general
(Rogers, 1995). Initially, only a few countries adopt innovations; and one or
a few countries introduce a policy. These countries are so-called policy labo-
ratories (Volden, 2006). Policy makers in other countries await whether the
policy is successful or not. When this policy is perceived as successful, more
and more countries follow, resulting in a faster growing number of adoptions.
Ultimately, most countries will adopt, with more cautious countries, the
laggards, adopting in the final years. Examining the number of adoptions
per year over time will give the so-called S-shaped learning curve.
While this temporal pattern of diﬀusion is often found in studies on
policy adoptions (Berry and Berry, 2007; Gilardi, 2008; Gray, 1973), scholars
suggested that diﬀerent types of policies diﬀuse in diﬀerent temporal patterns.
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Gray (1973) found that some policies diﬀuse at a faster rate, and over
more states than others. Savage (1985) asserted “much diﬀusion research
has pointed to the fact that various attributes of innovations, including
their particular substance, shape the responsiveness of adopters to them”.
Unfortunately, both authors remained vague about which (attributes of)
policies lead to which pattern of diﬀusion. Recent studies on policy diﬀusion
have found that the diﬀusion patterns of policies are partly shaped by their
observability, complexity, and salience (Makse and Volden, 2011; Nicholson-
Crotty, 2009): policies that are highly observable, relatively simple, and
highly salient to the public diﬀuse at faster rates than other policies.
A similar claim is made by morality policy scholars. These scholars argued
that the temporal diﬀusion patterns of morality policies are distinct from
those of other policies (e.g., Boushey, 2010; Mooney and Lee, 1999b; Pierce
and Miller, 1999). This is explained with the distinct attributes of morality
policies: morality policies are characterized by their high observability, low
complexity, and their high salience to the public (Mooney and Lee, 1999b;
Mooney and Schuldt, 2008; Smith, 2002; Tatalovich and Daynes, 2005).
Policy diﬀusion theories state that such policies are therefore more likely
to diﬀuse rapidly after the first jurisdiction has adopted a policy, but these
adoption rate rapidly decline, as those jurisdictions unwilling to adopt a
policy are not likely to be influenced by the decisions of others. However, due
to their controversial nature, morality policies are not likely to be adopted
by all countries. After the first period with high adoption rates, the laggards
are unlikely to adopt the policy. The cumulative number of morality policy
adoptions would therefore not represent an S-shaped curve, but an R-shaped
curve.
In Chapter 4, we studied the temporal diﬀusion pattern of liberal abortion
policies. Our findings suggested that the cumulative number of liberal
abortion policies resembles an S-shaped curve, rather than an R-shaped
curve. In this chapter, we set out to compare the temporal diﬀusion patterns
of morality and non-morality policies, and study the extent to which there
are diﬀerences in these patterns between both types of policies. The research
question thus reads:
Research Question V: To what extent do the temporal diﬀu-
sion patterns of morality policies in Western European countries
diﬀer from those of non-morality policies in Western European
countries?
To answer this research question, we study the temporal diﬀusion patterns of
six morality policies and eleven non-morality policies that have been adopted
by a majority of seventeen European countries between 1961 and 2010. We
aim for scientific progress in threefold. Firstly, we improve on previous
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research on temporal diﬀusion patterns for morality policies by studying
multiple policies from diﬀerent policy types at once. Most studies on the
diﬀusion of morality policies are limited to one policy (e.g., Klawitter and
Hammer, 1999; Mooney and Lee, 1995), or on the diﬀusion of several policies
in the same policy area (e.g., Mooney and Lee (1999b) on laws on capital
punishment, and Pierce and Miller (1999) on state lottery adoptions). We
argue that to understand the diﬀerent characteristics of the diﬀusion patterns
of morality policies, it is necessary to study the temporal patterns of both
morality and non-morality policies.
Secondly, we aim to gain knowledge on the diﬀusion of morality policies
among Western European countries. The studies on European morality
policies has received increasingly more attention in the past years (e.g.,
Albæk et al., 2007; Engeli, 2009; Fink, 2008), but studies on the diﬀusion
of morality policies are limited to the American context. Our findings in
Chapter 4 and 5 show that in the case abortion reform, European policy
makers have not acted independent from each other. Studying the diﬀusion
patterns of other morality policies as well will provide us with more insights
into the temporal diﬀusion of morality policies.
Thirdly, we use more sophisticated methods for analysing the temporal
pattern of policy diﬀusion than previous studies on temporal diﬀusion. Most
studies merely described and discussed the shape of the patterns, and failed
to take internal determinants into account. In this study, we study the
temporal diﬀusion patterns using event history techniques, providing us with
the possibility to formally test expectations on the diﬀusion patterns, while
controlling for internal explanations. These methods were also applied in
Chapter 4.
6.2 Expectations
The classic theory on the diﬀusion of innovations formulates that actors
are interdependent (Rogers, 1995). The likelihood to adopt an innovation
is partly resulting from previous adoptions by other actors. An important
insight from this theory is that the adoption rates do not increase equally
over time, rather, they are normally distributed. When plotted over time,
cumulative number of adopters follows an S-shape curve (Gilardi, 2008; Gray,
1973; Mahajan and Peterson, 1985).
The S-curve is often found in studies on diﬀusion of a wide range of
innovations (Rogers, 1995). Initially, only a few actors adopt an innovations.
Other actors await whether the innovation is successful or not. When this
innovation is perceived as successful, more and more actors will adopt it,
resulting in a faster growing number of adoptions. After a majority of the
actors has adopted the innovation, the adoption rate starts to decrease.
Ultimately, most actors adopted the innovation, with more cautious actors,
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the laggards, adopting last. The characteristic shape of the social learning
curve is explained by the social learning theory (Gray, 1973; Mooney and
Lee, 1995; Rogers, 1995). Pioneer adopt innovations at an early stage, while
the majority is more hesitant. These actors are persuaded when they learn
of others from experiences with the innovation.
This temporal pattern of diﬀusion is often found in studies on policy
adoptions (Fink, 2011; Gilardi, 2008; Gray, 1973; Levi-Faur, 2005; Simmons
and Elkins, 2004), and is considered as a strong indication for policy diﬀusion.
Some morality policy scholars have found empirical evidence that morality
policies do not diﬀuse in diﬀerent patterns than other policies (Mooney
and Lee, 1995; Pierce and Miller, 1999). For instance, in the case of U.S.
pre-Roe v. Wade abortion reform (Mooney and Lee, 1995), the distribution
of cumulative adoptions has a clear S-shaped function over time, meaning
that the adoption rates over time approximate a bell-shaped curve. Our first
hypothesis therefore reads that there are no diﬀerences to be expected in the
shape of temporal diﬀusion patterns of morality and non-morality policies.
Hypothesis I: Over time, the cumulative number of morality
policy and non-morality policy adoptions follows an S-shaped
curve
Scholars on policy diﬀusion and the diﬀusion of morality policies in
particular have provided with theoretical arguments for distinct variations
in the adoption rates over time. In his classical theory on the diﬀusion
of innovations, Rogers (1995) states that adoption rates vary for diﬀerent
innovations. The rate of adoptions depends on certain attributes of innovation,
such as its complexity and the observability of an innovation. More complex
innovation diﬀuse slower than others, since they involve a greater deal of
learning. On the other hand, highly observable innovations diﬀuse much
faster, since actors are more aware of the adoption of these innovations,
which shortens the learning process.
According to Nicholson-Crotty (2009) and Makse and Volden (2011),
the attributes of policies also influence the temporal diﬀusion patterns of
policy adoptions. Among other things, these studies suggest that policies
that are highly salient, less complex, and more visible diﬀuse faster than
other policies. Morality policies, that are characterized by these attributes
(Mooney, 1999, 2000), are therefore more likely to diﬀuse at a faster rate.
Rapid adoption rates will not result in the expected S-curve of cumulative
number of adoptions, but as an R-curve (Boushey, 2010). Many countries
adopt a morality policy soon after the first adoption. However, given the
controversial nature of morality policies, those countries that are unwilling
to adopt the policy at first, are unlikely to be persuaded by the decisions of
other countries.
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Several studies set out to research the R-shaped curve of morality policies.
Firstly, Mooney and Lee (1999b) showed that the adoption of laws on death
penalties in American states indeed follows the R-curve pattern when the
adopted policy is favoured by a majority of the population. The learning
process is shortened, since policy makers are more likely to follow the demands
from the population, in stead of anticipating on the experiences of other
states. Secondly, Boushey (2010) studied the temporal patterns of a variety
of morality policies simultaneously, and compared these with the temporal
patterns of other policies. His findings showed that morality policies indeed
are determined by a faster adoption rate than non-morality policies.
We thus hypothesize that the adoption rate of morality policies over time
diﬀers from those of non-morality policies, with the cumulative number of
morality policy adoptions following an R-shaped curve, and the cumulative
number of non-morality policy adoptions resembling an S-shaped curve.
Hypothesis II reads:
Hypothesis II: Over time, the cumulative number of morality
policy adoptions follows an R-shaped curve, while the cumulative
number of non-morality policy adoptions follows an S-shaped
curve
6.3 Data and Methods
6.3.1 Selection of Morality Policies
We analyse the diﬀusion patterns of six policies that are often categorized
as morality policies. We employed two criteria for selecting these policies.
Firstly, the policy must have been adopted by at least a majority of the
Western European countries. Secondly, the policy must be identified as a
morality policy in the scientific literature. We have selected the following
morality policies: laws on abortion, capital punishment, embryo research,
germline therapy, same-sex partnerships and smoking bans in working places,
public transport, cafes and restaurants. The following sections provide an
overview of the selected morality policies.
Abortion Policies Abortion policy is known as the prime example of a
morality policy (Patton, 2007), and as such, it has been thoroughly studied by
morality policy scholars (e.g., Engeli, 2009; Mooney and Lee, 1995; Patton,
2007; Roh and Haider-Markel, 2003). As we have shown in Chapter 2,
abortion laws can vary widely in the degree of permissiveness. In Part Three
of this book, we incorporated the adoption of an abortion law allowing women
to have an abortion during the first trimester of their pregnancy on social or
economic grounds, in case of severe distress, or on request. Such abortion law
120 6. TEMPORAL DIFFUSION OF POLICIES
was first adopted by a Western European country in 1967, when the United
Kingdom introduced the Abortion Act. Since 1967, nearly every Western
European country adopted a law allowing women to have an abortion on
one of these grounds. The last country to do adopt this policy was Spain in
2010. Ireland is the only country that has not adopted a permissive abortion
law. Data are derived from Chapter 2.
Capital Punishment Another example of a thoroughly studied morality
policy is the law on capital punishment (e.g., Mooney and Lee, 1999a,b, 2000).
While the death penalty was not used in most European countries in the
aftermath of the Second World War, all Western European countries still had
laws allowing capital punishment in the early 1960s. In 1968, Austria was
the first Western European country to oﬃcially abolish capital punishment
for all crimes. In the following two decades, all Western-European countries
except Greece abolished capital punishment. In 2004, Greece was the last
country to follow the example set by Austria. Data on this variable are
derived from United Nations (2012).
Embryo Production and Germline Therapy Breakthroughs in the
field of assisted reproductive technologies have not only oﬀered solutions for
couples by whom spontaneous pregnancies failed to occur, it has also oﬀered
possibilities in the way we can influence the health of the unborn child, or
even produce embryos for scientific research. These changing possibilities
came with moral dilemmas, and Western European governments have often
answered to these changes with regulating the practice of embryo research.
Studies on laws on assisted reproductive technologies and embryo research
have often framed the issue as a morality issue (e.g., Fink, 2008; Montpetit
et al., 2007). Nevertheless, the classification of these policies are less clear
then the examples above. The matter of embryo research policies is more
technical than the previous examples. Furthermore, the economic impact of
stem cell research can be significant (Fink, 2008). We include the adoption
of laws forbidding the practice of two techniques involving embryo research
from 1987 to 2006. Firstly, we include laws on Germline (gen) therapy,
measuring whether the use of germline therapy to aﬀect characteristics of
the unborn child is forbidden. The first Western European country to forbid
this practice was Spain in 1988. Subsequently, ten other Western European
countries adopted similar legislation on germline therapy. Nowadays, Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, and Luxembourg have not adopted these
policies. Secondly, we include laws on Embryo production, measuring whether
it is forbidden to produce embryos exclusively for the use of scientific research.
Norway and Ireland where the first Western European countries to disallow
this practice in 1987. Until 2006, all countries in Western Europe except
Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, Switzerland and the United Kingdom adopted
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similar policies. Data on both types of legislation are gathered from Fink
(2008).
Same-Sex Partnership The legal position of same-sex couples and rights
of homosexuals have been thoroughly studied by several morality scholars
(e.g., Haider-Markel, 2001; Klawitter and Hammer, 1999). We study the
extent to which countries have adopted laws legally recognizing marital or non-
marital partnership between 1988 and 2010.30 On June 7 1989, Denmark was
the first Western European country to adopt a law on registered partnership
of same-sex couples. In the following decades, most Western European
countries have adopted a law on same sex civil unions. The last country
to adopt such legislation was Ireland in 2011.31 Greece and Italy are the
only Western European countries that have not yet adopted laws legally
recognizing registered partnership for same-sex couples. Data on the adoption
of these laws are derived from Festy (2006), Hodson (2011) and Barnett and
Siatta (2011).
Smoking Bans We include the introduction of smoking bans in workplaces
(including public transport, cafes and restaurants) as our last morality policy.
Studlar (2008) argued that tobacco regulations are often classified as morality
policies, although the debate surrounding the policy can also be framed as
a non-morality, economic policy. Furthermore, the adoptions are strongly
influenced by European Union recommendations to adopt smoking bans
(Origo and Lucifora, 2010). Smoking bans in restaurants and bars have been
adopted in a small period of time. In 2004, the bans were introduced in
Western Europe by Ireland and Norway. Five years later, all countries had
adopted such policies. Data on this legislation are gathered from EPHA
(2012) and Origo and Lucifora (2010).
Selection of Non-morality Policies
We compare the diﬀusion patterns of morality policies with those of non-
morality policies. Policies were selected when they met the following criteria.
Firstly, the policy must obviously not fit in the category of a morality policy.
Secondly, the policy must have been adopted by a large number of countries
between 1960 and 2010. Similar to Boushey (2010) we have included search
terms for policy diﬀusion europe and policy adoption europe in two scientific
search engines (JSTOR and Google Scholar) to identify studies on policy
diﬀusion. We included the policy adoption when the scientific publication
produced a detailed overview of policy adoptions in the seventeen Western
European countries. Ultimately, we have selected eleven policies.
Independent Regulatory Agencies We study the diﬀusion patterns of
six independent regulatory agencies. Regulatory agencies are authorities inde-
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pendent from government and other branches. These agencies are authorized
by the government to regulate a specific area. In this study, we incorporate
independent regulatory agencies in six areas: competition policy (adopted
between 1957 and 1997 by fifteen countries), electricity (adopted between
1921 and 2000 by fifteen countries), the environment (adopted between 1967
and 1996 by nine countries), financial services (adopted between 1934 and
2002 by sixteen countries), pharmaceuticals (adopted between 1963 and 2001
by eleven countries), and telecommunications sector (adopted between 1981
and 2002 by all countries). All data on the introduction of independent
regulatory agencies is derived from Gilardi (2008).
Privatization We include the privatization of two sectors: airlines and
telecommunications. Both variables measure the first time a government
privatized the airlines or telecommunications sectors at least to some degree.
The telecommunications sector was first privatized in 1984 by the United
Kingdom. Ultimately, all countries except Luxembourg would follow this
example. The privatization of airlines sectorwas first introduced in Italy
in 1985. The last country to privatize its airlines industry was Switzerland
in 2005. Six countries did not privatize their airlines sector. Data for the
privatization of telecommunications are gathered from Fondazione Eni Enrico
Mattei (2010). Data on airlines privatizations are gathered from International
Civil Aviation Organization (2010).
Parental Leave We include the adoption of parental leave legislation.
Parental leave laws provide parents the possibility to unpaid leave for a
longer period of time, after the maternity and paternity leave. Parental leave
legislation has been adopted by all Western European countries. The first
country to adopt such legislation was Sweden in 1974. In 2005, Switzerland
was the last country to adopt parental leave legislation. Data on parental
leave legislation are derived from Ray (2008, 2009).
Bureaucratic Accountability of Citizens We included two laws on the
bureaucratic accountability of citizens: the introduction of an Ombudsman
and the introduction of data protection laws. Firstly, dating back to 1809,
Ombudsman was first introduced in Sweden. The role of the Ombudsman
is to “provid[e] a mechanism of redress for citizen complaints about malad-
ministration” (Bennett, 1997, p. 215). The Ombudsman was adopted by all
but six countries in 1992. Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg
and Switzerland did not adopt such legislation. Secondly, we include data
protection laws. These laws “provid[e] the citizen with a right to control the
circulation of personal data relating him or her” (Bennett, 1997, p. 215).
The data protection law was first adopted in Western Europe in 1973 by
Sweden. By 1992, all countries except Greece and Italy had adopted similar
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legislation. Data are derived from Bennett (1997).
6.3.2 Risk-sets of the Data Set
To test our hypotheses, we have constructed a country-year data set for each
policy. The data sets vary in the number of observations, as the risk sets
for countries diﬀer. The first year of our analyses is the year after the first
adoption of the policy, since policies cannot diﬀuse before one country has
adopted the policy. When a policy was first adopted prior to 1961, we set
the first year of the risk set to 1961, since data on internal determinants is
mostly unavailable for the years prior to 1961. When a country adopted the
policy, it is no longer at risk of adopting it in the subsequent years. Therefore,
countries are not included in our data set in all years after they adopted the
policy. In Table 6.1 and 6.2, we present an overview of the morality policy
adoptions and the non-morality policy adoptions in the seventeen countries
under study.
Table 6.1: Morality Policy Adoptions in Seventeen Western European Coun-
tries
Country Abortion Capital Embryo Germline Same-Sex Smoking
Punishment Production Therapy Partnership Bans
Austria 1974 1968 1992 1992 2010 2009
Belgium 1990 1996 - - 1999 2006
Denmark 1970 1978 1997 - 1989 2007
Finland 1970 1972 1999 - 2001 2007
France 1974 1981 1994 1994 1999 2008
Germany 1976 1987 1990 1990 2001 2009
Greece 1986 2004 2002 - - 2009
Ireland - 1990 1987 - 2011 2004
Italy 1978 1994 - 2004 - 2005
Luxembourg 1978 1979 - - 2004 2006
the Netherlands 1981 1982 2002 2002 1998 2008
Norway 1975 1979 1987 1994 1993 2004
Portugal 2007 1976 2006 2006 2001 2008
Spain 2010 1995 1988 1988 2005 2006
Sweden 1974 1972 1991 1991 1994 2005
Switzerland 2001 1992 - 2005 2007 2008
the United Kingdom 1967 1998 - 1990 2005 2007
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To test our hypotheses, we estimate the extent to which the likelihood of
policy adoption is aﬀected by diﬀerent specifications of the eﬀect of time32.
By including diﬀerent modifications of a duration variable, we can test
whether the likelihood of a policy adoption over time resembles the expected
R- and S-shaped curves. We estimate temporal variations in the likelihood
of adopting a policy by including four modifications of time. Firstly, we
include a linear duration variable, which is not expected by both hypotheses.
Secondly, we include quadratic and cubic functions of time, as is expected
by hypothesis I, and we model a natural logarithmic eﬀect of time on the
likelihood to adopt to examine the adoption rate predicted by hypothesis
II. We compare the AIC-values of these four models to determine which
modification is best in explaining the likelihood of an adoption to occur. By
interpreting the estimated eﬀects, we can than conclude to what extent the
predicted temporal diﬀusion pattern follows an R- or S-curve.
Temporal diﬀusion patterns are often interpreted as evidence for pol-
icy diﬀusion, but may also appear when policy makers respond to similar
internal circumstances (e.g., Elkins and Simmons, 2005). To account for
such internal explanations, we include a small set of internal determinants.
Policy adoptions are commonly explained by economic, social, and political
determinants (Mooney and Lee, 1995). We include six variables to account
for internal determinants which may also explain the adoption of a policy.
First, we include the share of left-wing parties and Christian parties in the
government. The share of left-wing parties ranges from 0 to 63.60, and the
share of Christian parties ranges from 0 to 54.40. Data were derived from
the Comparative Political Dataset I 1960-2006 (Armingeon et al., 2008) and
the Parliament and Government Composition Database (Doring and Manow,
2010). Next, we include two societal characteristics reflecting the moral
values of citizens: the proportion of members of the Catholic Church and
Protestant churches, contrasted against the total number of citizens in a
country. The proportion of members of the Catholic Church ranges from
0.04 to 88.46, while the proportion of members of Protestant churches ranges
from 0.02 to 73.04. We gathered information from the World Churches Hand-
book (Brierley, 1997). Finally, we include two economic variables: the gross
domestic product and the unemployment rate. The gross domestic product
ranges from 2,337 to 54,482, while the unemployment rate ranges from 2.05
to 24.17. Data were derived from the World Development Indicators World
Bank (2010). 33
6.4 Results
We calculated four models for six morality policies and eleven non-morality
policies, resulting in a total number of 68 regression models. In Table 6.3, we
present an overview of the calculated AIC values for models with significant
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eﬀects of duration. The AIC value is an indication of the goodness of fit of
the model. The smallest AIC values, reflecting the models that are best able
to explain the adoption of a policy, are printed in bold. Further, when no
significant eﬀect is found for the included duration variable, we can conclude
that this modification of time does not explain the adoption of a policy.
Table 6.3: AIC Values for Models Explaining Policy Adop-
tion a
Policy Linear Quadratic Cubic Logarithmic
Morality Policy
Abortion n.s. n.s. 115.19 116.71
Capital Punishment 127.75 n.s. n.s. 128.38
Embryo Production n.s. 77.57 n.s. 76.75
Germline Therapy n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
Same-Sex Partnership 96.41 n.s. n.s. 95.58
Smoking Ban 57.67 55.52 n.s. 61.22
Non-Morality Policies
RA: Competition 111.87 111.65 109.89 111.12
RA: Electricity 93.83 90.29 90.64 92.46
RA: Environment n.s. 76.88 70.70 n.s.
RA: Financial Services 117.93 n.s. n.s. n.s.
RA: Pharmaceuticals 99.03 88.75 89.86 95.11
RA: Telecom 103.97 n.s. n.s. 108.13
Privatization Airlines n.s. n.s. 73.50 n.s.
Privatization Telecom 97.31 n.s. 82.13 103.08
Parental Leave 118.72 n.s. n.s. 120.93
Ombudsman n.s. 80.46 n.s. n.s.
Data Protection n.s. 112.14 n.s. n.s.
a n.s.: coeﬃcients of the duration variable(s) not significant at p< .1;
One-tailed test
Table 6.3 shows large diﬀerences in the eﬀect of duration on the likelihood
to adopt a policy. For morality policies, we find that the adoption of a
permissive abortion law is best explained with a cubic measure of time. This
result is similar to our findings in Chapter 4. However, two morality policies
(the ban on embryo production and the adoption of same-sex partnership
legislation) show a logarithmic eﬀect of time, while the abolishment of capital
punishment is best explained with a linear eﬀect of time, and the likelihood to
adopt a smoking ban shows a quadratic eﬀect of time. Further, the likelihood
to adopt a ban on germline therapy does not diﬀer over time.
When we take a look at the results for the non-morality policies, we
find that these policy adoptions are most often best explained by quadratic
or cubic transformations of time. The introduction of independent regula-
tory agencies in the field of financial services and telecommunications and
adoption of parental leave laws is the only non-morality policy that are best
explained by a linear eﬀect of time. However, since we have not yet studied
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the regression coeﬃcients, we must be aware not to draw any preliminary
conclusions from Table 6.3. For that, we must plot the predicted adoption
rates.
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Figure 6.1: Time-varying Estimated Likelihoods for Adopting Morality
Policies
To interpret our findings, we plot the predicted likelihood of adopting
a policy, separate for each policy. For an S-shaped distribution of the
cumulative number of policy adoptions, we expect that the adoption rate
over time follows a bell-shaped curve, while for an R-shaped distribution,
the adoption rates would follow an inverted R-curve, with high adoption
rates in the early years. In Figure 6.1, we present the predicted likelihoods
for adopting morality policies. We do not present the predicted likelihood of
the adoption of germline therapy bans, as the likelihood of adoption such
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Figure 6.2: Time-varying Estimated Likelihoods for Adopting Non-Morality
Policies (1)
ban does not vary over time. First, we see that the adoption rate of liberal
abortion laws follows the same temporal pattern as in Chapter 4. This
curve resembles the bell-shaped adoption rates expected in hypothesis I, but
deviates from the the S-curve in later years. For the ban of smoking in public
places, we find an S-shaped curve of the non-cumulative adoption rate. The
cumulative number of smoking ban adoptions would therefore not follow
the S-shaped curve, nor the R-shaped curve. Further, the curves for the
other morality policies show remarkable similarities in the way the likelihood
evolves over time. We see that all of these policies are more likely to be
adopted as time passes. This clearly does not resemble either the adoption
rates of the S-shaped curve, nor the R-shaped curve.
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Figure 6.3: Time-varying Estimated Likelihoods for Adopting Non-Morality
Policies (2)
In Figure 6.2, we present the time-varying likelihoods for the adoption
of six non-morality policies: the independent regulatory agencies. Although
deviating at some points, most of the regulatory policies have diﬀused
over time following adoption rates predicted by the social learning theory
(e.g., Gilardi, 2008). The introduction of regulatory agencies in the areas
of competition, electricity, and pharmaceuticals most clearly show that
adoption rates are low at first, begin to increase rapidly, and decreases as
the majority has adopted the policy. The temporal diﬀusion patterns for
independent regulatory agencies in the field of environment, financial services
and telecommunications are less clear. First, over time, the likelihood to
introduce an independent regulatory agency for the environment shows two
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peaks: in the late 1960s and in the early 1990s. Independent regulatory
agencies for the financial services and telecommunications show no peaks at
all. The likelihood to adopt such policies increases almost linear over time.
Figure 6.3 presents the diﬀusion patterns over time for the last five policies:
the privatization of airlines and telecommunications, the adoption of parental
leave laws, the introduction of an ombudsman and laws on data protection.
First, we find bell-shaped curves of the adoption rates over time for the pri-
vatization of airlines, the introduction of an ombudsman and data protection
laws. The cumulative number of these adoption rates result in the predicted
S-shaped curve. Further, we do not see the predicted temporal diﬀusion
pattern for the adoption of parental leave laws. As we have previously argued,
linear eﬀects of duration do not produce the variations in the likelihood over
time as expected by theories on policy diﬀusion. The privatization of the
telecommunication sector does not show the predicted bell-shaped curve.
Although the likelihood of adopting such privatization is low in the first years
and increases after 1990, the likelihood of adopting the privatization does
not decrease after a majority has adopted the privatization.
In sum, our findings support our first hypothesis, stating that the cumulative
number of policy adoptions resembles temporal diﬀusion patterns - the S-
shaped curve - as predicted by Gray (1973) and Rogers (1995), for about
three quarter of the non-morality policies. With the exception of four non-
morality policies (the introduction of regulatory agencies in the area of
financial services and telecommunications, the privatization of airlines and
telecommunications and the adoption of parental leave laws), the likelihood of
all non-morality policies showed time-varying patterns reflecting the predicted
bell-shaped curve over time.
The first ypothesis expected that the cumulative number of all policy
adoptions resembles an S-shaped curve, while the second hypothesis expected
that the cumulative number of morality policies resembles an R-shaped curve.
For the majority of the morality policies we studied in this chapter, we have
not found the temporal diﬀusion patterns predicted by theories on morality
policy diﬀusion. The abortion law is the exception to the rule: for abortion
policies, we found adoption rates that to a large extent reflect the adoption
rates predicted by the social learning theory.
6.5 Conclusions and Discussion
6.5.1 Conclusions
In this chapter, we studied the temporal diﬀusion patterns of morality and
non-morality policies. Scholars suggested that diﬀerent type of policies involve
diﬀerent temporal diﬀusion patterns, but failed to formulate hypotheses on the
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diﬀerences between policies that would result in diﬀerent diﬀusion patterns.
Morality policy scholars have oﬀered hypotheses on the distinct patterns of
morality policies (e.g., Boushey, 2010; Mooney and Lee, 1999b; Pierce and
Miller, 1999). They claim that, since morality policies are relatively simple,
highly observable and involve great public involvement, the adoptions of
morality policies would not follow the S-shaped curve that is best explained
with the social learning theory. Rather, these scholars suggest that morality
policies diﬀuse with rapid speed, resulting in a R-shaped curve of cumulative
adoptions over time. In contrast with these expectations, several scholars
found evidence that morality policies do diﬀuse in the expected S-shaped
curve (e.g., Mooney and Lee, 1995). In this chapter, we set out to compare
the temporal diﬀusion patterns of morality and non-morality policies, and
aimed to answer the following question: To what extent do the temporal
diﬀusion patterns of morality diﬀer from those of non-morality policies in
Western Europe?.
We formulated two hypotheses on the temporal diﬀusion patterns of
morality and non-morality policies. Firstly, based on empirical evidence
of morality policy scholars, we hypothesized that the cumulative number
of both morality and non-morality policy adoptions diﬀuse following the
S-shaped curve predicted by Rogers (1995), and thus the adoption rates
follow a bell-shaped curve over time. This hypothesis can also be described
as the null hypothesis, stating that there are no diﬀerences in the spread of
adoption rates over time between morality and non-morality policies. The
second hypothesis, or alternative hypothesis, reads that, contrary to non-
morality policies, the cumulative number of adoptions of morality policies do
not show the characteristic S-shaped curve, but rather produces an R-shaped
curve.
To test our hypotheses, we studied the diﬀusion patterns of seventeen
policies that have been adopted by Western European countries between
1961 and 2010. Our findings show that the majority of non-morality policies
indeed follow the expected S-shaped patterns, providing evidence for the
classic diﬀusion theory that highly relies on social learning mechanisms.
Regarding morality policies, we found that most morality policies indeed
show distinct temporal patterns of adoptions, but these are not explained by
the expectations of morality policy scholars. For most morality policies, we
found no evidence of an R- nor an S-shaped curve. The adoption rates of
morality policies seem to increase slowly, rather than to follow a bell-shaped
curve over time, or a rapidly declining adoption rate. Not in line with this
general finding is the temporal diﬀusion pattern of the adoption of liberal
abortion policies. For abortion policies we found that the temporal diﬀusion
pattern of cumulative adoptions is best described as an S-shaped curve.
We can thus answer our research question as follows: in contrast with
non-morality policies, most morality policies do not diﬀuse over time following
diﬀusion patterns predicted by the classic diﬀusion theory, nor by morality
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policy scholars. Furthermore, as the occurrence of these patterns are often
considered to be evidence for the diﬀusion of policies, our findings suggest
that morality policies are less likely to diﬀuse.
6.5.2 Discussion
Our findings suggests that for most morality policies do not diﬀuse in
patterns expected by theories on policy diﬀusion. However, our findings are
not unambiguous: for abortion policies, we found convincing evidence of
interdependency between policy makers. This raises the question why one of
the morality policies we studied diﬀused, while others did not. Furthermore,
although we found that most non-morality policies tend to diﬀuse over time,
not all of them showed the expected temporal patterns. Recent studies on
policy diﬀusion recognizes that policy attributes are influential for the pattern
of diﬀusion over time (Boushey, 2010; Makse and Volden, 2011; Nicholson-
Crotty, 2009). Our findings emphasize the importance of studying the
eﬀect of these policy attributes on the diﬀusion of policies, as the distinction
between morality and non-morality policies is not suﬃcient enough to explain
diﬀerences in diﬀusion patterns.
In this study, we solely focused on temporal variations in the adoptions rates
of policies. We acknowledge that this is only a small aspect of policy diﬀusion.
Firstly, temporal diﬀusion patterns are not shaped solely by these temporal
variations. Adoption rates may be higher for one policy than the other,
and some policies may diﬀuse faster and across more countries than others.
Secondly, policy diﬀusion studies also suggest that policies spread across
space. In the next chapter, we study the extent to which the spatial diﬀusion
patterns of morality policies are distinct from those of other policies.
Chapter 7
Spatial Diﬀusion of Policies
among Seventeen European
Countries between 1961 and
201034
7.1 Introduction
In their decision making process, policy makers are assumed to be influenced
by decisions made by policy makers in other polities. Evidence for this
claim has been found in studies focusing on the diﬀusion of policies between
organizations (Greenhalgh et al., 2004), cities (Crain, 1966), states (Gilardi
and Fuglister, 2008; Gray, 1973; Walker, 1969), and countries (Brooks, 2005;
Gilardi, 2008; Weyland, 2005). The diﬀusion of policies often shows similar
patterns: the distribution of polities adopting a new policy follows the
S-shaped learning curve, and the likelihood of adopting a certain policy
increases when nearby polities have already done so. In the previous chapter,
we found that only one of the six morality policies under study followed the
S-shaped curve (the adoption of liberal abortion policies), whereas it was
more often found for the non-morality policies we studied.
Scholars in the field of so-called morality policies have deducted hypothe-
ses on diﬀerent diﬀusion patterns for such policies, compared to non-morality
policies. The body of research concerning morality policies is rapidly growing
in the past two decades. While the research interests of morality policy
scholars vary widely - from the politics leading to the adoption of morality
policy or the framing of the debate to the implementation and consequences
of morality policies - they all embrace a “central unifying claim (. . . ) that
there is a class of value- or morality-based policies that can be distinguished
from non-morality policies, and that these distinguishing characteristics can
be used to explain and predict political behaviour in morality policy arenas”
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(Smith, 2002, p. 382). Morality policies are thus considered as a distinct
type of policies. Furthermore, morality policy scholars have stated that
the politics involved with morality policies are diﬀerent from those of other
policy types. The adoption processes of morality policies rely more on public
opinion and moral preferences of interest groups and politicians, and are less
influenced by economic conditions (Camobreco and Barnello, 2008; Mooney,
1999; Mooney and Lee, 1995).
Studies on the spatial diﬀusion of morality policies found mixed results
for the claim that morality policies diﬀuse in diﬀerent patterns. For U.S.
same-sex marriage bans, Haider-Markel (2001) found that morality policies
do not spread across neighbouring or regional states. Rather, he argues, the
spread of bans is best explained by the level of activism of national interest
groups within states. On the other hand, Klawitter and Hammer (1999),
Mooney and Lee (1995), and Pierce and Miller (1999) found evidence for
a regional spread of morality policies. Nevertheless, scholars argued that
morality policy adoption is to a lesser extent explained by regional diﬀusion
than the adoption of non-morality policies. Firstly, morality policies are
largely shaped by public opinion, and the willingness of policy makers to
adopt a morality policy is therefore to a lesser extent aﬀected by actions
of policy makers in other jurisdictions, and to a larger extent by internal
determinants (Mooney and Lee, 1995, 1999b). Secondly, morality policies are
highly observable, therefore policy makers are more likely to gain knowledge
on the adoption of a morality policy in a jurisdiction they are unfamiliar
with than of the adoption of a non-morality policy in that jurisdiction.
In this chapter, we investigate the extent to which morality policies indeed
diﬀuse in diﬀerent spatial patterns than non-morality policies. In so doing, we
study the diﬀusion processes of six morality policies and eleven non-morality
policies that have been adopted by seventeen European countries35 between
1961 and 2010. We answer the following research question:
Research Question VI: To what extent is the adoption of
morality and non-morality policies in Western European countries
between 1961 and 2010 aﬀected by previous adoptions of (a)
neighbouring countries, and (b) culturally and politically similar
countries?
We aim for progress in threefold. First, studies on morality policies most
often only examine the diﬀusion of one policy. We argue that, in order
to test hypotheses on diﬀerences between policies, one should compare the
diﬀusion processes of multiple policies. While such multi-policy approach
to test the most fundamental claim of the morality policy theory, i.e., that
morality policies involve diﬀerent adoption processes than non-morality
policies, has not yet been applied, scholars in the field have suggested it.
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For instance, Mooney and Schuldt (2008) remarked that future research by
morality policy scholars should focus on the actual comparison of morality
policy by simultaneously focusing on multiple policies. In this chapter, we
answer to this call by studying the diﬀusion of morality and non-morality
policies.
Furthermore, policy diﬀusion has been a popular field of research in
the past decade. This has lead to an impressive body of research, where
knowledge is growing rapidly. This has lead to new insights. One of these
insight is that the spatial spread of, for instance, policies, might not (only)
be a regional infection, but could work through other mechanisms as well:
policies may not only diﬀuse among nearby countries, as argued by Beck
et al. (2006). In this study, we investigate whether countries follow nearby
countries, but we also look for spatial diﬀusion patterns based on political
and cultural or religious proximity as well. We study the extent to which
these patterns diﬀer between diﬀerent policies.
Our third point of progress involves the geographic region we concentrate
on. While morality policies have been the object of research for numerous
studies, most of these studies have focused on morality policies in the United
States. Those studies focusing on morality policies outside the United States
often focus on one country or a small number of countries. Cross-national
research on the politics of morality policies is quite rare, although there
are a few studies focusing on morality policies in European countries where
diﬀerences between the morality policies of multiple countries are explained
using sophisticated methodological techniques (e.g., Field, 1979; Fink, 2008;
Wasserman, 1983). By focusing on the diﬀusion patterns of both morality
and non-morality policies across European countries, not only do we gain
knowledge on the distinctive nature of morality policies, but on morality
policy adoption in European countries as well.
7.2 Expectations
The most common expectation involves diﬀusion processes of policies among
regional countries. In 1969, Walker introduces the regional diﬀusion model
in his study on the adoption of policies (Walker, 1969). He stated that policy
makers make policies to solve problems in society. However, solving such
problems is highly complex, and decision makers are not able to gather all
necessary information for making such decisions. To reduce the risk of failing
policies, policy makers make use of analogies. One way to do so, Walker
argued, is by examining the solutions oﬀered by legislators in other polities.
He finds for the United States of America that when other states have oﬀered
solutions for a problem a state is dealing with, policy makers are more likely
to introduce such innovation in their states too.
While policy makers tend to gain knowledge from decisions made in other
136 7. SPATIAL DIFFUSION OF POLICIES
countries, it makes more sense to look at the solutions to problems oﬀered
by some countries than by others. An often-formulated expectation is that
policies diﬀuse across neighbouring polities (Berry and Berry, 1990; Crenson,
1974; Mooney and Lee, 1995; Volden, 2006; Walker, 1969). Policy makers
are more likely to make an analogy with countries that are nearby, since
neighbouring countries often deal with similar problems, and policy makers
are more aware of solutions oﬀered in nearby countries than in countries
further away.
Regarding morality policies, Mooney and Lee (1995) and Haider-Markel
(2001) expected that these policies do not diﬀuse across neighbouring coun-
tries, because of the controversial nature of morality policies and the high
influence of the majority’s opinion on morality policy. Empirical evidence
for this expectation is mixed. On the one hand, scholars found evidence that
the adoption of a permissive abortion law by a state is more likely when the
surrounding states already have such laws (Klawitter and Hammer, 1999;
Mooney and Lee, 1995; Pierce and Miller, 1999). On the other hand, Haider-
Markel (2001) found that national interest groups and state characteristics
better explain morality policies than policy adoptions in neighbouring states.
Although there is some evidence for spatial diﬀusion of morality policies,
adoptions of these policies are expected to be to a smaller extent influenced by
the decisions of regional jurisdictions. Morality policies are highly observable.
Therefore, we expect that Walker’s mechanism of regional diﬀusion is to a
lesser extent applicable to morality policies than to non-morality policies.
Policy makers are more aware of the adoptions of highly observable policies.
Thery are therefore more likely to know when another jurisdiction adopts a
morality policy, even when these jurisdictions are not nearby. Therefore, we
expect that the adoption of morality policies is less likely to diﬀuse across
regions. We thus formulate
Hypothesis I: The adoption of a morality policy is to a lesser
extent explained by the policy actions of neighbouring countries
than the adoption of a non-morality policy.
We can also interpret the concept of “nearby” in a diﬀerent way. Policy
makers are thought of as consulting solutions oﬀered in countries, and es-
pecially those countries they have more knowledge of. While it is plausible
that policy makers have more knowledge of neighbouring countries than of
countries far away, as we have seen in Chapter 4 other interpretations of
“nearby” are possible. Walker (1969) hinted toward this less strict interpreta-
tion of “nearby”, but it is put forward more explicitly by Beck et al. (2006).
They stated that “space is more than geography”. Since policy makers are
influenced in their decision making by their ideological preferences (Berry
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and Berry, 1990; Grogan, 1994), it is more likely that they will look at
countries with similar ideologies than to countries with diﬀerent ideologies.
A policy maker is thus more likely to consult the solution oﬀered for a given
problem in a country with a similar political ideology than a country with a
dissimilar political ideology. Volden (2006) found support for this hypothesis,
showing that successful the Children’s Health Insurance programs diﬀuse
across states with unified Republican Governments.
Thus, countries can be close in other ways than geographic, for instance
in a political, economical or cultural/moral sense. When countries have
extensive trade-relations with each other, it is to be expected that they react
on each other’s policies regarding trade. Moreover, we can imagine that
countries known for their welfare state ideology are more likely to look at
each others’ policies regarding social security or social expenditure. For
morality policies, however, it is likely that countries with a similar ethical
background follow each other. Since morality policies deal with ethics, and
religion has clear opinions on moral issues, we argue that countries with
similar religious backgrounds are more likely to learn from each other. For
instance, countries with a Catholic background are likely to influence each
other when it comes to policies regarding morality, for instance matters of
life and death. Furthermore, since morality policies are often non-economical
issues, while non-morality policies most often are, we expect that the policy
actions of countries with a similar welfare state regime, which reflects the
economy type of a country, are more likely to other countries when non-
morality policies are at stake than when morality policies are at stake. We
thus expect that:
Hypothesis II: The adoption of a morality policy is to a larger
extent explained by the policy actions of countries with a similar
cultural background than the adoption of a non-morality policy.
Hypothesis III: The adoption of a morality policy is to a lesser
extent explained by the policy actions of countries with a similar
view on the welfare state than the adoption of a non-morality
policy.
7.3 Data and Methods
7.3.1 Dependent Variables
We analyse the diﬀusion patterns of six policies that are often categorized as
morality policies, and eleven policies that do not fit the description of morality
policies. We have selected the following morality policies: Abortion measures
the adoption of an abortion law allowing women to have an abortion either
on social or economic grounds, or on request. Death penalty measures the
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abolishment of capital punishment. Euthanasia refers to the policy allowing
people to request euthanasia. Same-sex marriage measures the adoption
of legislation allowing homosexuals to marry. Germline gen therapy refers
to the adoption of a policy that forbids the manipulation of human genes
to prevent genetically inheritable deceases. Embryo production measures
the adoption of a policy forbidding the production of embryos for scientific
research. At last, we incorporate policies on smoking bans in public places.
We have selected the following non-morality policies. First, we measure
the adoption of a policy on parental leave. Two policies on bureaucratic
accountability of citizens are included: the introduction of the ombudsman,
and data protection laws. We include two sectors that have been subject of
privatization, namely the privatization of airlines and of the telecommunica-
tion sector. At last, the introduction of regulatory agencies in seven sectors
are included, embracing the privatization of airlines, competition, electricity,
environment, the financial service, food safety, pensions, pharmaceuticals,
and telephone companies. More detailed information on the policies and the
moments of adoptions are presented in Chapter 6. In Table 7.1, we provide
an overview of the number of times each policy is adopted, and the length of
the risk set.
Table 7.1: Overview of the Number of Adop-
tions and Range of Years
Policy Number First Last
of Adoptions Year Year
Morality Policy
Abortion 16 1968 2010
Capital Punishment 17 1969 2004
Embryo Production 11 1988 2010
Germline Therapy 12 1989 2010
Same-Sex Partnership 13 1990 2010
Smoking Ban 17 2005 2009
Non-Morality Policies
RA: competition 15 1961 2010
RA: electricity 15 1961 2010
RA: Environment 9 1968 2010
RA: Financial Services 16 1961 2010
RA: Pharmaceuticals 11 1964 2010
RA: Telecom 17 1982 2002
Privatization Telecom 16 1985 2010
Privatization Airlines 10 1986 2005
Parental Leave 17 1976 2005
Ombudsman 12 1961 2010
Data Protection 15 1974 2010
7.3. DATA AND METHODS 139
7.3.2 Independent Variables: Connectivity
Whether countries are nearby is measured in three ways. First, neighbouring
countries are identified, where every bordering country is identified as neigh-
bouring country. Second, to capture cultural proximity, we group countries
based on their religious orientation. Data are gathered from the World
Churches Handbook (Brierley, 1997). Based on the religious composition of
the population, we diﬀerentiate between five types of countries: predomi-
nantly Catholic countries, predominantly Protestant countries, predominantly
Anglican countries, predominantly Orthodox countries, and mixed countries.
Third, countries are distinguished on their political views based on their type
of welfare state, following the typology of Esping-Andersen (1990). We distin-
guish between liberal countries, conservative countries and social-democratic
countries.
7.3.3 Other Independent Variables
We include the variable duration to study the temporal diﬀusion of policies.
This variable obtains a value of “1” in the year after the first country adopts
the policy. We control for a small number of country characteristics, account-
ing for political, economical, and societal explanations for the adoption of
a policy. Controlling for these variables is necessary, since we aim to rule
out that possible indications of diﬀusion are the result of omitted variables.
Neighbouring countries are often similar on numerous country characteristics
(Ward and Gleditsch, 2007). We include indicators that are likely to influence
the adoption of policies. We choose for a small set of indicators because our
dataset and the number of events are rather small.
Next, we include internal determinants reflecting the political, cultural
and economical situation in a country. We include the strength of (a) left and
(b) Christian and conservative parties in the government. The strength of
parties is measured as the proportion of votes in the latest election, derived
from the Comparative Political Dataset I 1960-2006 (Armingeon et al.,
2008). Additional data on post-2006 elections are added from the Parliament
and Government Composition Database (Doring and Manow, 2010). As
a measurement for veto players, we include the number of parties in the
government. Furthermore, we include for two economic measures, constant
GDP per capita and unemployment rate. Both variables are gathered from
World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2010). Finally, we include
the percent of the population that is member of the Catholic Church and
member of a Protestant denomination. This variable is derived from the
World Churches Handbook (Brierley, 1997). Missing values were replaced
using linear interpolation.
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7.3.4 Methods
We use a dyadic event history approach to analyse our data. This method is
often used in research on the influence of other country’s policy decisions on
the adoption of a policy by a country (Gilardi and Fuglister, 2008; Volden,
2006). We have constructed a directed dyad-year data set. In every year
countryi is at risk of adopting a policy, other countries can influence it.
To capture this influence, dyads are computed between Countryi and every
Countryj . To see whether Countryj ’s decisions influence Countryi’s likelihood
of adoption, we need to include information on Countryj ’s policy adoptions in
our model. We do this by including a variable measuring whether Countryj
adopted the policy previously. To estimate whether the policy decisions of
countries with shared ties are interdependent, we include a variable having
value “1” when Countryj has previously adopted the policy at stake and
has a shared tie with Countryi. A significant positive b-estimate would then
mean that the likelihood to adopt a policy increases when a country with a
shared tie has previously done so. For example, we test our hypothesis on
diﬀusion across neighbouring countries as follows:
Adoptioni = b0 + b1 · Adoptionj,t−1 · Neighbouringi,j (7.1)
7.4 Results
We use probit discrete time event history models to answer our research
question. Table 7.2 until 7.5 present the regression coeﬃcients for the models
of the seventeen policies, including the interactions with one of the four
types of connectivity. Note that the N of the models diﬀer. When analysing
policy diﬀusion, a country must first have adopted the policy. We therefore
restricted the risk set, starting in the first year after the first adoption, or,
if this took place prior to 1961, the risk set starts in 1961. Due to these
diﬀerent sizes of the risk sets, it is not possible to directly compare the
estimates of the models of diﬀerent policies. We will therefore only focus on
the diﬀerences between the significance of the diﬀusion variables.
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In Table 7.2, we have only included internal determinants. Since we do
not hypothesize on the influence of internal determinants on the likelihood
to adopt a policy, we will not go to great lengths to discuss the findings in
detail. This table allows us to compare the goodness of fit of this model with
those of the models including diﬀusion explanation. In general, we see that
all policies are influenced by political, social, and economical determinants.
This is not in line with expectations from the morality policy theory. As
we have argued in Chapter 1, morality policies are thought to be explained
by moral determinants, rather than economical, as morality policies reflect
moral issues, and most often do not involve high economical costs. However,
our findings suggest that morality policies are influenced by economical
determinants as well.
Table 7.3 presents the estimates that allow us to test for regional diﬀusion.
We find that liberal abortion policies and policies allowing same-sex partner-
ships are the only morality policies that diﬀuse across neighbouring countries.
If a neighbouring country has already adopted such policy, a country is more
likely to adopt the liberal abortion policy or a law on same-sex partnership
itself. When comparing the goodness of fit with the models for abortion and
same-sex partnership with their equivalents in Table 7.2, we see that the
model for abortion policy benefits from including the diﬀusion variables, as
the AIC value slightly decreases. For the models explaining the adoption of
same-sex partnership legislation, the AIC values do not diﬀer. We find no
influence of the policy decisions of neighbouring countries on the likelihood
to adopt other morality policies. Further, for non-moralities we find that only
the adoption of an independent regulatory agency in the telecommunications
sector is positively related with a neighbouring country’s previous decision.
Again, we find a slight decrease in the AIC value.
In sum, we find little evidence for the diﬀusion of policies among neigh-
bouring countries in Western Europe. Only three policies have diﬀused
among neighbouring countries, of which two policies (liberal abortion law
and same-sex partnership legislation) are morality policies. In Hypothesis I,
we expected that morality policies were to a lesser extent influenced by policy
actions of neighbouring countries. Our findings thus refute this hypothesis.
In Table 7.4 we give the estimates regarding the hypothesis on diﬀusion
among countries with similar religious backgrounds. We find mixed evidence
for such diﬀusion for morality policies. The abolishment of capital punishment
and embryo production is positively correlated with the adoption of such
legislation in countries with similar religious traditions. Thus, a country is
more likely to adopt these policies when countries with a shared religious
heritage have previously adopted such policies. Looking at the AIC values,
we see that these models are both better in explaining the adoption of the
abolishment of capital punishment and embryo production than models
without diﬀusion explanations. Further, we find that the introduction of
independent regulatory agencies in the field of electricity, the adoption of
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parental leave laws, and the introduction of the ombudsman is positively
influenced by the policy decisions in countries with shared religious traditions.
For all policies, we find a decrease in the AIC value after including the
diﬀusion variable, leading to better fitting models.
Hypothesis II expected that morality policies were more likely to diﬀuse
among countries with a shared religious heritage than non-morality policies.
Our findings are mixed: two out of six morality policies diﬀused in this
pattern, while three out of eleven non-morality policies diﬀused in this way.
However, we argue that the distinction between non-morality policies and
morality policies is sometimes unclear. Some non-morality policies have clear
moral features, while morality policies, especially those regarding health,
may have a strong economic impact. It is arguable for two of the three
non-morality policies, namely the ombudsman and parental leave legislation
that these policies have a strong moral component.
In Table 7.5, we test the extent to which policies diﬀuse among countries
with shared welfare state regimes. The introduction of same-sex partnership
legislation is the only morality policy for which we find a positive influence
of the policy action of countries with a shared welfare state. This does
not lead to a better fitting model: the AIC value is the same as the AIC
value in the model with only internal determinants. Further, we find that
the likelihood to adopt independent regulatory agencies in the field of the
environment and the likelihood to privatize the telecommunication market
increases when countries with a shared welfare state regime have previously
adopt such policy. The AIC value for the model explaining the adoption
of the environment agency slightly decrease after including the diﬀusion
determinant, resulting in a better goodness of fit.
The findings in Table 7.5 suggest that only a few policies diﬀuse among
countries with shared welfare state regimes. From those policies, we cannot
tell whether non-morality policies are more likely to diﬀuse among such
countries, as suggested by Hypothesis III. However, given our findings in
Table 7.4 and Table 7.5, we can conclude that some policies indeed diﬀuse
among countries with shared ties, as suggested by Beck et al. (2006).
7.5 Conclusions and Discussion
In this chapter we compared the spatial diﬀusion patterns of morality policies
and non-morality policies in seventeen European countries. Our research
question read “To what extent is the adoption of morality and non-morality
policies in Western European countries between 1961 and 2010 aﬀected by
previous adoptions of (a) neighbouring countries, and (b) culturally and
politically similar countries?”.
As an answer to our research question, we conclude that although not
all policies tend to diﬀuse in the same way, the pattern of diﬀusion cannot
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be explained by the distinction between morality and non-morality policies.
Our results suggest that there are little diﬀerences in the diﬀusion patterns
between the selected morality and non-morality policies. We must however
be careful in interpreting our findings. With a small number of events and a
small risk set, the data we used to analyse the diﬀusion patterns might have
lacked the statistical power to suﬃciently test our hypotheses. This problem
can be dealt with by including more countries in the analysis.
Our findings shed some light on the research findings regarding the
diﬀusion of morality policies in the American states. Mooney and Lee (1995)
found support for geographic diﬀusion of abortion policies among the states,
while Haider-Markel (2001) found no evidence thereof when studying bans on
same-sex marriage. We find other results for the European context: similar
to the findings of Mooney and Lee (1995), we find that the adoption of liberal
abortion laws diﬀuses across neighbouring countries. However, in contrast
with the findings of Haider-Markel (2001), our findings suggest that laws on
same-sex partnership have diﬀused among neighbouring countries.
We find that the pattern of diﬀusion cannot be explained by the distinction
between morality and non-morality policies. Certainly, this does not rule
out that diﬀerent policies diﬀuse diﬀerently. In a recent publication, Makse
and Volden (2011) find promising evidence for the notion that diﬀerences in
the diﬀusion of policies can be explained by other characteristics of policies.
They find that the compatibility, complexity, observability, and triability of
policies explain the rate of adoptions, as well as the likelihood of regional
diﬀusion.
In this chapter, we aimed to study whether policies tend to diﬀuse across
patterns other than through neighbouring countries. We found evidence
that supports the suggestions formulated by Beck et al. (2006). Next to
regional diﬀusion patterns, we found support for diﬀusion among countries
with shared religious traditions, and among similar welfare state regimes.
Unfortunately, we were unable to incorporate the three types of connectivity
simultaneously in one model.
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Part IV
Answers to Research
Questions

Chapter 8
Conclusions and Discussions
8.1 Introduction
In this thesis, we addressed the question whether morality policies diﬀuse in
diﬀerent patterns than other policies. Literature on policy diﬀusion suggests
that policies diﬀuse in predictable temporal and spatial patterns (Mooney and
Lee, 1995). As early policy diﬀusion scholars already suggested (Gray, 1973;
Savage, 1985; Walker, 1969), not all policies diﬀuse in similar ways. Some
policies diﬀuse faster, other policies diﬀuse to smaller number of jurisdictions,
and some policies do not diﬀuse at all.
Several scholars have argued that the way policies diﬀuse is largely
influenced by the attributes of a policy (Makse and Volden, 2011; Nicholson-
Crotty, 2009; Rogers, 1995). Derived from Lowi’s notion that the type of
policy determines the political process involved with policy adoption (Lowi,
1964, 1972), scholars have argued that morality policies are involved with
their own politics (Meier, 1994; Mooney, 1999, 2000; Tatalovich and Daynes,
2005). Not only do the characteristics of morality policies shape the internal
adoption processes, it also aﬀects the way morality policies diﬀuse across
jurisdictions. Most prominently, scholars have argued that morality policies
may diﬀuse in a faster rate, as learning processes are to a lesser extent involved
(Makse and Volden, 2011; Mooney and Lee, 1999b; Nicholson-Crotty, 2009).
Furthermore, while evidence for regional morality policy diﬀusion is widely
available (e.g., Klawitter and Hammer, 1999; Mooney and Lee, 1995; Pierce
and Miller, 1999), such processes are though to be less applicable to morality
policies than non-morality policies (e.g., Haider-Markel, 2001; Mooney and
Lee, 1995).
In this study, we examined the extent to which morality policies indeed
involve distinct diﬀusion patterns. In so doing, we aimed to contribute to
the literature on morality policies in two important ways. Firstly, while
American studies under the heading of morality policies date back to the
1970s (e.g., Fairbanks, 1977), scholars have only recently began to study
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morality policies in Europe. Processes of policy have so far been neglected
in the European studies on morality policies, even though numerous studies
have been devoted to the diﬀusion of morality policies in American states
and the diﬀusion of non-morality policies in Europe. Since the diﬀusion
of morality policies amongst European countries is an unexplored scientific
territory, we started out with a detailed study on the diﬀusion of laws
on induced abortion across Western European countries. The first central
question of this book reads: To what extent do internal explanations and
policy diﬀusion explanations account for the adoption of liberal abortion
policies in Western European countries between 1961 and 2010? In four
empirical studies, we described when and how abortion laws have changed
in eighteen Western European countries (Chapter 2), explained how internal
political and societal characteristics influenced abortion reform (Chapter 3),
and examined temporal and spatial diﬀusion patterns (Chapters 4 and 5).
Secondly, we argued that hypotheses on the distinct diﬀusion patterns
of morality policies must be tested in a multi-policy approach, contrasting
the diﬀusion patterns of morality policies with non-morality policies. Un-
fortunately, the lion’s share of studies on morality policy diﬀusion examines
the diﬀusion of a single policy. We studied the distinct patterns of morality
policies in multi-policy settings. To study the extent to which morality
policies diﬀuse in distinct patterns, we compared six morality policies and
eleven non-morality policies. Our second central question reads To what ex-
tent do morality policies diﬀuse in a diﬀerent way among Western European
countries between 1961 and 2010 than non-morality policies? In Chapter 6,
we studied the extent to which morality policies diﬀuse in a diﬀerent rate
over time than non-morality policies. Chapter 7 dealt with a comparison of
the spatial diﬀusion patterns of morality and non-morality policies.
To answer our two central questions, we formulated six research questions,
which are addressed in an equal number of empirical studies. In the following
section, we describe the main findings of these studies by answering the six
research questions and two central questions. Subsequently, we review the
implications of our findings and discuss the limitations of our research.
8.2 Research Findings
8.2.1 Part Two: Abortion Policies
After describing the research field and formulating the research question
in Part One, we addressed the adoption of abortion policies in Western
European countries between 1960 and 2010. In this part, we sat out to study
the extent to which morality policy theory is applicable to the European
context.
Before studying adoption processes of abortion policies in Western Eu-
ropean countries since 1960, it is necessary to understand when and how
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abortion policies have changed in this period. In Chapter 2, we provided an
overview of the developments in Western European countries between 1960
and 2010, and answer the question:
Research Question I: Which changes in the conditions for
legally obtaining an abortion and the procedural barriers to abor-
tion occurred in Western European countries between 1960 and
2010?
Using legal texts and secondary sources, we described the developments
in the judicial status of induced abortion in eighteen Western European
countries between 1960 and 2010. We provided a detailed discussion of
the relevant legislation on the conditions for legally obtaining an abortion
and procedural barriers to abortion that have been in act in the countries
surveyed. Furthermore, we quantified the permissiveness of the abortion
laws, and we thereby provided with a powerful instrument for quantitative
cross-national research on abortion policies.
We found that the legal conditions for Western European women to
obtain an abortion have become more liberal between 1960 and 2010. In
1960, the possibilities for Western-European woman to terminate an unwanted
pregnancy were limited. Most countries allowed induced abortion in cases of
severe threat to the life or health of the pregnant woman. In the subsequent
decades, abortion became more permissive in a majority of the Western
European countries. By 2010, every country had adopted more permissive
abortion laws, except for Ireland. Almost three quarter of the Western
European countries have laws allowing abortion (virtually) on request. With
the exception of Ireland, all the other European countries in this review now
allow early abortion for socio-economic reasons.
Furthermore, procedural barriers may limit the access to abortion. In all
countries, abortion can only take place in hospitals or authorized facilities.
Authorization of (at least) a second physician is necessary in two third of the
countries when the abortion is allowed on medical grounds. In 50% of the
countries, minors need the consent of a parent or guardian when they seek for
an abortion. However, in most of these countries, the physician may refrain
from this, if they find it necessary. Seven countries have specified a waiting
period, ranging from three days to one week. Half of the countries have laws
that specifically state that the physician is allowed not to participate on
ethical or religious grounds. After requesting an abortion, women in nine
countries are informed on alternative options, such as adoption. Informing
the woman on contraceptives to avoid future unwanted pregnancies is obliged
in only four countries, and in two other countries, woman are oﬀered to be
informed on the use of contraceptives. Five countries oﬀer (after)care to the
women.
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The instrument we developed in Chapter 2, which allows quantitative cross-
national comparison of abortion policies was used as the dependent variable
in later chapters. In Chapter 3, we studied the extent to which liberal
abortion policy adoption is explained by political and societal characteristics.
In this chapter, we asked:
Research Question II: To what extent do (a) political and (b)
societal characteristics influence the likelihood of abortion laws
being liberalized in Western European countries between 1961 and
2010?
The scientific aims of this chapter were threefold. Firstly, we studied the
extent to which hypotheses from the morality policy theory are able to
explain abortion policy adoption in Western Europe. Secondly, we aimed
to contribute to the literature on European abortion policy adoption by
applying a quantitative multivariate analysis. Some scholars suggested
that the impact of political actors are highly influential in the adoption
processes of abortion policies (Norris, 1986; Outshoorn, 1996), while others
suggested an insignificant role for such actors, as abortion reform is mostly
explained by social and moral indicators (Minkenberg, 2002). A multivariate
approach allows for simultaneously studying both explanations. Thirdly,
several scholars (Elkins and Simmons, 2005; Gilardi, 2005; Holzinger and
Knill, 2005) stressed the importance of ruling out internal explanations when
studying policy diﬀusion, as internal developments occurring at the same
time in diﬀerent countries might produce misleading evidence for policy
diﬀusion. In this chapter, we identified the main internal determinants for
abortion policy adoption.
Our findings showed that abortion policy reform is explained by both
societal and political explanations. Countries with a larger share of left-
wing parties in the parliament are more likely to adopt a more permissive
abortion policies. The share of Christian parties in the parliament seems to
be positively related to the adoption of a period model abortion law, while
not related with the adoption of an indication model abortion law. For the
societal explanations, we found that the adoption of an indication model
abortion law is not influenced by societal determinants. However, we found
that the adoption of a period model abortion law is more likely to occur
in countries with fewer Catholics and Protestants. Period model abortion
laws were also more likely to be adopted when the university enrolment of
women is higher, the number of physicians was higher, and the public opinion
towards abortion was more liberal. Our findings suggest that societal actors
influenced the likelihood of adopting a permissive abortion, but the adoption
of such policy is foremost influenced by political actors.
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Furthermore, we studied the way political and societal characteristics
influence each other’s eﬀect on the likelihood to adopt a liberal abortion law.
Our findings provided with some evidence that left-wing parties are more
likely to adopt a period model abortion law when the demand for abortion
policies is high. On the other hand, we found that Christian parties were
more likely to adopt the more restrictive indication model abortion law when
the percent of Catholics in a country is higher, while left-wing countries
were less likely to adopt such policies when societal support for permissive
abortion laws is higher. We argued that, with more support from the society,
left-wing parties might not settle for an indication model abortion law, but
adopt a period model abortion law. Christian parties, that have not been
able to avoid the adoption of liberal abortion reform, might be able to settle
for a less permissive indication model when societal resistance against the
liberalization of abortion is higher.
Overall, our findings suggested that the adoption of abortion laws is
influenced by both societal and political determinants, similar to the findings
of morality policy scholars in the U.S. states. In addition to this research, we
found that societal and political explanations are interdependent. Our results
provide evidence for the idea that politicians are risk-avoiding: politicians
appear more likely to act on their ideological beliefs when lower political cost
is involved, i.e., when there is a parallel demand from society.
We studied temporal diﬀusion patterns in Chapter 4. In this chapter, we
examined how the likelihood of adopting a policy over time changes. Theories
on policy diﬀusion suggest that over time, policies diﬀuse in predictable
patterns. The distribution of cumulative policy adoptions over time is
often understood to follow an S-shaped curve, resembling a learning process.
However, some studies suggest that morality policies are more likely to deviate
from this curve, with a rapid boost of adoptions after the first adoption took
place. In this chapter, we sat out to answer the following research question:
Research Question III: To what extent does the cumulative
number of liberal abortion law adoptions in Western European
countries between 1968 and 2010 follow an S-curve or an R-
curve?
Using event history analyses, we studied how the likelihood of adopting
abortion policies evolved over time. Our results suggest that the likelihood to
adopt permissive abortion policies in Western Europe resembles the predicted
S-shaped curve, rather than the R-curve. At first, adoption rates are low. As
more countries have adopted liberal abortion laws, the likelihood to adopt
starts to increase rapidly, and, when the majority has adopted permissive
abortion laws, the adoption rate decreases. Nevertheless, we found some
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deviations from the expected trend. While theories on policy diﬀusion
suggest that, when the majority of countries have adopted the policy, the
adoption rate becomes continuously slower. However, for the adoption of
abortion policies in Western Europe, we found that adoption rates began
to increase rapidly again in the final years of our study period. We oﬀered
country-specific explanations for this deviation.
The occurrence of an S-shaped curve is a strong indication that policies
diﬀuse across countries. To examine the geographical spread of abortion
policies in more detail, we studied the spatial diﬀusion patterns of abortion
policies. In Chapter 5, we elaborated on the interdependence between policy
decisions by studying not only whether policies diﬀused across countries, but
also by scrutinizing on which country was more likely to be influenced by
which country’s policy decisions. The research question we sat out to answer
reads:
Research Question IV: To what extent is the adoption of liberal
abortion policies in Western European countries between 1968
and 2010 explained by previous adoptions of (a) neighbouring
countries, and (b) culturally, linguistically and politically similar
countries?
Theories on policy diﬀusion recognize that not all jurisdictions are equally
interdependent. In his seminal study, Walker (1969) theorized on these
diﬀerences in interdependences. In their decision making process, policy
makers tend to make analogies with other jurisdictions, by asking: what
solutions have been oﬀered by other policy makers? According to Walker,
policy makers are more aware of the political actions of neighbouring juris-
dictions, and therefore, more likely to learn from their experiences. Hence,
when a jurisdiction adopts a policy, other jurisdictions can learn from the
experiences in that jurisdiction, and regional jurisdictions are more likely to
be aware of the adoption of the policy and the experiences. This results in
geographical diﬀusion patterns: the likelihood of adopting a policy increases
when neighbouring polities have previously adopted a similar policy.
A more general hypothesis to this theory is that when explaining the
unknown, man reason in analogies with what is known and important to
them (Topitsch, 1954, 1958). When adopting a new policy, the outcome is
yet unknown. To reduce risks, policy makers compare the results of policy
adoptions in jurisdictions they are familiar with, and that are important to
them. Certainly, policy actions of neighbouring jurisdictions are likely to
be known by and important to policy makers, however, Beck et al. (2006)
recognize that other polities may very well meet these description. Policy
makers may not only look at solutions oﬀered in regional jurisdiction, but
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may also refer to jurisdictions further away, but with similarities in, for
instance, religion or political views. In Chapter 5, we formulated hypotheses
on the regional diﬀusion of abortion policies, as well as on diﬀusion across
countries with a similar religious tradition, shared linguistics and shared
views on welfare state regimes.
Our findings suggested that geographically nearby countries are indeed
more likely to be influenced by the adoption of a liberal abortion law in a
country. When controlled for internal determinants, we found that a country
is more likely to adopt a permissive abortion law when its neighbouring
countries have adopted such law. However, we found no evidence for diﬀusion
among countries with shared ties other than geographically.
To answer our first central question, we compare our research findings
with the expectations of morality policy theory and findings of studies on
American morality policies. Most prominent, Mooney and Lee (1995) studied
the adoption of abortion policies in American states in the years prior to
the introduction of a liberal abortion law resulting from the Supreme Court
decision in Roe versus Wade. Firstly, similar to their findings, we find that
morality policies in European countries are influenced by societal and political
characteristics. Furthermore, Mooney and Lee (1995) found evidence for
the diﬀusion of morality policies over time - resembling the S-shaped curve -
and across space. In our chapters on the diﬀusion of abortion policies across
Western European countries, we found similar results. The adoption rates
over time indeed followed the patterns predicted by the social learning theory,
although some deviations were found in the later years. Secondly, abortion
policies indeed were more likely to be adopted when neighbouring countries
had previously adopted a liberal abortion policy. However, not all findings are
in agreement with the expectations of morality policy theory. Morality policy
scholars and scholars on policy diﬀusion state that, as morality policies are
relatively simple, they are more likely to diﬀuse rapidly, with a turn-oﬀ point
much sooner than expected by theories on social learning. Our findings do
not suggest that morality policies diﬀused in such manner across European
countries: especially in the first years after the adoption of a liberal abortion
law, the likelihood to adopt permissive policies remained low. However, so far
we have only studied the diﬀusion of liberal abortion policies. In Part Three,
we included other morality policies, allowing us to more thoroughly study
the diﬀusion of morality policies.
8.2.2 Part Three: Comparing Morality Policies and Non-
morality Policies
In Part Two, we found evidence for the diﬀusion of abortion policies - a
prime example of morality policies - across European countries. In Part
Three, we study the extent to which other morality policies have also diﬀused,
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and the extent to which morality policies diﬀuse in diﬀerent patterns than
non-morality policies. In Chapter 6 and 7, we compared temporal and
spatial diﬀusion patterns of six morality and eleven non-morality policies in
seventeen European countries.
In Chapter 6, we compared the temporal diﬀusion patterns of morality
and non-morality policies. Morality policy scholars claim that, since morality
policies are relatively simple, highly observable and involve great public
involvement, the adoptions of morality policies would not follow an S-shaped
curve that is best explained with the social learning theory. These scholars
suggest that morality policies diﬀuse in rapid speed, resulting in an R-
shaped curve of cumulative adoptions over time. In contrast with these
expectations, several scholars found evidence that morality policies do diﬀuse
in the expected S-shaped curve (e.g., Mooney and Lee, 1995). In this chapter,
we set out to compare the temporal diﬀusion patterns of morality and
non-morality policies, and aimed to answer the following question:
Research Question V: To what extent do the temporal diﬀu-
sion patterns of morality policies in Western European countries
diﬀer from those of non-morality policies in Western European
countries?
The classic theory on the diﬀusion of innovations (Rogers, 1995) suggests
that innovation diﬀuses over time in a characteristic pattern. Over time, the
cumulative number of adoptions represent an S-shaped curve. Numerous
studies have found evidence that this general hypothesis also holds for the
adoption of policies. However, several scholars have argued that this does not
hold for morality policies, as morality policies tend to diﬀuse with a faster
rate at first, but rapidly decrease over time. Here, the cumulative adoption
curve would not follow an S-shaped curve, but an R-curve. In this chapter,
we set out to test whether these diﬀerences in the temporal diﬀusion patterns
of morality policies and non-morality policies are found in the European
context.
We studied the diﬀusion patterns of seventeen policies that have been
adopted by Western European countries between 1961 and 2010. Generally,
our findings indeed suggest that there are large diﬀerences in the temporal
diﬀusion patterns of morality policies and non-morality policies. However,
the temporal diﬀusion patterns largely deviated from the curves expected by
the morality policy theory. Temporal diﬀusion patterns of morality policies
are mostly shaped by increasing, rather than decreasing, adoption rates
over time. Liberal abortion laws appeared to be the only morality policy
diﬀusing in an S-shaped curve. Furthermore, we found the predicted S-
shaped curve for most, but not all, non-morality policies. The cumulative
number of adoptions of the introduction of regulatory agencies in the area
8.2. RESEARCH FINDINGS 167
of telecommunications, the privatization of airlines and telecommunication
and the adoption of parental leave laws did not follow the predicted S-shape
curve.
To answer our research question, we thus conclude that although not
all policies tend to diﬀuse in the same way, the pattern of diﬀusion cannot
be explained by the distinction between morality and non-morality policies.
Our results suggest that there are little diﬀerences in the diﬀusion patterns
between the selected morality and non-morality policies. We found that
the cumulative number of adoptions of non-morality policies most often
follow the S-shaped curve. However, the diﬀerences between the rapidness of
the diﬀusion and the total number of adopters were unclear, while theories
on morality policies suggested otherwise. The diﬀusion patterns did not
reveal diﬀerences between both types of policies, although some non-morality
policies tended to diﬀuse across states with similar views on welfare states.
Furthermore, while morality policies were expected to diﬀuse across countries
with a shared religious heritage, we found no evidence thereof.
In Chapter 7, we compared the spatial diﬀusion patterns of seventeen morality
policies and non-morality policies in seventeen European countries. We sat
out to answer the following research question:
Research Question VI: To what extent do the spatial diﬀu-
sion characteristics of morality and non-morality policies across
seventeen European countries diﬀer?
Derived from the morality policy theory, we expected that morality
policies were less likely to diﬀuse across neighbouring countries than non-
morality policies. Furthermore, given the nature of morality policies, we
expected that morality policies are more likely to diﬀuse across countries
with shared moral values, while non-morality, mostly economic policies, are
more likely to diﬀuse across countries with shared views on economics.
Our research findings suggested that some morality and non-morality
policies diﬀuse in geographical patterns. Firstly, our findings showed that
most morality policy adoptions were not significantly influenced by adoptions
in neighbouring countries. We found a significant eﬀect of regional diﬀusion
for only two morality policies, liberal abortion policies and policies on same-
sex partnership. For non-morality policies, we only found significant for a
small minority of the policies we studied.
Next, we found no evidence that morality policies are more likely to
diﬀuse across countries with similarities in their religious tradition than
non-morality policies. Again, only two morality policies indeed diﬀused in
this pattern, while we found evidence for such diﬀusion for three non-morality
policies. Further, we did not find that non-morality policies are more likely to
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diﬀuse across countries with a shared view on the welfare state than morality
policies.
We find that the pattern of diﬀusion cannot be explained by the distinction
between morality and non-morality policies. First of all, evidence for the
diﬀusion of morality policies is only partly found: most of the morality policies
appeared not to diﬀuse, both in temporal and spatial patterns. However,
evidence for the spatial diﬀusion of Secondly, our findings suggest that there
are large diﬀerences between morality policies. This suggest that a more
thorough study on the attributes of policies is necessary. The distinction
between morality and non-morality policy is not sharp enough to explain why
policies diﬀuse in diﬀerent patterns, and why some policies do not diﬀuse at
all.
With our findings in Chapter 6 and 7, we can answer the second central
question. First of all, we found that evidence for the diﬀusion of morality
policies is scarce. For only one morality policy, liberal abortion reform, we
found convincing evidence of both temporal and spatial diﬀusion. Secondly,
we found that non-morality policies are more likely to diﬀuse across countries
and over time than morality policies. Thus, we can answer the question
by stating that non-morality policies are more likely to diﬀuse over time in
patterns predicted by the social learning thesis, while most morality policies
are not likely to diﬀuse over time. Moreover, morality policies are more
likely to diﬀuse across neighbouring countries, but not more likely to diﬀuse
across countries with similar religious traditions that non-morality policies.
Further, non-morality policies are not more likely to diﬀuse among countries
with similarities in their views on the welfare state.
Our findings that morality policies most often do not diﬀuse does not
contradict with our findings in Part One. In agreement with our findings in
the first part, Part Two showed that liberal abortion reform appeared to be
the only morality policy that diﬀused over time, and one of the few morality
policies that diﬀused across space. This raises questions on why abortion
policies diﬀuse, while other morality policies appeared not to. This is one of
the directions for future research we address in the next section.
8.3 Scientific Implications
In the first chapter of this thesis, we articulated six lacunae in the studies
on morality policy diﬀusion. In the last section of this book, we contemplate
on the extent to which we were able to make progress on these six points,
and provide suggestions for future research.
Firstly, we suggested that the study of European morality policies could
benefit from a quantitative, cross-national approach. Applying such methods
gave us the opportunity to test competing hypotheses, by simultaneously
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testing the eﬀect of diﬀerent determinants. Although a quantitative, cross-
national approach certainly has its drawbacks - for instance, country-specific
circumstances may be overlooked - our understanding of the politics of policy
adoption processes can gain from this method.
Secondly, we aimed to fill the gap in knowledge on the diﬀusion patterns
of morality policies across European countries. Starting with evidence from
studies on the diﬀusion of non-morality policies across European countries,
and suggestions from the European abortion law studies on interdependence
between policy decisions of European countries, we set out to explore the
diﬀusion patterns of morality policies. Indeed, we found evidence for the
diﬀusion of abortion policies across countries and overtime. Nevertheless, we
found less convincing results for the diﬀusion of other morality policies in
Western Europe.
Thirdly, we provided insights in the diﬀusion patterns of morality policies,
by comparing the temporal and spatial diﬀusion patterns of both morality
and non-morality policies. This appears to be a necessary approach for two
important reasons. Firstly, the hypothesis that morality policies involve
diﬀerent diﬀusion dynamics than non-morality policies a priori demands a
multi-policy approach. Secondly, and a posteriori, our result showed that not
only do morality policies are involved with diﬀerences in the interdependencies
between policy actions of diﬀerent countries, there are also large diﬀerences
found between morality policies. Using a single policy approach to study the
diﬀusion - or adoption - of morality policies does not provide with enough
evidence to make generalized statements about morality policies.
Fourthly, we recognized drawbacks in the methods applied to study
the temporal diﬀusion patterns of policies. Generally, these methods oﬀer
no opportunity to control for internal determinants. To overcome these
problems, we applied an event history approach that provides the opportunity
to incorporate duration variables to study the time-varying likelihood to
adopt a policy, while controlling for internal determinants simultaneously.
Fifthly, we aimed to contribute to the literature on spatial interdependen-
cies between countries by scrutinizing on other similarities than geographical
proximity. Starting with the theoretical explanations for regional diﬀusion
oﬀered by Walker (1969), we formulated a more general hypothesis on spatial
connectivity (c.f. Hume, 1757; Tobler, 1970; Topitsch, 1954, 1958). From this
general hypothesis, we were able to hypothesize on other than geographical
connectivities. We studied the extent to which policies diﬀuse across re-
gional countries, as well as across countries with similarities in their religious
tradition, linguistics, and views on the welfare state.
Sixthly, we applied more sophisticated methods to analyse spatial diﬀusion
patterns than previous research on morality policy diﬀusion. By applying
dyadic event history analyses, we were not only able to test whether the
likelihood to adopt a policy increases when other countries have already
done so (as we did in Chapter 7), but we were also able to test whether the
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likelihood of a country to adopt a specific model of abortion law increases
when other countries adopted the same policy previously (Chapter 5).
While our study oﬀers important advances in the methods used for study-
ing the diﬀusion of morality policies, a lot of progress can still be made on
this point. We provided more formal tests to study both temporal and spatial
diﬀusion patterns of morality and non-morality policies. Unfortunately, we
were unable to test the extent to which the diﬀerences found between morality
policies and non-morality policies were significant. Such test is oﬀered by
Nicholson-Crotty (2009) and Makse and Volden (2011), where the authors
study the adoption of multiple policies at the same time. The explanatory
variable in their studies is not the adoption of a specific policy, but they
examine the likelihood to adopt any policy. To understand the diﬀerences in
the adoption processes of diﬀerent policies, they include variables measuring
the attributes of policies. Analysing the influence of these attributes on the
likelihood to adopt oﬀers an opportunity to understand the extent to which
policies involve distinct diﬀusion patterns.
In our study, we were unable to apply such approach. Simply estimating
the likelihood to adopt any policy, and including a variable measuring whether
the policy is a morality or non-morality policy appeared to be unfruitful, since
we found major diﬀerences in the diﬀusion patterns within each policy type.
Future research could benefit from the insights that there are large variations
in the diﬀusion of diﬀerent policies within the same policy type. Gathering
more detailed information on diﬀerent attributes of policies, and comparing
the political processes of these policies simultaneously, as Nicholson-Crotty
(2009) and Makse and Volden (2011) previously did, could provide with a
better understanding of why diﬀerent policies are involved with diﬀerent
patterns. More generally, this approach is likely to advance our understanding
of policy-specific adoption processes, and more thoroughly test the hypothesis
that politics is determined by policies.
At last, we provided more understanding of the temporal and spatial
diﬀusion patterns. While studies on diﬀusion patterns most often focus on one
dimension of policy diﬀusion, or, as we did, study them in separate analyses,
future research may explore the benefits of a more dynamic diﬀusion models,
by interacting between temporal and spatial diﬀusion patterns. Researches
may aim to understand not only which country is more likely to be influenced
by a nearby country, but also include insights on temporal diﬀusion in the
studies of spatial diﬀusion patterns. Research should not only focus on which
country influence another country, they should also test whether policies
diﬀuse faster across similar countries.
Further, we studied whether policies are more likely to diﬀuse among
countries with shared ties. Due to a lack of power in our data set, we
were not able to thoroughly distinguish between diﬀerent natures of these
ties. Certainly, it is likely that abortion policies diﬀuse among countries
with a shared Protestant tradition but not among countries with a shared
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Catholic tradition, since Protestant churches are often more permissive
towards abortion than Catholics. Studying the diﬀusion among Protestant
and Catholic countries may oﬀer more insights than studying the diﬀusion
of policies among countries with similar religious traditions.
The hypotheses on diﬀusion we formulated in our empirical chapters were
mostly derived from policy diﬀusion theories that are strongly influenced by
social learning theory. We have done so, since most arguments on diﬀerences
in the diﬀusion patterns of morality policies are derived from the notion
that the social learning theory is to a lesser extent applicable to morality
policies. However, as we have pointed out in Chapter 1, learning is only one
mechanism through which diﬀusion can occur. While some mechanisms do
not provide with a plausible explanation for morality policy diﬀusion (e.g.,
simply emulating the decisions of others), future research may benefit from
a more thorough investigation of these mechanisms. For instance, diﬀusion
through competition may be fruitful in explaining more economically driven
morality policies, such as policies on health and research.
In this thesis, we have aimed to contribute to the literature on morality
policies, as well as on the literature on policy diﬀusion. Our findings suggest
that a more thorough look on the attributes of policies is necessary to gain a
better understanding in the adoption processes of morality policies, as well
as on the diﬀerences between the diﬀusion patterns of policies. Furthermore,
we have provided with a tool for the cross-national comparison of abortion
in Western Europe, and provided with methods to simultaneously analyse
the influence of internal determinants and temporal diﬀusion determinants.
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Notes
1A summary of Galton’s comments were included in the conclusions when
Tylor’s study was published in The Journal of the Anthropological Institute
of Great Britain and Ireland. There, the concluding remarks read: “It was
extremely desirable for the sake of those who may wish to study the evidence
for Dr. Tylor’s conclusions, that full information should be given as to
the degree in which the customs of the tribes and races which are compared
together are independent. It may be, that some of the tribes had derived
them from a common source, so that they were duplicate copies of the same
original. Certainly, in such an investigation as this, each of the observations
ought, in the language of statisticians, to be carefully “weighted”.’ (Tylor,
1889, p. 270).
2Morality policy scholars have suggested that the temporal diﬀusion
pattern of morality policies is not only shaped by a faster adoption rate. Due
to the controversial nature of morality issues, and the diﬃculty to reach a
morality policy equilibrium, several scholars suggest that the S- or R-shaped
curve for morality policies is truncated: some polities at stake are not likely
to adopt at all. This characteristic of the temporal diﬀusion of morality
policies is not studied in this thesis. The main reason for not doing is because
some of the selected policies in our research are relatively new. Therefore,
the diﬀusion process of these policies might still be in full eﬀect. This is
problematic for testing hypotheses on the truncation of the S- or R-curve, as
we can not be conclusive with respect to the extent morality policies do not
diﬀuse across as many countries as other policies. It might just be that the
non-adopting countries have not yet adopted the policy.
3Walker (1969) already hinted toward this less strict interpretation of
“nearby”. However, Beck et al. (2006) first provided theoretical and method-
ological approaches to study other spatial patterns of diﬀusion.
4Fink’s 2011 study on the adoption of laws on embryo research is an
exception to this rule.
5In contrast with Part II, we do not include Iceland in our analysis. We
have used secondary sources to gather information on the adoption of policies.
Most often, information on policy adoptions in Iceland are often not included
in these sources.
6A diﬀerent version of this chapter is currently under review. Besides the
countries discussed in this chapter, it also includes detailed information on
the abortion policies of Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Czech Republic,
Estonia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
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Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. Co-authors are Mark Levels,
and Ariana Need.
7Of course, this objection is only relevant if researchers are interested in
studying the development of legal changes over a longer period of time.
8These countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic
of Germany (and Germany after the re-unification of Germany), Finland,
France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
9Note that at least one source suggests that the legalization date of
abortion in France took place considerably earlier. Rust Bullfinch (1984,
p. 18) states that Article 162-1 of the Public Health Code legalized abortion
of pregnancies under ten weeks of gestation for reasons of serious distress
as early as October 5 1953. However, other sources observe that the Penal
Code was observed stringently and that even after the 1955 legalization of
abortion, access to therapeutic abortion was restricted. The original text
of the Decree 53-1001 of 5 October 1953 does not contain an Article 161-1
(France, 1953, p. 8849).
10Goldberg (1984) notes that in Greece abortions were previously legal
if the health of the woman was endangered or if fetal defects were present,
but were available on request if the husband consents since 1984. This
interpretation is not supported by the primary sources in any way.
11Health is not defined in the legislation itself, and other sources state that
abortion is not available in Luxembourg for social reasons (Cook and Dickens,
1988; International Planned Parenthood, 2009). However, in parliamentary
debates, health was defined as “physical, mental and social health”(Eser
and Koch, 1988). Therefore, we wil classify this law as allowing abortion
on socioeconomic grounds, similar to several sources state that abortion is
available on social grounds during the first twelve weeks of the pregnancy
(Boland and Katzive, 2008; United Nations, 2002).
12According to Cook and Dickens (1988), the 1981 law of the Netherlands
permits abortion to save the life of the pregnant woman or in case of risk to
the woman’s mental health. Indeed, the legislation is virtually on request,
since the pregnant woman needs to state that she is in a state of emergency.
This could be considered as a mental health reason. However, since there is
no approval for the woman’s statement needed from physicians or a board,
this legislation is generally considered to allow women to have an abortion
on request (e.g., Ketting and Van Praag, 1986; Outshoorn, 1996; United
Nations, 2002).
13The Oﬀences Against the Person Act 1861 was not eﬀective in Scotland,
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The Infant Life (Preservation) Act was not eﬀective in Northern-Ireland and
Scotland, but McBride Stetson (2001) states that while abortion was not
legal, the practice of abortion did not diﬀer from other parts of the United
Kingdom.
14A slightly diﬀerent version of this chapter is currently under review.
Co-authors are Ariana Need, Mark Levels and Wout Ultee.
15Eser (1994) and Minkenberg (2002) also distinguish a “distress model”
for laws which allow women to have an abortion if they declare that they are
in a state of emergency. Rather than including this as a separate category,
we consider it to be a period model since the emergency state does not have
to be certified by a physician or expert. Grouping both models into one
category has statistical advantages, as otherwise the number of events per
abortion law model would be too small.
16There are within-country diﬀerences in some cases. The United King-
dom’s 1967 Abortion Act does not apply in Northern Ireland, where abortion
remains regulated as it was in the entire United Kingdom before the intro-
duction of the 1967 Act. In Germany, after the reunification of Germany,
abortion laws in the western and eastern part diﬀered until the 1995 law
was adopted. Furthermore, even though the permissiveness of the law is
regulated on a national level, accessibility to abortion may vary between
regions. Since the data provides national-level measures, we chose to ignore
these within-country diﬀerences.
17Spain, Portugal and Greece have known dictatorial regimes. Since we are
interested in the democratic process that leads to the adoption of permissive
abortion laws, the political characteristics for these countries were set to
zero.
18We included the best fitting specification for duration in the models. The
likelihood of adopting an indication model law over time was best described
with a quadratic term for year, and the likelihood of adopting a period model
law over time was best described with a cubic function of year.
19A slightly diﬀerent version of this chapter is currently under review.
Co-authors are Ariana Need, Mark Levels and Wout Ultee.
20This problem is also recognized by Ward and Gleditsch (2007). One way
to cope with it is by estimating autocorrelated error models. Similar to the
methods we apply, these models use country-year observations. However,
these models cannot be fitted with a risk set such as we use here, where the
number of observations per year varies over time.
21Some scholars control for time in their event history model of policy
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adoption. For instance, Klawitter and Hammer (1999) included year dummies.
However, these year dummies are not used to test whether the diﬀusion
pattern indeed has an S-shaped curve, as their hypotheses suggested.
22The aditional inspection of the b-parameters is necessary, since we would
expect a parabolic eﬀect that opens down, i.e. the likelihood to adopt is
low both during the first and the last years. However, with the top of the
parabola outside the range of our year-variable, the eﬀect may also represent
the R-shaped curve.
23Note that this is not similar to laws allowing women to terminate their
pregnancy on mental health grounds. Here, we refer to the so-called distress
model, where the decision whether the woman is in a state of distress is
made solely by the woman herself. Laws allowing abortion on mental health
grounds require that physicians certify whether these grounds are met.
24De jure, the 1935 law of Iceland was stricter: socio-economic reasons
were suﬃcient grounds for an abortion during the first six weeks of the
pregnancy, and not the entire first trimester
25The 1978 law of Luxembourg can also be regarded as a law allowing
abortion only on (physical and mental) health grounds. While the law
stipulates health grounds as legal conditions for abortion, parliamentary
debates on the law suggest that following the definition of health by the
World Health Organization, socio-economic grounds are also considered as
suﬃcient grounds for the termination for a pregnancy (e.g., Eser and Koch,
1988).
26A slightly diﬀerent version of this chapter is currently under review.
Co-authors are Ariana Need, Mark Levels and Wout Ultee.
27We consider period model abortion laws to be the most permissive laws.
Such laws allow women to have an abortion during the first trimester of the
pregnancy, either on request of the pregnant woman or when the pregnant
woman states that she is in a state of distress and this state has not to be
confirmed by a physician or third party.
28As these measures sometimes overlap, we have not presented a model with
the four connectivity matrices at once. However, this model was calculated
and did not lead to significant diﬀerences in the results or conclusions.
29A slightly diﬀerent version of this chapter is currently under review.
Co-authors are Ariana Need and Minna van Gerven.
30Some countries adopted laws allowing same-sex marriage. These laws
are included in this measurement as well, since allowing same-sex marriage a
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priori recognizes same-sex living unions.
31Unfortunately, our data set does not contain information for 2011. Hence,
we do not include this adoption in our analyses.
32See Chapter 4 for an extensive description of the methods we apply.
33Note that we do not present the descriptive statistics for our variables,
as we use seventeen diﬀerent data sets.
34A slightly diﬀerent version of this chapter is currently under review.
Co-authors are Ariana Need and Minna van Gerven.
35Similar to Chapter 6, we do not include Iceland in our analyses. Hence,
these countries we study are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
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(Summary in Dutch)
Deel I: Introductie tot de Onderzoeksvragen
In dit proefschrift is onderzocht in hoeverre de diﬀusiepatronen van morele
en amorele wetgevingen in West-Europese landen verschillen. Waarom een
land een bepaalde wetgeving op een gegeven moment invoert is van veel
factoren afhankelijk: wie de beleidsmakers zijn, hoeveel steun er voor de
wetgeving is, en hoeveel weerstand er tegen de wetgeving is. Theoriee¨n over
de diﬀusie van wetgeving stellen dat de invoering van een wet in het ene
rechtsgebied op meerdere manieren van invloed kan zijn op de invoering
van een gelijksoortige wet in een ander rechtsgebied (Elkins en Simmon,
2005). Wanneer het ene rechtsgebied een bepaald soort wetgeving heeft
ingevoerd, kan dit de kans vergroten dat andere rechtsgebieden zullen volgen,
bijvoorbeeld omdat het eerste rechtsgebied een precedent heeft geschapen.
Anderzijds kan de invoering van een wetgeving in het ene rechtsgebied de kans
verkleinen dat andere rechtsgebieden eenzelfde wet invoeren, bijvoorbeeld
omdat het eerste rechtsgebied geen succesvolle ervaringen heeft met de
ingevoerde wetgeving.
Uit deze interdependenties tussen (beleidsmakers in) verschillende landen
volgen voorspelbare patronen van de invoeringen van wetgevingen in tem-
porele en ruimtelijke zin (Mooney en Lee, 1995). Zo stellen theoriee¨n over
diﬀusie dat temporele diﬀusie zich kenmerkt doordat het cumulatieve aantal
rechtsgebieden dat een beleidsinnovatie invoert een zogenaamde S-curve volgt
over de tijd: het beleid wordt eerst in een klein aantal jurisdicties ingevoerd.
Na enige tijd volgt de meerderheid, en tot slot weinig invoeringen in de
laatste, lange periode (Gray, 1973; Mooney, 2007).
Ook in ruimtelijke zin kunnen diﬀusiepatronen herkend worden. De meest
algemene hypothese over ruimtelijke diﬀusie is dat de kans dat een land
een wetgeving invoert groter is wanneer andere landen de wetgeving reeds
hebben ingevoerd, en dat deze kans nog groter is wanneer deze andere landen
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dichterbij gelegen zijn (Walker, 1969). Immers, we zijn beter op de hoogte
van wat er gebeurt in de landen die nabij zijn, dan landen die verder van ons
af liggen. Nabijheid kunnen we hier in geografische zin interpreteren, waarbij
nabije landen de landen zijn die aangrenzend of op zijn minst in dezelfde
regio liggen. Wetgeving zal zich bij deze vorm van diﬀusie als een inktvlek
over de kaart verspreiden. Maar ook andere interpretaties van nabij zijn
mogelijk: bijvoorbeeld landen die in cultureel of economisch opzicht nabij
zijn (Beck, Gleditsch en Beardsley, 2006).
Reeds in de begindagen van het onderzoek naar de diﬀusie van beleid
en wetgeving werd de mogelijkheid dat niet alle soorten wetgeving zich op
eenzelfde manier verspreiden geopperd. Sommige typen wetgeving zouden
sneller en over meer landen kunnen verspreiden dan andere typen, terwijl
andere typen wetgeving helemaal niet zou verspreiden. Verschillende onder-
zoekers hebben gesteld dat de wijze waarop wetgeving verspreidt in grote
mate bepaald wordt door kenmerken van de wetgeving (Gray, 1973; Makse
en Volden, 2011; Nicholson-Crotty, 2009). Voortbouwend op deze hypothese
stelt de morele wetgevingstheorie dat morele wetgeving - wetgeving waar in
het draait om saillante basiswaarden van mensen, en waarbij de betrokken-
heid van burgers groot is - op een andere wijze verspreiden dan andere -
amorele - wetgevingen. Zo zou morele wetgeving sneller verspreiden dan
amorele wetgeving, wetgeving waar het niet primair om basiswaarden gaat,
en waar de betrokkenheid van burgers doorgaans lager is. Na een snelle
verspreiding kort na de eerste invoering zal de snelheid van adopties echter
drastisch afnemen, hetgeen niet resulteert in de karakteristieke S-curve wan-
neer we het cumulatieve aantal landen dat een wetgeving heeft ingevoerd
over tijd bezien, maar in een zogenaamde R-curve (Mooney en Lee, 1999b).
Daarnaast hebben diverse onderzoekers de hypothese geformuleerd dat
morele wetgeving minder snel via buurlanden zou verspreiden. Omdat moreel
beleid zeer zichtbaar is, zou het minder uitmaken welk land als eerste een
bepaalde morele wet heeft ingevoerd. Empirisch onderzoek laat echter zien
dat deze hypothese niet blijkt op te gaan: er lijkt toch sprake te zijn van
regionale diﬀusie van morele wetgeving in de Verenigde Staten (Mooney
en Lee, 1995). In dit proefschrift wordt een nieuwe hypothese getoetst,
namelijk dat bij morele wetgevingen de interdependenties het sterkst zijn
tussen landen die in religieus opzicht op elkaar lijken, terwijl bij amorele, en
vaak economische wetgevingen de interdependenties het sterkst zijn tussen
landen die in economisch opzicht meer op elkaar kijken.
In dit proefschrift is onderzocht in hoeverre de diﬀusiepatronen van morele
wetgeving inderdaad zo afwijkend zijn als vaak wordt verondersteld. De twee
belangrijkste toevoegingen die met dit proefschrift beoogd worden te maken,
zijn het bestuderen van de diﬀusie van morele wetgeving in West-Europa,
iets wat voorheen onderbelicht is gebleven in de literatuur, en het vergelijken
van zowel morele als amorele wetgevingen.
Allereerst is vooruitgang geboekt door de diﬀusie van morele wetgeving
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in West-Europa te onderzoeken. In het onderzoek naar morele wetgeving
ligt de nadruk met name op de politieke processen rondom de invoereing
van morele wetgeving in de Verenigde Staten. Slechts recentelijk is er in
de literatuur rondom morele wetgeving groeiende aandacht voor morele
wetgeving in Europese landen (bijvoorbeeld Engeli, 2009; Fink, 2008; Green-
Pedersen, 2007). Ik acht het van belang om theoriee¨n over de invoering van
morele wetgeving te toetsen in verschillende contexten. Daarnaast is dit
proefschrift, voor zover te overzien, de eerste studie waarin de diﬀusie van
morele wetgeving binnen Europa centraal staat. Weliswaar is er onderzoek
geweest naar de diﬀusie van morele wetgeving, maar dit onderzoek beperkte
zich tot de Verenigde Staten (bijvoorbeeld Boushey, 2010). Verder is er
onderzoek geweest naar de diﬀusie van wetgevingen binnen Europa, maar is
er vooralsnog geen aandacht besteed aan de diﬀusie van morele wetgeving
op dit continent.
In het tweede deel van dit proefschrift is onderzocht in hoeverre morele
wetgeving een eigen diﬀusiepatroon kent. Dit is gedaan door te toetsen in
hoeverre de belangrijkste hypothesen van theoriee¨n over diﬀusie en moreel
beleid opgaan voor West-Europa. Hiertoe onderzochten we de invoering
van abortuswetgeving, misschien wel het beste voorbeeld van een morele
wetgeving, in West-Europese landen tussen 1960 en 2010. De eerste centrale
vraag van dit boek luidt dan ook: In hoeverre bieden interne determinanten
en diﬀusiepatronen een verklaring voor de invoering van liberale abortuswet-
gevingen in West-Europese landen tussen 1961 en 2010? In vier empirische
studies is onderzocht hoe en wanneer de abortuswetgeving van achttien
West-Europese landen is veranderd (Hoofdstuk 2), in welke mate politieke
en maatschappelijke kenmerken van een land de kans op hervorming van de
abortuswet be¨ınvloedt (Hoofdstuk 3), en in welke mate de invoering van een
nieuwe abortuswet in andere West-Europese landen de kans op hervorming
van de abortuswet in een land be¨ınvloedt (Hoofdstukken 4 en 5).
In het derde deel van dit boek wordt bepleit dat de hypothese dat morele
wetgeving zich op een distinctieve wijze verspreidt over tijd en over landen
een vergelijkingshypothese is. Het diﬀusiepatroon van morele wetgeving
onderscheidt zich van het diﬀusiepatroon van amorele wetgeving. Om deze
hypothese te toetsen is het derhalve noodzakelijk om beide typen wetgevingen
onder de loep te nemen. Helaas is deze onderzoeksaanpak vooralsnog nauweli-
jks toegepast in het onderzoek naar de diﬀusie van morele wetgevingen. In
Hoofdstukken 6 en 7 onderzochten we de diﬀusie van zes morele wetgevingen
en elf amorele wetgevingen die tussen 1961 en 2010 zijn ingevoerd. De tweede
centrale vraag luidt: In hoeverre verspreidt moreel beleid zich op een andere
manier in West-Europese landen tussen 1961 en 2010 dan amoreel beleid?
Hoofdstuk 6 onderzoekt de mate waarin de temporele diﬀusiepatronen van
morele wetgevingen afwijkend zijn van die van amorele wetgevingen. Hoofd-
stuk 7 onderzoekt in hoeverre de ruimtelijke diﬀusiepatronen van morele
wetgevingen anders zijn dan die van amorele wetgevingen.
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Tot slot worden in het vierde deel van dit boek de centrale vragen
beantwoord. In Hoofdstuk 8 bespraken we onze belangrijkste bevindingen,
en reflecteerden we op de implicaties van onze bevindingen en onze bijdragen
aan het onderzoeksveld.
Deel II: Abortuswetgeving als Morele Wetgeving
In het tweede deel van dit proefschrift stond de invoering en diﬀusie van
abortuswetgeving in West-Europa tussen 1960 en 2010 centraal. Om de
diﬀusie van abortuswetgeving in West-Europa te onderzoeken is het allereerst
noodzakelijk om duidelijk in beeld te hebben welke abortuswetgevingen
er in de verschillende jaren van kracht zijn geweest. Hoofdstuk 2 van dit
proefschrift geeft een overzicht van de ontwikkelingen op het gebied van
abortuswetgeving in West-Europese landen tussen 1960 en 2010 door de
volgende onderzoeksvraag te stellen:
Onderzoeksvraag I: Welke wijzigingen in de voorwaarden voor
het verkrijgen van een legale abortus en welke wijzigingen in
de procedurele belemmeringen voor het verkrijgen van een legale
abortus vonden plaats in West-Europese landen tussen 1960 en
2010?
Door juridische teksten en secundaire bronnen te raadplegen, hebben we
de ontwikkelingen in de legale status van abortus provocatus beschreven in
achttien West-Europese landen tussen 1960 en 2010. In het tweede hoofdstuk
wordt een beschrijving gegeven van de West-Europese wetgevingen met
betrekking tot abortussen die van kracht zijn geweest in deze periode. De
wetgevingen zijn vervolgens gekwantificeerd, zodat het mogelijk is om in
de latere hoofdstukken van dit proefschrift kwantitatief landenvergelijkend
onderzoek uit te voeren naar de invoering van abortuswetgeving.
De wettelijke voorwaarden om zwangerschap af te breken zijn liberaler
geworden tussen 1960 en 2010. In 1960 waren de mogelijkheden voor een
West-Europese vrouw om een ongewenste zwangerschap af te breken beperkt.
De meeste landen stonden een abortus alleen toe wanneer er sprake was
van een ernstige bedreiging van het leven of de gezondheid van de zwangere
vrouw. In de decennia na 1960 wijzigde de juridische status van abortus
drastisch. Een meerderheid van de West-Europese landen voerde wetgeving
in waarbij de omstandigheden waaronder zwangere vrouwen een abortus
konden verkrijgen werden verruimd. Met uitzondering van Ierland heeft elk
onderzocht West-Europees land haar abortuswetgeving liberaler gemaakt.
Op dit moment staat bijna driekwart van de West-Europese landen abortus
op verzoek van de zwangere vrouw toe gedurende het eerste trimester van de
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zwangerschap. In alle landen behalve Ierland is een abortus tijdens het eerste
trimester toegestaan wanneer hier sociaaleconomische redenen toe zijn.
Naast de wettelijke voorwaarden voor het verkrijgen van een abortus, zijn
er procedurele belemmeringen die de toegang tot abortussen voor zwangere
vrouwen die wel gerechtigd zijn om een abortus te krijgen kunnen beperken.
Allereerst mag een abortus in alle onderzochtte landen enkel plaatsvinden
in ziekenhuizen of erkende installaties. Wanneer een abortus plaatsvindt op
medische gronden, is er in tweederde van de landen toestemming nodig van
(tenminste) twee artsen. In de helft van de landen dient een minderjarige
vrouw toestemming van een ouder of voogd te hebben alvorens zij een abortus
mag ondergaan. Echter, in de meeste landen mag van deze verplichting
worden afgeweken wanneer dit in het belang van de zwangere vrouw is. In
de helft van de bestudeerde landen heeft een arts de mogelijkheid om op
grond van gewetensbezwaren af te zien van de behandeling. De behandeling
dient dan door een andere arts overgenomen te worden. Wanneer een vrouw
een verzoek tot abortus kenbaar maakt, zal zij in negen landen voorgelicht
worden over mogelijke alternatieven, zoals adoptie. In vier landen dient de
vrouw voorlichting te krijgen over contraceptie, en in twee landen wordt deze
informatie vrijwillig aangeboden. In vijf landen vindt er nazorg plaats voor
de vrouw.
In Hoofdstuk 3 wordt onderzocht in hoeverre politieke en sociale kenmerken
een verklaring bieden voor de invoering van liberale abortuswetgeving. Daar-
toe wordt de volgende vraag beantwoord:
Onderzoeksvraag II: In welke mate be¨ınvloeden (a) politieke
en (b) sociale kenmerken van een land de kans dat abortuswet-
gevingen worden geliberaliseerd in West-Europese landen tussen
1961 en 2010?
Met behulp van gebeurtenissenanalysen werd een antwoord gegeven op deze
vraag. De resultaten laten zien dat abortus hervorming zowel door zowel
sociale als door politieke kenmerken van een land kan worden verklaard.
Landen met meer linkse partijen in het parlement hebben een grotere kans
op de invoering van een toleranter abortusbeleid. Het aandeel christelijke
partijen in het parlement lijkt positief gerelateerd te zijn aan de invoering van
een periode model abortuswet, waarbij abortus is toegestaan gedurende de
eerste periode van een zwangerschap, terwijl het negatief gerelateerd is aan de
invoering van een indicatiemodel abortuswet, waarbij abortus is toegestaan
als aan bepaalde voorwaarden is voldaan. Voorts wordt de invoering van een
indicatiemodel abortuswet niet be¨ınvloed door sociale determinanten. We
blijkt de goedkeuring van een periode model abortuswet meer waarschijnlijk
te zijn in landen met minder katholieken en meer protestanten. De kans op
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de invoering van een periode model abortuswetgeving is groter wanneer het
aantal universitair geschoolde vrouwen groter is, het aantal artsen hoger is
en de publieke opinie liberaler ten opzichte van abortus is. De resultaten
laten zien dat sociale factoren en politieke factoren beiden een verklaring
bieden voor de invoering van liberale abortuswetgeving.
Verder is onderzocht in hoeverre sociale kenmerken van een land een
invloed uitoefenen op het eﬀect van politieke kenmerken op de kans op een
invoering van een liberalere abortuswetgeving. Uit de bevindingen blijkt dat
linkse partijen meer kans hebben om een periode model abortus wet in te
voeren wanneer de vraag naar een liberale abortuswet groot is, terwijl chris-
telijke partijen een grotere kans hebben om het meer restrictieve indicatie
model in te voeren wanneer de weerstand tegen liberale abortuswetgeving
groot is. Hieruit volgt de conclusie dat, met meer steun in de samenleving,
linkse partijen geen genoegen nemen met een indicatie model abortuswet,
maar kiezen voor de liberalere periode model abortuswet. Christelijke parti-
jen, die niet in staat zijn geweest om versoepeling van de abortuswetgeving
te voorkomen, opteren juist voor een minder tolerante indicatie model abor-
tuswet als de maatschappelijke weerstand tegen de liberalisering van abortus
hoger is.
In Hoofdstuk 4 is de temporele diﬀusie van moreel beleid onderzocht. The-
oriee¨n over de diﬀusie van wetgeving suggereren dat, over de tijd bezien,
wetgeving zich verspreidt in voorspelbare patronen. De verdeling van de
cumulatieve invoering van wetgeving zou over de tijd een S-curve. Echter,
sommige onderzoekers suggereren dat moraal beleid juist via een ander pa-
troon verloopt, de zogenaamde R-curve. In dit hoofdstuk is onderzocht in
hoeverre de temporele diﬀusie van liberale abortuswetgeving in West-Europa
een voorspelbaar patroon volgt, en wordt de volgende onderzoeksvraag
beantwoord:
Onderzoeksvraag III: In hoeverre volgt het cumulatieve aantal
invoeringen van een liberale abortuswet in West-Europese landen
tussen 1968 en 2010 de S-curve of de R-curve?
Met behulp van gebeurtenissen analyse is onderzocht in welke mate de kans
op de invoering van abortus beleid verandert over de tijd. De resultaten
suggereren dat de kans op permissieve abortus beleid in West-Europa de
voorspelde S-vormige curve lijkt te volgen, en niet de R-curve. Na de eerste
adoptie vinden de eerstvolgende adopties relatief traag plaats. Naarmate
meer landen een liberale abortuswetgeving hebben ingevoerd, begint de kans
op invoering te stijgen, en, wanneer de meerderheid een liberale abortuswet-
geving heeft ingevoerd, begint de snelheid waarmee landen een wetgeving
invoeren weer te dalen. Toch zijn er ook afwijkingen van de S-curve. Zo blijkt
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dat er, nadat de meerderheid een liberale abortuswetgeving heeft ingevoerd
en het aantal nieuwe invoeringen afneemt, er een hernieuwde snelle stijging
van invoeringen plaatsvindt in de 21e eeuw. In Hoofdstuk 4 worden enkele
landspecifieke verklaringen voor deze afwijkingen gegeven.
In Hoofdstuk 5 is onderzocht in hoeverre er sprake is van een ruimtelijke sprei-
ding van liberale abortuswetgeving. Daarbij is de volgende onderzoeksvraag
beantwoord:
Onderzoeksvraag IV: In hoeverre is de invoering van liberale
abortuswetgeving in West-Europese landen tussen 1968 en 2010
te verklaren door eerdere invoeringen van (a) buurlanden, en
(b) landen die in cultureel, taalkundig, en sociaaleconomische
opzichten gelijkend zijn?
Wederom is een gebeurtenissenanalyse uitgevoerd om deze vraag te beant-
woorden. De bevindingen laten zien dat er inderdaad sprake is van diﬀusie
via nabije landen. De kans dat een land een liberale abortuswetgeving in-
voert stijgt nadat een buurland een dergelijke wetgeving heeft ingevoerd.
Deze bevinding is echter beperkt tot geografische nabijheid: er zijn geen
aanwijzingen voor diﬀusie tussen landen met gedeelde banden die anders dan
geografisch zijn.
Deel III: Vergelijking Morele en Amorele Wetgev-
ing
In het tweede deel van ons proefschrift werd ingegaan op de diﬀusiepatronen
van een typisch voorbeeld van morele wetgeving, namelijk de abortuswetgev-
ing. In het derde deel van dit proefschrift staat de mate waarin de temporele
en ruimtelijke diﬀusiepatronen van morele wetgeving inderdaad onderschei-
dbaar zijn van de diﬀusiepatronen van amorele wetgeving centraal. Dit is
gedaan door de temporele en ruimtelijke diﬀusiepatronen van zes morele en
elf amorele wetgevingen te vergelijken in zeventien Europese landen.
Hoofdstuk 6 gaat in op de de diﬀusie van wetgeving over tijd. De klassieke
theorie over de diﬀusie van innovaties stelt dat een innovatie zich verspreidt
in een karakteristiek patroon (Rogers, 1995). Over de tijd bezien vertoont het
cumulatieve aantal adopties van een innovatie een S-vormige curve. Talrijke
studies hebben vaak bewijs gevonden dat deze algemene hypothese ook opgaat
voor de invoering van het beleid. Onderzoekers naar morele wetgeving stellen
echter dat dit type wetgeving zich in een sneller tempo verspreid gedurende
de eerste jaren nadat het eerste land een wet invoert, maar dat het snelle
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tempo aanzienlijk daalt na verloop van tijd (Boushey, 2010; Mooney en
Lee, 1999b). Hierdoor zou de cumulatieve adoptiecurve niet de vorm van
een S-curve aannemen, maar eerder van een R-curve. In Hoofdstuk 6 is
getoetst of deze verschillen in de temporale verspreiding patronen van morele
en amorele wetgeving inderdaad worden gevonden, en wordt de volgende
onderzoeksvraag beantwoord:
Onderzoeksvraag V: In hoeverre verschilt het temporele dif-
fusiepatroon van morele wetgevingen in West-Europese landen
met die van amorele wetgevingen in West-Europese landen?
De bevindingen laten zien dat er inderdaad sprake is van grote verschillen in
de diﬀusiepatronen van morele en amorele wetgeving. In veel, maar niet alle
gevallen vertoonde het temporele diﬀusiepatroon van amorele wetgevingen
een S-vorm, terwijl we in de meeste gevallen geen voorspeld patroon vonden
voor de diﬀusie van morele wetgeving. Het cumulatieve aantal landen dat
een morele wetgeving invoerde bleek alleen in het geval van de invoering
van een liberale abortuswetgeving een S-curve te vertonen, terwijl er in geen
enkel geval bewijs voor een R-curve wordt gevonden.
Hoofdstuk 7 onderzocht de ruimtelijke diﬀusiepatronen van zeventien morele
en amorele wetgevingen in zeventien Europese landen tussen 1961 en 2010.
Daarbij is de volgende onderzoeksvraag beantwoord:
Onderzoeksvraag VI: In hoeverre verschilt het ruimtelijk dif-
fusiepatroon van morele wetgevingen in West-Europese landen
met die van amorele wetgevingen in West-Europese landen?
In dit hoofdstuk is getoetst of beide typen wetgeving zich via ruimtelijke
patronen verspreiden, door te onderzoeken in hoeverre de invoering van
een wetgeving in een naburig land, of een land dat in sociaaleconomisch
of religieus opzicht gelijkend is, tot een grotere kans op de invoering van
wetgeving leidt. Daarnaast is onderzocht of morele wetgeving inderdaad
eerder via religieus gelijkende landen verspreidt, terwijl amorele wetgeving
juist via sociaaleconomisch gelijkende landen verspreidt.
De bevindingen laten zien dat de meeste morele wetgevingen inderdaad
niet verspreiden via naburige landen. Alleen bij de invoering van een liberale
abortuswetgeving en de invoering van geregistreerd partnerschap voor ho-
moseksuele stellen, zagen we dat invoeringen van soortgelijke wetgeving in
een naburig land de kans op een invoering vergrootte. Bij amorele wetgevin-
gen bleek er echter minder vaak sprake te zijn van diﬀusie van wetgevingen
via naburige landen.
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Daarnaast bleek niet dat de invoering van morele wetgeving zich vaker
verspreidde via religieus gelijkende landen. Slechts bij twee typen morele
wetgeving vonden we een dergelijk patroon, tegenover drie typen amorele
wetgeving waar we dit patroon herkenden. Eveneens verspreidt amorele
wetgeving zich niet in sterkere mate over sociaaleconomisch gelijkende landen.
Deel IV: Antwoorden op de Onderzoeksvragen
In het eerste deel van dit proefschrift zijn twee centrale vragen en zes onder-
zoeksvragen geformuleerd. De zes onderzoeksvragen werden beantwoord in de
zes empirische studies van dit proefschrift. Met deze informatie voorhanden
konden in het vierde deel van het boek de beide centrale vragen beantwoord
worden.
De eerste centrale vraag luidde: In hoeverre bieden interne determinanten
en diﬀusiepatronen een verklaring voor de invoering van liberale abortuswet-
gevingen in West-Europese landen tussen 1961 en 2010? In vrijwel alle
landen in West-Europa heeft een hervorming van de abortuswetgeving plaats-
gevonden, en hierbij zijn de omstandigheden waaronder abortus is toegestaan
verruimd. Uit de bevindingen in het derde hoofdstuk blijkt dat de kans op
invoering van de meest liberale abortuswetgeving stijgt wanneer de politieke
en maatschappelijke steun voor liberale abortuswetgeving groter is, terwijl,
anderzijds, de kans op een minder liberale abortuswetgeving groter is wanneer
de maatschappelijke weerstand groter is.
Echter, in Hoofdstukken 4 en 5 bleek dat niet alleen de interne determinan-
ten een verklaring bieden voor de invoering van liberale abortuswetgevingen.
In Hoofdstuk 4 vertoonde de verspreiding van abortuswetgeving het kenmerk-
ende patroon van temporele diﬀusie: de zogenaamde S-curve. In Hoofdstuk
5 zagen we dat de kans dat een land een abortuswetgeving invoert stijgt
wanneer naburige landen een dergelijke wetgeving al eerder hebben ingevoerd.
Dit pleit voor de hypothese dat landen interdependent zijn wanneer het gaat
om de invoering van abortuswetgeving, en dat nabije landen elkaar sterker
be¨ınvloeden dan landen die verder gelegen zijn.
Met de bevindingen in Hoofdstuk 6 en 7 kon antwoord worden gegeven op
de tweede centrale vraag. Deze tweede centrale vraag luidde: In hoeverre
verspreidt morele wetgeving zich op een andere manier in West-Europese
landen tussen 1961 en 2010 dan amoreel morele wetgeving? Allereerst bleek
dat er grote verschillen waren in de diﬀusiepatronen van morele en amorele
wetgevingen verspreidde over tijd. Vrijwel geen enkel van de bestudeerde
morele wetgevingen vertoonde de voorspelde S- of R-curve, terwijl bij een
meerderheid van de amorele wetgevingen de voorspelde S-curve werd gevon-
den. Voorts lijkt de diﬀusie van morele wetgeving vaker plaats te vinden
via naburige landen. Er zijn geen aanwijzingen dat morele wetgevingen
zich verspreiden via landen die in religieus opzicht gelijkend zijn, en dat
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amorele wetgevingen juist via landen die in sociaaleconomisch opzicht op
elkaar gelijkend zijn. Dit is in strijd met de geformuleerde hypothesen over
de ruimtelijke diﬀusie van morele wetgeving.
Bibliography
Akaike, H. (1973). Information theory as an extension of the maximum
likelihood. In Petrov, B. and Csaki, F., editors, Second International
Symposium on Information Theory, pages 267–281. Akademiai Kiado,
Budapest.
Akaike, H. (1974). A new look at the statistical model identification. IEEE
Transactions on Automatic Control, AC-19:pp. 716–723.
Albæk, E., Green-Pedersen, C., and Nielsen, L. (2007). Making tobacco
consumption a political issue in Denmark and the US. The dynamics of
issue expansion in comparative perspective. Journal of Comparative Policy
Analysis, 9(1):1–20.
Allen, M. (2005). Laying down the law? Interest group influence on state
adoption of animal cruelty felony laws. Policy Studies Journal, 33(3):443–
455.
Armingeon, K., Gerber, M., Leimgruber, P., and Beyeler, M. (2008). The
Comparative Political Data Set 1960-2006. Institut fur Politikwissenschaft,
Bern.
Austria (1937). Bundesgesetz, womit die Bestimmungen des Strafgesetzes
zum Schutze der Leibesfrucht abgea¨ndert und erga¨nzt werden. Bundesge-
setzblatt, 57(3):884–885.
Barnett, L. and Siatta, P. (2011). Societal properties and law on same-sex non-
marital partnerships and same-sex marriage in European Union nations.
Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development, 25(4):625–672.
Beck, N., Gleditsch, K., and Beardsley, K. (2006). Space is more than
geography. Using spatial econometrics in the study of political economy.
International Studies Quarterly, 50(1):27–44.
Bennett, C. (1997). Understanding ripple eﬀects. The cross-national adop-
tion of policy instruments for bureaucratic accountability. Governance,
10(3):213–233.
190 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Berer, M. (2008). A critical appraisal of laws on second trimester abortion.
Reproductive Health Matters, 16(31-1):3–13.
Berry, F. and Berry, W. (1990). State lottery adoptions as policy innova-
tions. An event history analysis. The American Political Science Review,
84(2):395–415.
Berry, F. and Berry, W. (1992). Tax innovation in the states. Capitalizing on
political opportunity. American Journal of Political Science, 36(3):715–742.
Berry, F. and Berry, W. (2007). Innovation and diﬀusion models in policy
research. In Sabatier, P. A., editor, Theories of the Policy Process, pages
223–260. Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado.
Blofield, M. (2008). Women’s choices in comparative perspective. Abor-
tion policies in late-developing catholic countries. Comparative Politics,
40(4):339–419.
Bognetti, G. (1984). Italy. In Campbell, D., editor, Abortion Law and Public
Policy, pages 83–100. Martinus Nijhoﬀ Publishers, Dordrecht.
Boland, R. and Katzive, L. (2008). Developments in laws on induced abortion:
1998-2007. International Family Planning Perspectives, 34(3):110–120.
Bolzendahl, C. and Myers, D. (2004). Feminist attitudes and support for
gender equality. Opinion change in women and men, 1974-1998. Social
Forces, 83(2):759–790.
Boushey, G. (2010). Policy Diﬀusion Dynamics in America. Camebridge
University Press, New York.
Braun, D. and Gilardi, F. (2006). Taking ‘Galton’s problem’ seriously.
Towards a theory of policy diﬀusion. Journal of Theoretical Politics,
18(3):298–322.
Brierley, P. (1997). World Churches Handbook. Based on the Operation
World Database by Patrick Johnstone WEC International 1993. Christian
Research, London.
Brooks, J. (1992). Abortion policy in western democracies. A cross-national
analysis. Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Adminis-
tration, 5(3):342–357.
Brooks, S. (2005). Interdependent and domestic foundations of policy change.
The diﬀusion of pension privatization around the world. International
Studies Quarterly, 49(2):273–294.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 191
Burnham, K. and Anderson, D. (2002). Model Selection and Multimodel
Inference. A Practical Information-Theoretic Approach. Springer-Verlag,
New York, 2nd ed. edition.
Burnham, K. and Anderson, D. (2004). Multimodel inference. Understanding
AIC and BIC in model selection. Sociological Methods and Research,
33(2):261–304.
Caldwell, L. (1986). Feminism and abortion politics in Italy. In Lovenduski,
J. and Outshoorn, J., editors, The New Politics of Abortion, pages 105–124.
Sage, Beverly Hills.
Camobreco, J. and Barnello, M. (2008). Democratic responsiveness and
politcy shock. The case of state abortion policy. State Politics and Policy
Quarterly, 8(1):48–65.
Cocca, C. (2002). The politics of statutory rape laws. Adoption and reinven-
tion of morality policy in the States, 1971-1999. Polity, 35(1):51–72.
Cook, R. and Dickens, B. (1978). A decade of international change in abortion
law: 1967-1977. American Journal of Public Health, 68(1):673–644.
Cook, R. and Dickens, B. (1988). International developments in abortion
law : 1977-88. American Journal of Public Health, 78(1):1305–1311.
Cook, R., Dickens, B., and Bliss, L. (1999). International developments
in abortion law from 1988 to 1998. American Journal of Public Health,
89(1):579–586.
CPDA (2011). Comparative Parliamentary Democracy Archive.
http://www.pol.umu.se/ccpd.
Crain, R. (1966). Fluoridation. The diﬀusion of an innovation among cities.
Social Forces, 44(4):467–476.
Crenson, M. (1974). The Un-Politics of Air Pollution. A Study on Non-
Decisionmaking in the Cities. The Johns Hopkins University Press, Balti-
more.
David, H., Fleischhacker, J., and Hohn, C. (1988). Abortion and eugenics in
Nazi Germany. Population and Development Review, 14(1):81–112.
David, H. P. (1992). Abortion in Europe, 1920-91. A public health perspective.
Studies in Family Planning, 23(1):1–22.
De Bruijn, J. (1979). Geschiedenis van Abortus in Nederland. Een Analyse
van Opvattingen en Discussies 1600-1979. Van Gennep, Amsterdam.
192 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Delmas, M. (2002). The diﬀusion of environmental management standards
in Europe and in the United States. An institutional perspective. Policy
Sciences, 35(1):91–119.
Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety (2010). Guidance on
the Termination of Pregnancy. The Law and Clinical Practice in Northern
Ireland. http://www.dhsspsni.gov.uk/guidance-termination-pregnancy-jul-
2010.pdf on 6 April 2011, Retrieved from.
Dickens, B. and Cook, R. (1979). Development of Commonwealth abortion
laws. International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 28(3):424–457.
Dorbritz, J. and Fleischhacker, J. (1999). The former german democratic
republic. In David, H., editor, From abortion to contraception. A resource
to public policies and reproductive behavior in Central and Eastern Europe
from 1917 to the present, pages 121–144. Greenwood Press, London.
Doring, H. and Manow, P. (2010). Parliament and Government Composi-
tion Database (ParlGov). An Infrastructure for Empirical Information on
Political Institutions, Version 10/02. http://www.parlgov.org, Retrieved
from.
Elkins, Z. and Simmons, B. (2005). On waves, clusters, and diﬀusion. A
conceptual framework. The Annals of the American Academy of Political
and Social Science, 598(1):33–51.
Engeli, I. (2009). The challenges of abortion and assisted reproductive
technologies in Europe. Comparative European Politics, 7(1):56–74.
EPHA, editor (2012). European smoking bans. Evolution of the legislation.
http://www.epha.org/a/1941 on January 5 2012, Retrieved from.
Eser, A. (1986). Reform of German abortion law. First experiences. The
American Journal of Comparative Law, 34(2):369–383.
Eser, A. (1994). Abortion law reform in Germany in international comparative
perspective. European Journal of Health Law, 1(1):15–34.
Eser, A. and Koch, H., editors (1988). Schwangerschafsabbruch im Inter-
nationalen Vergleich. Rechtlige Regelungen - Soziale Rahmenbedingungen
- Empirische Grunddaten. Teil 1: Europa. Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft,
Baden-Baden.
Esping-Andersen, G. (1990). The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism.
Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Eugenic Society (1939). Swedish law on abortion. The Eugenic Review,
31(2):109–110.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 193
European Values Study Foundation, and World Values Survey Association
(2006). European and World Values Surveys Four-Wave Integrated Data
File, 1981-2004, v.20060423. ASEP/JDS, Madrid, Spain/Tilburg Univer-
sity, Tilburg, the Netherlands. Aggregate File Distributors: ASEP/JDS
and ZA, Cologne, Germany, The Aggregate File Producers.
Fairbanks, J. (1977). Religious forces and ‘morality’ policies in the American
states. Western Political Quarterly, 30(1):411–417.
Ferree, M., Gamson, W., Gerhards, J., and Rucht, D. (2002). Shaping
Abortion Discourse. Democracy and the Public Sphere in Germany and
the United States. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Festy, P. (2006). Legal recognition of same-sex couples in Europe. Population,
61(4):417–453.
Field, M. (1979). Determinants of abortion policy in the developed nations.
Policy Studies Journal, 7(4):771–781.
Fink, S. (2008). Politics as usual or bringing religion back in? The influence
of parties, institutions, economic interests, and religion on embryo research
laws. Comparative Political Studies, 41(12):1631–1656.
Fink, S. (2011). A contagious concept. Explaining the spread of privatization
in the telecommunications sector. Governance: An International Journal
of Policy, Administration, and Institutions, 24(1):111–139.
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (2010). Privatization Barometer.
http://www.privatizationbarometer.net on 21 September 2010, Retrieved
from.
France (1953). De´cret No. 53-1001 du 5 octobre 1953 portant codification
des textes le´gislatifs concernant la sante´ publique. Journal Oﬃciel de la
Republique Franc¸aise, 1953(1):8833–8899.
Gilardi, F. (2005). The institutional foundations of regulatory capitalism. The
diﬀusion of independent regulatory agencies in Western Europe. Annals
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 598(1):84–101.
Gilardi, F. (2008). Delegation in the Regulatory State. Independent Regulatory
Agencies in Western Europe. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.
Gilardi, F. and Fuglister, K. (2008). Empirical modeling of policy diﬀusion
in federal states. The dyadic approach. Swiss Political Science Review,
14(3):413–450.
Girvin, B. (1996). Ireland and the european union. The impact of integration
and social change on abortion policy. In Githens, M. and McBride Stetson,
194 BIBLIOGRAPHY
D., editors, Abortion Politics: Public Policy in Cross-Cultural Perspective,
pages 211–224. Routledge, New York / London.
Glendon, M. (1987). Abortion and Divorce in Western Law. Harvard
University Press, Cambridge.
Goldberg, M. (1984). Four countries liberalize abortion laws. Planned
Parenthood Review, 4(1):20–21.
Gray, V. (1973). Innovations in the states. A diﬀusion study. The American
Political Science Review, 67(4):1174–1185.
Green-Pedersen, C. (2007). The conflict of conflicts in comparative per-
spective. Euthanasia as a political issue in Denmark, Belgium, and the
Netherlands. Comparative Politics, 39(3):273–291.
Greenhalgh, T., Robert, G., MacFarlane, F., Bate, P., and Kyriakidou, O.
(2004). Diﬀusion of innovations in service organizations. Systematic review
and recommendations. The Milbank Quarterly, 82(4):581–629.
Grogan, C. (1994). Political-economic factors influencing state medicaid
policy. Political Research Quarterly, 47(3):589–622.
Haider-Markel, D. (2001). Policy diﬀusion as a geographical expansion of
the scope of political conflict. Same-sex marriage bans in the 1990s. State
Politics and Policy Quarterly, 1(1):5–26.
Haider-Markel, D. and Meier, K. (1996). The politics of gay and lesbian
rights. Expanding the scope of conflict. Journal of Politics, 58(2):332–349.
Heiss, H. (1967). Die Abortsituation in Europa und in Außereuropa¨ischen
La¨ndern. Eine Medizinisch-Rechtsvergleichende Studie. Ferdinand Enke
Verlag, Stuttgart.
Henshaw, S., Singh, S., and Haas, T. (2008). The incidence of abortion
worldwide. International Family Planning Perspectives, 25(Supplement):30–
38.
Hodson, L. (2011). A marriage by any other name? Schalk and Kopf v.
Austria. Human Rights Law Review, 11(1):170–179.
Hoﬀman, J. and Miller, A. (1997). Social political attitudes among religious
groups. Convergence and divergence over time. Journal for Scientific Study
of Religion, 36(1):52–70.
Holzinger, K. and Knill, C. (2005). Causes and conditions of policy conver-
gence. Journal for European Public Policy, 12(5):775–796.
Hume, D. (1757). Four Dissertations. Millar, London.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 195
Imai, K., King, G., and Lau, O. (2008). Zelig: Everyone’s Statistical Software.
R Package Version 3.3-1. http://gking.harvard.edu/zelig, Retrieved from.
International Civil Aviation Organization (2010).
List of Government-owned and Privatized Airlines.
http://www.icao.int/sustainability/Documents/PrivatizedAirlines.pdf on
21 September 2010, Retrieved from.
International Planned Parenthood (2007). Abortion Legislation in Europe.
IPPF European Network, Brussels, 2007 edition.
International Planned Parenthood (2008). Access to Safe Abortion. A Tool for
Assessing Legal and Other Obstacles. IPPF European Network, Brussels.
International Planned Parenthood (2009). Abortion Legislation in Europe.
IPPF European Network, Brussels, 2009 edition.
Ketting, E. (1978). Van Misdrijf tot Hulpverlening. Een analyse van de
Maatschappelijke Betekenis van Abortus Provocatus in Nederland. Samson
Uitgeverij, Alphen aan de Rijn.
Ketting, E. and Van Praag, P. (1983). Abortus Provocatus. Wet en Praktijk.
NISSO, Zeist.
Ketting, E. and Van Praag, P. (1986). The marginal relevance of legislation
relating to induced abortion. In Lovenduski, J. and Outshoorn, J., editors,
The New Politics of Abortion, pages 154–169. Sage, Beverly Hills.
King, G. and Zeng, L. (2001). Logistic regression in rare events data. Political
Analysis, 9(2):137–163.
Klawitter, M. and Hammer, B. (1999). Spatial and temporal diﬀusion of
local antidiscrimination policies for sexual orientation. In Riggle, E. and
Tadlock, B., editors, Gays and Lesbians in the Democratic Process, pages
22–38. Columbia University Press, New York.
Lane, J., McKay, D., and Newton, K. (1996). Political Data Handbook.
OECD Countries. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Levi-Faur, D. (2005). The global diﬀusion of regulatory capitalism. Annals
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 598(1):12–32.
Løkeland, M. (2004). The legal right has been won, but not the moral right.
Reproductive Matters. Supplement: Abortion Law, Policy and Practice in
Transition, 12(24):167=173.
Lowi, T. (1964). Review. American business, public policy, case-studies, and
political theory. World Politics, 16(4):677–715.
196 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Lowi, T. (1972). Four systems of policy, politics, and choice. Public Admin-
istration Review, 32(4):298–310.
Lowi, T. (2005). Foreword. New dimensions in policy and politics. In
Tatalovich, R. and Daynes, B., editors, Moral Controversies in American
Politics, pages x–xxi. M.E. Sharpe, New York.
Luxembourg (1879). Penal Code. Article 348-353.
http://www.legilux.public.lu/leg/a/archives/1909/0053/a053.pdf
on April 5 2011, Retrieved from.
Luxembourg (1978). Loi du 15 novembre 1978 relative a`
l’information sexuelle, a` la prevention de l’avortement clan-
destin et a` la reglementation de l’interruption de la grossesse.
http://www.legilux.public.lu/leg/a/archives/1978/0081/a081.pdf
on April 5 2011, Retrieved from.
Mahajan, V. and Peterson, R. (1985). Models for Innovation Diﬀusion. Sage
Publications, London.
Makse, T. and Volden, C. (2011). The role of policy attributes in the diﬀusion
of innovations. The Journal of Politics, 73(1):108–124.
McBride Stetson, D. (1996a). Abortion policy triads and woman’s rights
in Russia, the United States, and France. In Githens, M. and McBride
Stetson, D., editors, Abortion Politics: Public Policy in Cross-Cultural
Perspective, pages 97–118. Routledge, New York / London.
McBride Stetson, D. (1996b). Feminist perspectives on abortion and repro-
ductive technologies. In Githens, M. and McBride Stetson, D., editors,
Abortion Politics: Public Policy in Cross-Cultural Perspective, pages 211–
224. Routledge, New York / London.
McBride Stetson, D. (2001). Introduction. Abortion, women’s movements,
and democratic politics. In McBride Stetson, D., editor, Abortion Politics,
Women’s Movements, and the Democratic State: A Comparative Study of
State Feminism, pages 1–16. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Medoﬀ, M. (2002). The determinants and impact of state abortion restrictions.
American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 61(2):481–493.
Meier, K. (1994). The Politics of Sin. M.E. Sharpe, New York.
Meier, K. and Johnson, C. (1990). The politics of demon rum. American
Politics Quarterly, 18(3):404–429.
Mincer, J. (1963). Market prices, opportunity costs and income eﬀects.
In Christ, C., Friedman, M., Goodman, L., Griliches, Z., Harberger, A.,
BIBLIOGRAPHY 197
Liviatan, N., Mincer, J., Mundlak, Y., Nerlove, M., Patinkin, D., Telser, L.,
and Theil, H., editors, Measurement in Economics, pages 67–82. Stanford
University Press, Stanford.
Minkenberg, M. (2002). Religion and public policy. Institutional, cultural, and
political impact on the shaping of abortion policies in Western democracies.
Comparative Political Studies, 35(2):221–247.
Mock, E. (1984). Austria. In Campbell, D., editor, Abortion Law and Public
Policy, pages 19–40. Martinus Nijhoﬀ Publishers, Dordrecht.
Montpetit, E., Rothmayr, C., and (eds.), F. V. (2007). The Politics of
Biotechnology in North America and Europe. Lexington Books, Lanham.
Mooney, C. (1999). The politics of morality policy. Symposium editor’s
introduction. Policy Studies Journal, 27(4):676–680.
Mooney, C. (2000). The Public Clash of Private Values. The Politics of
Morality Policy. Chatham House, Chatham.
Mooney, C. and Lee, M. (1995). Legislative morality in the American states.
The case of pre-roe abortion regulation reform. American Journal of
Political Science, 39(3):599–627.
Mooney, C. and Lee, M. (1999a). Morality policy reinvention. State death
penalties. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science, 566:80–92.
Mooney, C. and Lee, M. (1999b). The temporal diﬀusion of morality policy.
The case of death penalty legislation in the American states. Policy Studies
Journal, 27(4):766–780.
Mooney, C. and Lee, M. (2000). The influence of values on consensus and
contentious morality policy. U.S. death penalty reform, 1956-83. Journal
of Politics, 62(1):223–239.
Mooney, C. and Schuldt, R. (2008). Does morality policy exist? Testing a
basic assumption. Policy Studies Journal, 36(2):199–218.
Myers, J. and Seif, M. (2010). Global perspective of legal abortion. Trend
analysis and accessibility. Best Practice & Research Clinical Obstetrics
and Gynaecology, 24(4):457–466.
Naroll, R. (1961). Two solutions to Galton’s problem. Philosophy of Science,
28(1):15–39.
Nicholson-Crotty, S. (2009). The politics of diﬀusion. Public policy in the
American states. The Journal of Politics, 71(1):192–205.
198 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Norrander, B. and Wilcox, C. (2001). Public opinion and policymaking in
the States. the case of post-Roe abortion policy. Policy Studies Journal,
27(4):707–722.
Norris, P. (1986). Politics and Sexual Equality. The Comparative Position of
Women in Western Democracies. Wheatsheaf, Brighton.
Northern Ireland (1945). Criminal Justice Act (Northern Ireland) 1945.
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/apni/1945/15/contents on April 6 2011,
Retrieved from.
OECD (2006). Population and Labour Force Statistics. Vol 2006 re-
lease 02. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
http://www.oecd.org/std/labour, Paris.
OECD (2010). Labour Force Statistics by Sex and Age. Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development. http://stats.oecd.org, Paris.
Origo, F. and Lucifora, C. (2010). Smoking bans in European workplaces.
CESifo DICE Report, 2010(3):36–42.
Outshoorn, J. (1996). The stability of compromise: Abortion politics in
Western Europe. In Githens, M. and McBride Stetson, D., editors, Abor-
tion Politics: Public Policy in Cross-Cultural Perspective, pages 145–164.
Routledge, New York / London.
Patton, D. (2007). The supreme court and morality poliy adoption in the
United States. the impact of constitutional context. Political Research
Quarterly, 60(3):468–488.
Pierce, P. and Miller, D. (1999). Variations in the diﬀusion of state lottery
adoptions. How revenue dedication changes morality policy. Policy Studies
Journal, 27(4):696–706.
Pinter, B. (2002). Medico-legal aspects of abortion in Europe. The European
Journal of Contraception and Reproductive Health, 7(1):15–19.
Pinter, B., Aubeny, G., Ba´rtfai, O., Loeber, S., Ozal, P., and Webb, A. (2005).
Accessibility and availability of abortion in six European countries. The
European Journal of Contraception and Reproductive Health, 10(1):51–58.
Portugal (1984). Lei no. 6/84. http://www.dre.pt on April 6 2011, Retrieved
from.
Portugal (1997). Lei no. 90/97. http://www.dre.pt on April 6 2011, Retrieved
from.
Portugal (2007). Lei no. 16/2007. http://www.dre.pt on April 6 2011,
Retrieved from.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 199
Potts, M., Diggory, P., and Peel, J. (1977). Abortion. Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge.
President and Fellows of Harvard College (2011). Annual Review of Popu-
lation Law. https://webapps.sph.harvard.edu/live/population-law/. Last
Accessed on 3 April 2011, Online data base:.
Quaas, M. (1984). Federal republic of Germany. In Campbell, D., editor,
Abortion Law and Public Policy, pages 41–60. Martinus Nijhoﬀ Publishers,
Dordrecht.
R Development Core Team (2010). R. A Language and Environment for
Statistical Computing. R Foundation for Statistical Computing, Vienna.
Rahman, A., Katzive, L., and Henshaw, S. (1998). A global review of laws on
induced abortion, 1985-1997. International Family Planning Perspectives,
24(2):56–64.
Ray, R. (2008). A Detailed Look at Parental Leave Policies in 21 OECD
Countries. Center for Economic and Policy Research, Washington.
Ray, R. (2009). Parental Leave Polices in 21 Countries. Assessing Gen-
erosity and Gender Equality. Center for Economic and Policy Research,
Washington.
Roemer, R. (1967). Abortion law. The approaches of diﬀerent nations.
American Journal of Public Health and the Nations’ Health, 57(11):1906–
1922.
Rogers, E. (1995). Diﬀusion of Innovations. The Free Press, New York,
fourth edition edition.
Roh, J. and Haider-Markel, D. (2003). All politics is not local. National
forces in state abortion initiatives. Social Science Quarterly, 84(1):15–31.
Ross, M. and Homer, E. (1976). Galton’s problem in cross-national research.
World Politics, 29(1):1–28.
Rust Bullfinch, S. (1984). Introduction. In Campbell, D., editor, Abortion
Law and Public Policy, pages 3–18. Martinus Nijhoﬀ Publishers, Dordrecht.
Samanni, M., Teorell, J., Kumlin, S., and Rothstein, B. (2008). The QoG
Social Policy Dataset, version 4Nov08. University of Gothenburg: The
Quality of Government Institute, http://www.qog.pol.gu.se, Gothenburg.
Savage, R. (1985). Diﬀusion research traditions and the spread of policy
innovations in a federal system. Publius, 15(4):1–28.
200 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Schenker, J. (2000). Women’s reproductive health. Monotheistic religious
perspectives. International Journal of Gynaecology and Obstetrics, 70(1):77–
86.
Schmitt, C. (2011). What drives the diﬀusion of privatization policy? Ev-
idence from the telecommunications sector. Journal of Public Policy,
31(1):95–117.
Sciﬃono, N., Ramjoue´, C., and Varone, F. (2009). Biomedical policies in
Belgium and Italy. West European Politics, 32(3):559–585.
Sedgh, G., Henshaw, S., Singh, S., Ahman, E., and Shah, I. (2007). In-
duced abortion. Estimated rates and trends worldwide. The Lancet,
370(9595):1338–1345.
Shipan, C. and Volden, C. (2008). The mechanisms of policy diﬀusion.
American Journal of Political Science, 52(4):840,–857.
Simmons, B. and Elkins, Z. (2004). The globalization of liberalization. Policy
diﬀusion in the international political economy. American Political Science
Review, 98(1):171–189.
Smith, K. (2002). Typologies, taxonomies, and the benefits of policy classifi-
cation. Policy Studies Journal, 30(3):379–395.
Spain (1985). Ley Organica 9/1985, de 5 de Julio, de reforma del articulo
417 bis del Co´digo Penal. http://www.boe.es/aeboe/consultas/ on April 6
2011, Retrieved from.
Spain (2010). Ley Organica 2/2010, de 3 de Marzo, de salud sex-
ual y reproductive y de la interrupcio´n voluntaria del embarazo.
http://www.boe.es/aeboe/consultas/ on April 6 2011, Retrieved from.
Sto¨rig, H. (1988). Taal. Het grote avontuur. Het Spectrum, Utrecht.
Strøm, K., Muller, W., and Bergman, T. (2008). Cabinets and Coalition Bar-
gaining. The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe. Oxford University
Press, Oxford.
Studlar, D. (2000). What constitutes morality policy? A cross-national
analysis. In Mooney, C., editor, The Public Clash of Private Values, pages
267–281. CQ Press, Washington.
Studlar, D. (2008). U.s. tobacco control. Public health, political economy, or
morality policy? Review of Policy Research, 25(5):393–410.
Switzerland (2010). Schweizeriches Strafgesetzbuch. Art 118-120.
http://legislationline.org/documents/section/criminal-codes on April 6
2011, Retrieved from.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 201
Tatalovich, R. and Daynes, B. (2005). Moral Controversies in American
Politics. M.E. Sharpe, New York, third edition.
Tews, K., Busch, P., and Jo¨rgens, H. (2003). The diﬀusion of new envi-
ronmental policy instruments. European Journal of Political Research,
42(1):569–600.
The Netherlands (1981). Wet Afbreking Zwangerschap.
http://wetten.overheid.nl on April 6 2011, Retrieved from.
The Netherlands (1995). Wet op Geneeskundige Behandelingsovereenkomst.
http://www.rbng.nl/userfiles/file/wetten/WGBO.pdf on April 5 2011,
Retrieved from.
Tietze, C. (1967). Abortion in Europe. American Journal of Public Health,
57(11):1923–1932.
Tobler, W. (1970). A computer movie simulating urban growth in the Detroit
region. Economic Geography, 46(Supplement: Proceedings. International
Geographical Union. Commission on Quantitative Methods):234–240.
Topitsch, E. (1954). Society, technology, and philosophical reasoning. Phi-
losophy of Science, 21(4):275–296.
Topitsch, E. (1958). Vom Ursprung und Ende der Metaphysik. Eine Studie
zur Weltanschauungskritik. Springer-Verlag, Wien.
Trommelmans, W. (2006). Vlaanderen Vrijt! 50 Jaar Seks in Vlaanderen.
Vzw Steam & Uitgeverij van Halewyck, Antwerpen.
Tylor, E. (1889). On a method of investigating the development of institutions.
Applied to laws of marriage and descent. The Journal of the Anthropological
Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, 18(3):245–272.
United Kingdom (1929). Infant Life (Preservation) Act.
http://www.legislation.gov.uk on April 6 2011, Retrieved from.
United Kingdom (1967). Abortion Act 1967. http://www.legislation.gov.uk
on April 6 2011, Retrieved from.
United Kingdom (1990). Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990.
http://www.legislation.gov.uk on April 6 2011, Retrieved from.
United Nations (2002). Abortion Policies. A Global Review. United Nations,
New York.
United Nations (2009). World Population Policies 2010. United Nations
Department of Economic and Social Aﬀairs / Population Division, New
York.
202 BIBLIOGRAPHY
United Nations (2012). Death Penalty. Countries Abolitionist for all
Crime. http://www.amnesty.org/en/death-penalty/countries-abolitionist-
for-all-crimes on January 04 2012, Retrieved from.
United Nations Fund for Population Activities (1974). Annual Review
of Population Law. Volume 1974. United Nations Fund for Population
Activities, New York.
United Nations Fund for Population Activities (1975). Annual Review
of Population Law. Volume 1975. United Nations Fund for Population
Activities, New York.
United Nations Fund for Population Activities (1978). Annual Review
of Population Law. Volume 1978. United Nations Fund for Population
Activities, New York.
United Nations Fund for Population Activities (1984). Annual Review of
Population Law. Volume 11. United Nations Fund for Population Activities,
New York.
Van Tienhoven van den Bogaard, B. (1887). Beschouwingen over Art. 295-
298 van het Wetboek van Strafrecht. J. Kasteel, ’s Gravenhagen.
Volden, C. (2006). States as policy laboratories. Emulating success in the
Children’s Health Insurance Program. American Journal of Political
Science, 50(2):294–312.
Walker, J. (1969). The diﬀusion of innovations among the American states.
The American Political Science Review, 63(3):880–899.
Ward, M. and Gleditsch, K. (2007). Spatial Regression Models. Sage Publi-
cations Inc., Thousand Oaks.
Wasserman, I. (1983). A cross-national comparison of contraception and
abortion laws. Social Indicators Research, 13(3):281–309.
Welch, M., Leege, D., and Cavendish, J. (1995). Attitudes toward abortion
among US catholics. Another case of symbolic politics? Social Science
Quarterly, 76(1):142–157.
Welch, S. and Thompson, K. (1980). The impact of federal incentives on state
policy innovation. American Journal of Political Science, 24(4):715–729.
Weyland, K. (2005). Theories of policy diﬀusion. Lessons from Latin American
pension reform. World Politics, 57(2):262–295.
World Bank (2010). World Development Indicators.
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators,
Retrieved from.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 203
World Health Organisation (1955). International Digest of Health Legislation
VI. World Health Organization, Geneva.
World Health Organisation (1957). International Digest of Health Legislation
VIII. World Health Organization, Geneva.
World Health Organisation (1965). International Digest of Health Legislation
XVI. World Health Organization, Geneva.
World Health Organisation (1966). International Digest of Health Legislation
XVII. World Health Organization, Geneva.
World Health Organisation (1970). International Digest of Health Legislation
XXI. World Health Organization, Geneva.
World Health Organisation (1971a). Abortion Laws. A Survey of Current
World Legislation. World Health Organization, Geneva.
World Health Organisation (1971b). International Digest of Health Legislation
XXII. World Health Organization, Geneva.
World Health Organisation (1974). International Digest of Health Legislation
XXV. World Health Organization, Geneva.
World Health Organisation (1975). International Digest of Health Legislation
XXVI. World Health Organization, Geneva.
World Health Organisation (1976). International Digest of Health Legislation
XXVII. World Health Organization, Geneva.
World Health Organisation (1977). International Digest of Health Legislation
XXVIII. World Health Organization, Geneva.
World Health Organisation (1979). International Digest of Health Legislation
XXIX. World Health Organization, Geneva.
World Health Organisation (1980). International Digest of Health Legislation
XXX. World Health Organization, Geneva.
World Health Organisation (1985). International Digest of Health Legislation
XXXV. World Health Organization, Geneva.
World Health Organisation (1996). International Digest of Health Legislation
XXXXVI. World Health Organization, Geneva.
World Health Organisation (2011). International Digest of Health Legislation.
http://apps.who.int/idhl-rils/. Accessed on 3 April 2011, Online data base.
204 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Curriculum Vitae
Roderick Sluiter was born in Gendringen (the Netherlands) on March 20,
1984. He obtained a Master of Science degree in sociology from the Radboud
University Nijmegen in 2007. In September 2007 he started as a PhD candi-
date at the Department of Sociology at the Radboud University Nijmegen
and the Interuniversity Center for Social Science Theory and Methodology.
As of September 2011, he is employed as a postdocteral researcher and teacher
at the Department of Sociology at the Radboud University Nijmegen.
206 8. CURRICULUM VITAE
ICS Dissertation Series
The ICS series presents dissertations of the Interuniversity Center for Social
Science Theory and Methodology. Each of these studies aims at integrating
explicit theory formation with state of the art empirical research or at the
development of advanced methods for empirical research. The ICS was
founded in 1986 as a cooperative eﬀort of the universities of Groningen
and Utrecht. Since 1992, the ICS expanded to the University of Nijmegen.
Most of the projects are financed by the participating universities or by the
Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO). The international
composition of the ICS graduate students is mirrored in the increasing
international orientation of the projects and thus of the ICS series itself.
1. C. van Liere, (1990). Lastige Leerlingen. Een empirisch onderzoek naar
sociale oorzaken van probleemgedrag op basisscholen. Amsterdam: Thesis
Publishers.
2. Marco H.D. van Leeuwen, (1990). Bijstand in Amsterdam, ca. 1800 - 1850.
Armenzorg als beheersings- en overlevingsstrategie. ICS dissertation, Utrecht.
3. I. Maas, (1990). Deelname aan podiumkunsten via de podia, de media en
actieve beoefening. Substitutie of leereﬀecten? Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
4. M.I. Broese van Groenou, (1991). Gescheiden Netwerken. De relaties met
vrienden en verwanten na echtscheiding. Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
5. Jan M.M. van den Bos, (1991). Dutch EC Policy Making. A Model-Guided
Approach to Coordination and Negotiation. Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
6. Karin Sanders, (1991). Vrouwelijke Pioniers. Vrouwen en mannen met
een ’mannelijke’ hogere beroepsopleiding aan het begin van hun loopbaan.
Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
7. Sjerp de Vries, (1991). Egoism, Altruism, and Social Justice. Theory and
Experiments on Cooperation in Social Dilemmas. Amsterdam: Thesis Pub-
lishers.
8. Ronald S. Batenburg, (1991). Automatisering in bedrijf. Amsterdam: Thesis
Publishers.
9. Rudi Wielers, (1991). Selectie en allocatie op de arbeidsmarkt. Een uitwerking
voor de informele en ge¨ınstitutionaliseerde kinderopvang. Amsterdam: Thesis
Publishers.
10. Gert P. Westert, (1991). Verschillen in ziekenhuisgebruik. ICS dissertation,
Groningen.
11. Hanneke Hermsen, (1992). Votes and Policy Preferences. Equilibria in Party
Systems. Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
208 8. ICS DISSERTATION SERIES
12. Cora J.M. Maas, (1992). Probleemleerlingen in het basisonderwijs. Amster-
dam: Thesis Publishers.
13. Ed A.W. Boxman, (1992). Contacten en carrie`re. Een empirisch theoretisch
onderzoek naar de relatie tussen sociale netwerken en arbeidsmarktposities.
Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
14. Conny G.J. Taes, (1992). Kijken naar banen. Een onderzoek naar de inschat-
ting van arbeidsmarktkansen bij schoolverlaters uit het middelbaar beroepson-
derwijs. Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
15. Peter van Roozendaal, (1992). Cabinets in Multi-Party Democracies. The Ef-
fect of Dominant and Central Parties on Cabinet Composition and Durability.
Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
16. Marcel van Dam, (1992). Regio zonder regie. Verschillen in en eﬀectiviteit
van gemeentelijk arbeidsmarktbeleid. Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
17. Tanja van der Lippe, (1993). Arbeidsverdeling tussen mannen en vrouwen.
Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
18. Marc A. Jacobs, (1993). Software: Kopen of Kopie¨ren? Een sociaal weten-
schappelijk onderzoek onder PC gebruikers. Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
19. Peter van der Meer, (1993). Verdringing op de Nederlandse arbeidsmarkt.
Sector en sekseverschillen. Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
20. Gerbert Kraaykamp, (1993). Over lezen gesproken. Een studie naar sociale
diﬀerentiatie in leesgedrag. Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
21. Evelien Zeggelink, (1993). Strangers into Friends. The Evolution of Friendship
Networks Using an Individual Oriented Modeling Approach. Amsterdam:
Thesis Publishers.
22. Jaco Berveling, (1994). Het stempel op de besluitvorming. Macht, invloed en
besluitvorming op twee Amsterdamse beleidsterreinen. Amsterdam: Thesis
Publishers.
23. Wim Bernasco, (1994). Coupled Careers. The Eﬀects of Spouse’s Resources
on Success at Work. Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
24. Liset van Dijk, (1994). Choices in Child Care. The Distribution of Child
Care Among Mothers, Fathers and Non-Parental Care Providers. Amsterdam:
Thesis Publishers.
25. Jos de Haan, (1994). Research Groups in Dutch Sociology. Amsterdam:
Thesis Publishers.
26. K. Boahene, (1995). Innovation Adoption as a Socio-Economic Process. The
Case of the Ghanaian Cocoa Industry. Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
27. Paul E.M. Ligthart, (1995). Solidarity in Economic Transactions. An Experi-
mental Study of Framing Eﬀects in Bargaining and Contracting. Amsterdam:
Thesis Publishers.
28. Roger Th. A.J. Leenders, (1995). Structure and Influence. Statistical Models
for the Dynamics of Actor Attributes, Network Structure, and their Interde-
pendence. Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
29. Beate Vo¨lker, (1995). Should Auld Acquaintance Be Forgot. . . ? Institutions
of Communism, the Transition to Capitalism and Personal Networks: the
Case of East Germany. Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
30. A. Cancrinus Matthijsse, (1995). Tussen hulpverlening en ondernemerschap.
Beroepsuitoefening en taakopvattingen van openbare apothekers in een aantal
West-Europese landen. Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
31. Nardi Steverink, (1996). Zo lang mogelijk zelfstandig. Naar een verklaring
209
van verschillen in orie¨ntatie ten aanzien van opname in een verzorgingstehuis
onder fysiek kwetsbare ouderen. Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
32. Ellen Lindeman, (1996). Participatie in vrijwilligerswerk. Amsterdam: Thesis
Publishers.
33. Chris Snijders, (1996). Trust and Commitments. Amsterdam: Thesis Pub-
lishers.
34. Koos Postma, (1996). Changing Prejudice in Hungary. A Study on the
Collapse of State Socialism and Its Impact on Prejudice Against Gypsies and
Jews. Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
35. Jooske T. van Busschbach, (1996). Uit het oog, uit het hart? Stabiliteit en
verandering in persoonlijke relaties. Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
36. Rene´ Torenvlied, (1996). Besluiten in uitvoering. Theoriee¨n over beleid-
suitvoering modelmatig getoetst op sociale vernieuwing in drie gemeenten.
Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
37. Andreas Flache, (1996). The Double Edge of Networks. An Analysis of the
Eﬀect of Informal Networks on Cooperation in Social Dilemmas. Amsterdam:
Thesis Publishers.
38. Kees van Veen, (1997). Inside an Internal Labor Market: Formal Rules,
Flexibility and Career Lines in a Dutch Manufacturing Company. Amsterdam:
Thesis Publishers.
39. Lucienne van Eijk, (1997). Activity and Well-being in the Elderly. Amsterdam:
Thesis Publishers.
40. Ro´bert Ga´l, (1997). Unreliability. Contract Discipline and Contract Gover-
nance under Economic Transition. Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
41. Anne Geerte van de Goor, (1997). Eﬀects of Regulation on Disability Duration.
ICS dissertation, Utrecht.
42. Boris Blumberg, (1997). Das Management von Technologiekooperationen.
Partnersuche und Verhandlungen mit dem Partner aus Empirisch Theoretis-
cher Perspektive. ICS dissertation, Utrecht.
43. Marijke von Bergh, (1997). Loopbanen van oudere werknemers. Amsterdam:
Thesis Publishers.
44. Anna Petra Nieboer, (1997). Life-Events and Well-Being: A Prospective
Study on Changes in Well-Being of Elderly People Due to a Serious Illness
Event or Death of the Spouse. Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
45. Jacques Niehof, (1997). Resources and Social Reproduction: The Eﬀects of
Cultural and Material Resources on Educational and Occupational Careers
in Industrial Nations at the End of the Twentieth Century. ICS dissertation,
Nijmegen.
46. Ariana Need, (1997). The Kindred Vote. Individual and Family Eﬀects of
Social Class and Religion on Electoral Change in the Netherlands, 1956-1994.
ICS dissertation, Nijmegen.
47. Jim Allen, (1997). Sector Composition and the Eﬀect of Education on Wages:
an International Comparison. Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
48. Jack B.F. Hutten, (1998). Workload and Provision of Care in General Practice.
An Empirical Study of the Relation Between Workload of Dutch General
Practitioners and the Content and Quality of their Care. ICS dissertation,
Utrecht.
49. Per B. Kropp, (1998). Berufserfolg im Transformationsprozeß. Eine the-
oretisch empirische Studie u¨ber die Gewinner und Verlierer der Wende in
210 8. ICS DISSERTATION SERIES
Ostdeutschland. ICS dissertation, Utrecht.
50. Maarten H.J. Wolbers, (1998). Diploma-inflatie en verdringing op de arbeids-
markt. Een studie naar ontwikkelingen in de opbrengsten van diploma’s in
Nederland. ICS dissertation, Nijmegen.
51. Wilma Smeenk, (1998). Opportunity and Marriage. The Impact of Individual
Resources and Marriage Market Structure on First Marriage Timing and
Partner Choice in the Netherlands. ICS dissertation, Nijmegen.
52. Marinus Spreen, (1999). Sampling Personal Network Structures: Statistical
Inference in Ego-Graphs. ICS dissertation, Groningen.
53. Vincent Buskens, (1999). Social Networks and Trust. ICS dissertation,
Utrecht.
54. Susanne Rijken, (1999). Educational Expansion and Status Attainment. A
Cross-National and Over-Time Comparison. ICS dissertation, Utrecht.
55. Me´rove Gijsberts, (1999). The Legitimation of Inequality in State-Socialist
and Market Societies, 1987-1996. ICS dissertation, Utrecht.
56. Gerhard G. Van de Bunt, (1999). Friends by Choice. An Actor-Oriented
Statistical Network Model for Friendship Networks Through Time. ICS disser-
tation, Groningen.
57. Robert Thomson, (1999). The Party Mandate: Election Pledges and Govern-
ment Actions in the Netherlands, 1986-1998. Amsterdam: Thela Thesis.
58. Corine Baarda, (1999). Politieke besluiten en boeren beslissingen. Het
draagvlak van het mestbeleid tot 2000. ICS dissertation, Groningen.
59. Rafael Wittek, (1999). Interdependence and Informal Control in Organiza-
tions. ICS dissertation, Groningen.
60. Diane Payne, (1999). Policy-Making in the European Union: an Analysis of
the Impact of the Reform of the Structural Funds in Ireland. ICS dissertation,
Groningen.
61. Rene´ Veenstra, (1999). Leerlingen - Klassen - Scholen. Prestaties en vorderin-
gen van leerlingen in het voortgezet onderwijs. Amsterdam, Thela Thesis.
62. Marjolein Achterkamp, (1999). Influence Strategies in Collective Decision
Making. A Comparison of Two Models. ICS dissertation, Groningen.
63. Peter Mu¨hlau, (2000). The Governance of the Employment Relation. A
Relational Signaling Perspective. ICS dissertation, Groningen.
64. Agnes Akkerman, (2000). Verdeelde vakbeweging en stakingen. Concurrentie
om leden. ICS dissertation, Groningen.
65. Sandra van Thiel, (2000). Quangocratization: Trends, Causes and Conse-
quences. ICS dissertation, Utrecht.
66. Rudi Turksema, (2000). Supply of Day Care. ICS dissertation, Utrecht.
67. Sylvia E. Korupp (2000). Mothers and the Process of Social Stratification.
ICS dissertation, Utrecht.
68. Bernard A. Nijstad (2000). How the Group Aﬀects the Mind: Eﬀects of
Communication in Idea Generating Groups. ICS dissertation, Utrecht.
69. Inge F. de Wolf (2000). Opleidingsspecialisatie en arbeidsmarktsucces van
sociale wetenschappers. ICS dissertation, Utrecht.
70. Jan Kratzer (2001). Communication and Performance: An Empirical Study
in Innovation Teams. ICS-dissertation, Groningen.
71. Madelon Kroneman (2001). Healthcare Systems and Hospital Bed Use.
ICS/NIVEL-dissertation, Utrecht.
72. Herman van de Werfhorst (2001). Field of Study and Social Inequality.
211
Four Types of Educational Resources in the Process of Stratification in the
Netherlands. ICS-dissertation, Nijmegen.
73. Tama´s Bartus (2001). Social Capital and Earnings Inequalities. The Role of
Informal Job Search in Hungary. ICS-dissertation Groningen.
74. Hester Moerbeek (2001). Friends and Foes in the Occupational Career. The
Influence of Sweet and Sour Social Capital on the Labour Market. ICS-
dissertation, Nijmegen.
75. Marcel van Assen (2001). Essays on Actor Perspectives in Exchange Networks
and Social Dilemmas. ICS-dissertation, Groningen.
76. Inge Sieben (2001). Sibling Similarities and Social Stratification. The Im-
pact of Family Background across Countries and Cohorts. ICS-dissertation,
Nijmegen.
77. Alinda van Bruggen (2001). Individual Production of Social Well-Being. An
Exploratory Study. ICS-dissertation, Groningen.
78. Marcel Coenders (2001). Nationalistic Attitudes and Ethnic Exclusionism
in a Comparative Perspective: An Empirical Study of Attitudes Toward the
Country and Ethnic Immigrants in 22 Countries. ICS-dissertation, Nijmegen.
79. Marcel Lubbers (2001). Exclusionistic Electorates. Extreme Right-Wing
Voting in Western Europe. ICS-dissertation, Nijmegen.
80. Uwe Matzat (2001). Social Networks and Cooperation in Electronic Com-
munities. A theoretical-empirical Analysis of Academic Communication and
Internet Discussion Groups. ICS-dissertation, Groningen.
81. Jacques P.G. Janssen (2002). Do Opposites Attract Divorce? Dimensions of
Mixed Marriage and the Risk of Divorce in the Netherlands. ICS-dissertation,
Nijmegen.
82. Miranda Jansen (2002). Waardenorie¨ntaties en partnerrelaties. Een panel-
studie naar wederzijdse invloeden. ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
83. Anne Rigt Poortman (2002). Socioeconomic Causes and Consequences of
Divorce. ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
84. Alexander Gattig (2002). Intertemporal Decision Making. ICS-dissertation,
Groningen.
85. Gerrit Rooks (2002). Contract en Conflict: Strategisch Management van
Inkooptransacties. ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
86. Ka´roly Taka´cs (2002). Social Networks and Intergroup Conflict. ICS-
dissertation, Groningen.
87. Thomas Gautschi (2002). Trust and Exchange, Eﬀects of Temporal Embed-
dedness and Network Embeddedness on Providing and Dividing a Surplus.
ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
88. Hilde Bras (2002). Zeeuwse meiden. Dienen in de levensloop van vrouwen,
ca. 1850 - 1950. Aksant Academic Publishers, Amsterdam.
89. Merijn Rengers (2002). Economic Lives of Artists. Studies into Careers and
the Labour Market in the Cultural Sector. ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
90. Annelies Kassenberg (2002). Wat scholieren bindt. Sociale gemeenschap in
scholen. ICS-dissertation, Groningen
91. Marc Verboord (2003). Moet de meester dalen of de leerling klimmen? De
invloed van literatuuronderwijs en ouders op het lezen van boeken tussen 1975
en 2000. ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
92. Marcel van Egmond (2003). Rain Falls on All of Us (but Some Manage to
Get More Wet than Others): Political Context and Electoral Participation.
212 8. ICS DISSERTATION SERIES
ICS-dissertation, Nijmegen.
93. Justine Horgan (2003). High Performance Human Resource Management in
Ireland and the Netherlands: Adoption and Eﬀectiveness. ICS-dissertation,
Groningen.
94. Corine Hoeben (2003). LETS’ Be a Community. Community in Local
Exchange Trading Systems. ICS-dissertation, Groningen.
95. Christian Steglich (2003). The Framing of Decision Situations. Automatic
Goal Selection and Rational Goal Pursuit. ICS-dissertation, Groningen.
96. Johan van Wilsem (2003). Crime and Context. The Impact of Individual,
Neighborhood, City and Country Characteristics on Victimization. ICS-
dissertation, Nijmegen.
97. Christiaan Monden (2003). Education, Inequality and Health. The Impact of
Partners and Life Course. ICS-dissertation, Nijmegen.
98. Evelyn Hello (2003). Educational Attainment and Ethnic Attitudes. How to
Explain their Relationship. ICS-dissertation, Nijmegen.
99. Marnix Croes en Peter Tammes (2004). Gif laten wij niet voortbestaan. Een
onderzoek naar de overlevingskansen van joden in de Nederlandse gemeenten,
1940-1945. Aksant Academic Publishers, Amsterdam
100. Ineke Nagel (2004). Cultuurdeelname in de levensloop. ICS- dissertation,
Utrecht.
101. Marieke van der Wal (2004). Competencies to Participate in Life. Measure-
ment and the Impact of School. ICS-dissertation, Groningen.
102. Vivian Meertens (2004). Depressive Symptoms in the General Population: a
Multifactorial Social Approach. ICS -dissertation, Nijmegen.
103. Hanneke Schuurmans (2004). Promoting Well-Being in Frail Elderly People.
Theory and Intervention. ICS-dissertation, Groningen.
104. Javier Arregui (2004). Negotiation in Legislative Decision-Making in the
European Union. ICS-dissertation, Groningen.
105. Tamar Fischer (2004). Parental Divorce, Conflict and Resources. The Eﬀects
on Children’s Behaviour Problems, Socioeconomic Attainment, and Transitions
in the Demographic Career. ICS-dissertation, Nijmegen.
106. Rene´ Bekkers (2004). Giving and Volunteering in the Netherlands: Sociological
and Psychological Perspectives. ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
107. Rene´e van der Hulst (2004). Gender Diﬀerences in Workplace Authority: An
Empirical Study on Social Networks. ICS-dissertation, Groningen.
108. Rita Smaniotto (2004). ’You Scratch My Back and I Scratch Yours’ Versus
’Love Thy Neighbour’. Two Proximate Mechanisms of Reciprocal Altruism.
ICS-dissertation, Groningen.
109. Maurice Gesthuizen (2004). The Life-Course of the Low-Educated in the
Netherlands: Social and Economic Risks. ICS-dissertation, Nijmegen.
110. Carlijne Philips (2005). Vakantiegemeenschappen. Kwalitatief en Kwantitatief
Onderzoek naar Gelegenheid en Refreshergemeenschap tijdens de Vakantie.
ICS-dissertation, Groningen.
111. Esther de Ruijter (2005). Household Outsourcing. ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
112. Frank van Tubergen (2005). The Integration of Immigrants in Cross-National
Perspective: Origin, Destination, and Community Eﬀects. ICS-dissertation,
Utrecht.
113. Ferry Koster (2005). For the Time Being. Accounting for Inconclusive
Findings Concerning the Eﬀects of Temporary Employment Relationships on
213
Solidary Behavior of Employees. ICS-dissertation, Groningen.
114. Carolien Klein Haarhuis (2005). Promoting Anti-Corruption Reforms. Evalu-
ating the Implementation of a World Bank Anti-Corruption Program in Seven
African Countries (1999-2001). ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
115. Martin van der Gaag (2005). Measurement of Individual Social Capital.
ICS-dissertation, Groningen.
116. Johan Hansen (2005). Shaping Careers of Men and Women in Organizational
Contexts. ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
117. Davide Barrera (2005). Trust in Embedded Settings. ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
118. Mattijs Lambooij (2005). Promoting Cooperation. Studies into the Eﬀects
of Long-Term and Short-Term Rewards on Cooperation of Employees. ICS-
dissertation, Utrecht.
119. Lotte Vermeij (2006). What’s Cooking? Cultural Boundaries among Dutch
Teenagers of Diﬀerent Ethnic Origins in the Context of School. ICS-dissertation,
Utrecht.
120. Mathilde Strating (2006). Facing the Challenge of Rheumatoid Arthritis. A
13-year Prospective Study among Patients and Cross-Sectional Study among
Their Partners. ICS-dissertation, Groningen.
121. Jannes de Vries (2006). Measurement Error in Family Background Vari-
ables: The Bias in the Intergenerational Transmission of Status, Cultural
Consumption, Party Preference, and Religiosity. ICS-dissertation, Nijmegen.
122. Stefan Thau (2006). Workplace Deviance: Four Studies on Employee Motives
and Self-Regulation. ICS-dissertation, Groningen.
123. Mirjam Plantinga (2006). Employee Motivation and Employee Performance
in Child Care. The eﬀects of the Introduction of Market Forces on Employees
in the Dutch Child-Care Sector. ICS-dissertation, Groningen.
124. Helga de Valk (2006). Pathways into Adulthood. A Comparative Study on
Family Life Transitions among Migrant and Dutch Youth. ICS-dissertation,
Utrecht.
125. Henrike Elzen (2006). Self-Management for Chronically Ill Older People.
ICS-Dissertation, Groningen.
126. Ayse Gu¨veli (2007). New Social Classes within the Service Class in the
Netherlands and Britain. Adjusting the EGP Class Schema for the Technocrats
and the Social and Cultural Specialists. ICS-dissertation, Nijmegen.
127. Willem-Jan Verhoeven (2007). Income Attainment in Post-Communist Soci-
eties. ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
128. Marieke Voorpostel (2007). Sibling support: The Exchange of Help among
Brothers and Sisters in the Netherlands. ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
129. Jacob Dijkstra (2007). The Eﬀects of Externalities on Partner Choice and
Payoﬀs in Exchange Networks. ICS-dissertation, Groningen.
130. Patricia van Echtelt (2007). Time-Greedy Employment Relationships: Four
Studies on the Time Claims of Post-Fordist Work. ICS-dissertation, Gronin-
gen.
131. Sonja Vogt (2007). Heterogeneity in Social Dilemmas: The Case of Social
Support. ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
132. Michael Schweinberger (2007). Statistical Methods for Studying the Evolution
of Networks and Behavior. ICS-dissertation, Groningen.
133. Istva´n Back (2007). Commitment and Evolution: Connecting Emotion and
Reason in Long-term Relationships. ICS-dissertation, Groningen.
214 8. ICS DISSERTATION SERIES
134. Ruben van Gaalen (2007). Solidarity and Ambivalence in Parent-Child Rela-
tionships. ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
135. Jan Reitsma (2007). Religiosity and Solidarity - Dimensions and Relationships
Disentangled and Tested. ICS-dissertation, Nijmegen.
136. Jan Kornelis Dijkstra (2007). Status and Aﬀection among (Pre)Adolescents
and Their Relation with Antisocial and Prosocial Behavior. ICS-dissertation,
Groningen.
137. Wouter van Gils (2007). Full-time Working Couples in the Netherlands.
Causes and Consequences. ICS-dissertation, Nijmegen.
138. Djamila Schans (2007). Ethnic Diversity in Intergenerational Solidarity.
ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
139. Ruud van der Meulen (2007). Brug over Woelig Water: Lidmaatschap
van Sportverenigingen, Vriendschappen, Kennissenkringen en Veralgemeend
Vertrouwen. ICS-dissertation, Nijmegen.
140. Andrea Knecht (2008). Friendship Selection and Friends’ Influence. Dynamics
of Networks and Actor Attributes in Early Adolescence. ICS-dissertation,
Utrecht.
141. Ingrid Doorten (2008). The Division of Unpaid Work in the Household: A
Stubborn Pattern? ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
142. Stijn Ruiter (2008). Association in Context and Association as Context:
Causes and Consequences of Voluntary Association Involvement. ICS-dissertation,
Nijmegen.
143. Janneke Joly (2008). People on Our Minds: When Humanized Contexts
Activate Social Norms. ICS-dissertation, Groningen.
144. Margreet Frieling (2008). ‘Joint production’ als motor voor actief burgerschap
in de buurt. ICS-dissertion, Groningen.
145. Ellen Verbakel (2008). The Partner as Resource or Restriction? Labour
Market Careers of Husbands and Wives and the Consequences for Inequality
Between Couples. ICS-dissertation, Nijmegen.
146. Gijs van Houten (2008). Beleidsuitvoering in gelaagde stelsels. De doorwerking
van aanbevelingen van de Stichting van de Arbeid in het CAO-overleg. ICS-
dissertation, Utrecht.
147. Eva Jaspers (2008). Intolerance over Time. Macro and Micro Level Questions
on Attitudes Towards Euthanasia, Homosexuality and Ethnic Minorities.
ICS-dissertation, Nijmegen.
148. Gijs Weijters (2008). Youth Delinquency in Dutch Cities and Schools: A
Multilevel Approach. ICS-dissertation, Nijmegen.
149. Jessica Pass (2009). The Self in Social Rejection. ICS-dissertation, Groningen.
150. Gerald Mollenhorst (2009). Networks in Contexts. How Meeting Opportunities
Aﬀect Personal Relationships. ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
151. Tom van der Meer (2009). States of Freely Associating Citizens: Comparative
Studies into the Impact of State Institutions on Social, Civic and Political
Participation. ICS-dissertation, Nijmegen.
152. Manuela Vieth (2009). Commitments and Reciprocity in Trust Situations.
Experimental Studies on Obligation, Indignation, and Self-Consistency. ICS-
dissertation, Utrecht.
153. Rense Corten (2009). Co-evolution of Social Networks and Behavior in Social
Dilemmas: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives. ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
154. Arieke J. Rijken (2009). Happy Families, High Fertility? Childbearing Choices
215
in the Context of Family and Partner Relationships. ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
155. Jochem Tolsma (2009). Ethnic Hostility among Ethnic Majority and Minority
Groups in the Netherlands. An Investigation into the Impact of Social Mobility
Experiences, the Local Living Environment and Educational Attainment on
Ethnic Hostility. ICS-dissertation, Nijmegen.
156. Freek Bucx (2009). Linked Lives: Young Adults’ Life Course and Relations
With Parents. ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
157. Philip Wotschack (2009). Household Governance and Time Allocation. Four
studies on the combination of work and care. ICS-dissertation, Groningen.
158. Nienke Moor (2009). Explaining Worldwide Religious Diversity. The Rela-
tionship between Subsistence Technologies and Ideas about the Unknown in
Pre-industrial and (Post-)industrial Societies. ICS-dissertation, Nijmegen.
159. Lieke ten Brummelhuis (2009). Family Matters at Work. Depleting and
Enriching Eﬀects of Employees’ Family lives on Work Outcomes. ICS-
dissertation, Utrecht.
160. Renske Keizer (2010). Remaining Childless. Causes and Consequences from
a Life Course Perspective. ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
161. Miranda Sentse (2010). Bridging Contexts: The interplay between Family,
Child, and Peers in Explaining Problem Behavior in Early Adolescence. ICS-
dissertation, Groningen.
162. Nicole Tieben (2010). Transitions, Tracks and Transformations. Social
Inequality in Transitions into, through and out of Secondary Education in
the Netherlands for Cohorts Born Between 1914 and 1985. ICS-dissertation,
Nijmegen.
163. Birgit Pauksztat (2010). Speaking up in Organizations: Four Studies on
Employee Voice. ICS-dissertation, Groningen.
164. Richard Zijdeman (2010). Status Attainment in the Netherlands, 1811-1941.
Spatial and Temporal Variation Before and During Industrialization. ICS-
dissertation, Utrecht.
165. Rianne Kloosterman (2010). Social Background and Children’s Educational
Careers. The Primary and Secondary Eﬀects of Social Background over
Transitions and over Time in the Netherlands. ICS-dissertation, Nijmegen.
166. Olav Aarts (2010). Religious Diversity and Religious Involvement. A Study of
Religious Markets in Western Societies at the End of the Twentieth Century.
ICS-dissertation, Nijmegen.
167. Stephanie Wiesmann (2010). 24/7 Negotiation in Couples Transition to
Parenthood. ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
168. Borja Martinovic (2010). Interethnic Contacts: A Dynamic Analysis of
Interaction Between Immigrants and Natives in Western Countries. ICS-
dissertation, Utrecht.
169. Anne Roeters (2010). Family Life Under Pressure? Parents’ Paid Work and
the Quantity and Quality of Parent-Child and Family Time. ICS-dissertation,
Utrecht.
170. Jelle Sijtsema (2010). Adolescent Aggressive Behavior: Status and Stimulation
Goals in Relation to the Peer Context. ICS-dissertation, Groningen.
171. Kees Keizer (2010). The Spreading of Disorder. ICS-dissertation, Groningen.
172. Michael Ma¨s (2010). The Diversity Puzzle. Explaining Clustering and Polar-
ization of Opinions. ICS-dissertation, Groningen.
173. Marie-Louise Damen (2010). Cultuurdeelname en CKV. Studies naar eﬀecten
216 8. ICS DISSERTATION SERIES
van kunsteducatie op de cultuurdeelname van leerlingen tijdens en na het
voortgezet onderwijs. ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
174. Marieke van de Rakt (2011). Two generations of Crime: The Intergenerational
Transmission of Convictions over the Life Course. ICS-dissertation, Nijmegen.
175. Willem Huijnk (2011). Family Life and Ethnic Attitudes. The Role of
the Family for Attitudes Towards Intermarriage and Acculturation Among
Minority and Majority Groups. ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
176. Tim Huijts (2011). Social Ties and Health in Europe. Individual Associations,
Cross-National Variations, and Contextual Explanations. ICS-dissertation,
Nijmegen.
177. Wouter Steenbeek (2011). Social and Physical Disorder. How Community,
Business Presence and Entrepreneurs Influence Disorder in Dutch Neighbor-
hoods. ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
178. Miranda Vervoort (2011). Living Together Apart? Ethnic Concentration
in the Neighborhood and Ethnic Minorities’ Social Contacts and Language
Practices. ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
179. Agnieszka Kanas (2011).The Economic Performance of Immigrants. The Role
of Human and Social Capital. ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
180. Lea Ellwardt (2011). Gossip in Organizations. A Social Network Study.
ICS-dissertation, Groningen.
181. Annemarije Oosterwaal (2011). The Gap between Decision and Implemen-
tation. Decision making, Delegation and Compliance in Governmental and
Organizational Settings. ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
182. Natascha Notten (2011). Parents and the Media. Causes and Consequences
of Parental Media Socialization. ICS-dissertation, Nijmegen.
183. Tobias Stark (2011). Integration in Schools. A Process Perspective on Stu-
dents’ Interethnic Attitudes and Interpersonal Relationships. ICS-dissertation,
Groningen.
184. Giedo Jansen (2011). Social Cleavages and Political Choices. Large-scale
Comparisons of Social Class, Religion and Voting Behavior in Western Democ-
racies. ICS-dissertation, Nijmegen.
185. Ruud van der Horst (2011). Network Eﬀects on Treatment Results in a Closed
Forensic Psychiatric Setting. ICS-dissertation, Groningen.
186. Mark Levels (2011). Abortion Laws in European Countries between 1960
and 2010. Legislative Developments and Their Consequences for Women’s
Reproductive Decision-making. ICS-dissertation, Nijmegen.
187. Marieke van Londen (2012). Exclusion of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands.
The eﬀects of individual and situational characteristics on opposition to ethnic
policy and ethnically mixed neighbourhoods. ICS-dissertation, Nijmegen.
188. Sigrid M. Mohnen (2012). Neighborhood context and health: How neighborhood
social capital aﬀects individual health. ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
189. Asya Zhelyazkova (2012). Compliance under Controversy: Analysis of the
Transposition of European Directives and their Provisions. ICS-dissertation,
Utrecht.
190. Valeska Korﬀ (2012). Between Cause and Control: Management in a Human-
itarian Organization. ICS-dissertation, Groningen.
191. Maike Gieling (2012). Dealing with Diversity: adolescents’ support for civil
liberties and immigrant rights. ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
192. Katya Ivanova (2012). From Parents to Partners: The Impact of Family
217
on Romantic Relationships in Adolescence and Emerging Adulthood. ICS-
dissertation, Groningen.
193. Jelmer Schalk (2012). The Performance of Public Corporate Actors: Essays on
Eﬀects of Institutional and Network Embeddedness in Supranational, National,
and Local Collaborative Contexts. ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
194. Alona Labun (2012). Social Networks and Informal Power in Organizations.
ICS-dissertation, Groningen.
195. Michal Bojanowski (2012). Essays on Social Network Formation in Het-
erogeneous Populations: Models, Methods, and Empirical Analyses. ICS-
dissertation, Utrecht.
196. Anca Minescu (2012). Relative Group Position and Intergroup Attitudes in
Russia. ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
197. Marieke van Schellen (2012). Marriage and crime over the life course. The
criminal careers of convicts and their spouses. ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
198. Mieke Maliepaard (2012). Religious Trends and Social Integration: Muslim
Minorities in the Netherlands. ICS-dissertation, Utrecht.
199. Fransje Smits (2012). Turks and Moroccans in the Low Countries around the
year 2000: determinants of religiosity, trend in religiosity and determinants
of the trend. ICS-dissertation, Nijmegen.
200. Roderick Sluiter (2012). The Diﬀusion of Morality Policies among Western
European Countries between 1960 and 2010. A Comparison of Temporal and
Spatial Diﬀusion Patterns of Six Morality and Eleven Non-morality Policies.
ICS-dissertation, Nijmegen.
